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Local law enforcement is the first line of
defense to counterterrorism in the United States. The task of recognizing
and identifying terrorists in the local jurisdiction is, however,
challenging. While law enforcement officers are trained to respond to
suicide bomb attacks or other terrorist events, little training and few
resources are available for the preventative and preemptive side of
security work. Preemption is controversial and carries inherent risk.
However, it may also prove to be the most effective form of protection in
the frenetic and ambiguous world of terrorism,[1] and so the question remains: What are the flags and
indicators that suggest someone is involved in terrorism-related
activities?
Developing an understanding of basic linguistic
patterns can assist officers to identify extremists in their territory
prior to rather than after an attack. Familiarity with terrorists'
linguistic indicators—when combined with simple interview and field
interrogation techniques—can help law enforcement to identify militant
believers. Linguistic analysis follows a two-pronged approach, looking at
phraseology and recurrent themes. Indeed, surveys of twelve important
Islamist documents, fifty-eight Al-Qaeda statements, and the Hamas
charter, show consistent reference to eight themes and eight texts. Of the
seventy statements analyzed, all were originally in the Arabic
language, excluding the Hamas Charter, which is readily accessible
in English.
Background
Radical Muslims worldwide respond to
fatwas and other calls for action by iconic leaders. For example,
in a February 23, 1998 statement, Osama bin Laden declared, "To kill the
Americans and their allies, civilians and military, is an individual duty
for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to
do it, in order to liberate Al-Aqsa Mosque [in Jerusalem] and the holy
mosque [in Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move
out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any
Muslim."[2] Shortly afterwards, his
followers detonated two truck bombs outside the U.S. embassies in Nairobi
and Dar-es-Salaam, killing 257 and injuring more than 5,000. Bin Laden is
not alone in inciting followers to terrorism. His lieutenant Ayman
al-Zawahiri and Los Angeles-born aide Adam Gadahn regularly issue messages
calling followers to jihad or issuing demands for surrender.
Many Americans may write off figures such as
bin Laden, Zawahiri, or Gadahn as psychopaths. Law enforcement officers
may see them as criminals inciting violence. To the violent Islamist,
however, whether they are financiers, empathizers, or potential suicide
bombers, these individuals are recognized as spiritual advisors who convey
God's word. Too often, U.S. authorities neglect the impact verbal
statements make in the world of Islamic militancy.
To the average American, the Arabic language is
just another foreign language. To Muslims, however, it is the language of
God. Islamic culture places a premium on literary expression.[3] The inherent power of the Arabic
language within the culture amplifies the import and power of the
fatwas issued by individual radical scholars to potential
jihadists. While Islamist advocacy groups argue that jihad is a peaceful,
internal struggle, many classical Muslim theologians as well as today's
radicals understand it to mean holy war. Michael Bonner, a professor of
medieval Islamic history at the University of Michigan, explains:
Most accounts of the jihad agree that it has
both an external and an internal aspect. The external jihad is an
activity in the world, involving physical combat against real enemies in
real time … Most modern Western writings on the jihad consider that the
external jihad, the physical combat against real adversaries, was the
first to arrive in history and has priority in most ways. In this view,
the internal jihad, the spiritualized combat against the self, is
secondary and derivative, despite all the importance it eventually
acquired in Muslim thought and society.[4]
Indeed, most comprehensive compilations of
Islamic law and hadith (sayings and actions of Muhammad) contain
sections on jihad, often describing it in the violent sense. To the
militant, it does not matter how advocacy groups or media networks define
jihad. What matters is what teachers and philosophers believe. Here, the
militant will find much to support his views. Muhammad bin Isma'il
al-Bukhari (810-70), the most famous compiler of hadith, dedicated
one-third of his fourth volume to jihad as physical holy war.
While U.S. authorities often defer judgment on
jihad in response to some advocates who say that true jihad is not
violent, extremists adhere closely to the teachings of radical scholars.
Taqi al-Din Ahmad Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328) provides inspiration for many
Sunni radicals, notably the Salafis. So, too, does Muhammad ibn 'Abdul
Wahhab an-Najdi (1703-92). More recently, Syed Abul A'la Maududi (1903-79)
argued, "The objective of Islamic jihad is to eliminate the rule of an
un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state
rule."[5] Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), an
important Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood ideologue, said,
It is not the function of Islam to compromise
the concepts of Jahiliya [pre-Islamic ignorance or barbarism extended to
the present day] which are current in the world or to coexist in the
same land together with a jahili (barbaric) system. Jahiliya, to
whatever period it belongs, is jahiliya; that is, deviation from the
worship of one Allah and the way of life prescribed by Allah.[6]
Street level police officers should recognize
that such historical references remain significant; the commentaries of
Bukhari, Ibn Taymiya, Maududi, and Qutb provide a baseline understanding
as to jihad's motivation or justification. Islamist believers utilize
these scholars and the standard Islamic texts, the Qur'an and the
hadith collections, as part of their daily justification for
attacks in the name of Islam.
These references are also significant for the
operational value of the linguistic themes. Islamist theologians and
terrorist leaders often use common linguistic themes. Terrorists provide
overt indicators of extremism, often unintentionally and subconsciously.
There are only so many variations upon the radical theme. Moderate Muslims
and those without violent propensities and understandings of jihad may
refer to some of the same texts—certainly the Qur'an and Bukhari—but
seldom in the same context or in conjunction with other linguistic
indicators of radicalism. Militant exegesis appears to be significant as a
first indicator of a puritanical belief system. While some common
references between moderates and radicals may lead to occasional
confusion, such uncertainty can be resolved within the context of the
breadth of investigative capacity.
Linguistic Determinants of Militancy
U.S. law enforcement officials and concerned
citizens can benefit from awareness that moderate Muslims do not use the
same linguistic patterns and references as Islamic radicals. A basic
understanding of the linguistic patterns of militancy coupled with an
investigator's normal interviewing techniques can assist in determining an
individual's ideology and religiosity. With a general understanding of
these techniques, the individual officer or agent can better evaluate on
close to a quantitative basis the flags and indicators of those
individuals potentially involved in terrorist activities.
Susan H. Adams, a retired FBI agent who has
focused much research in the field of evaluating veracity and deception in
criminal statements, argues that statement analysis can be an important
investigative tool and should also aid law enforcement interviewing
approaches. If such analysis is effective in criminal cases, then it can
be useful in counterterrorism as well. While many terrorists and militants
may seek to cloak their beliefs as they infiltrate society, Adams shows
that, nevertheless, linguistic behavior is subliminal.[7] All but the most professional terrorists may have
difficulty hiding their radicalism. Word choice matters.
Statements from bin Laden, Zawahiri, and Gadahn
provide a useful baseline, albeit one that can be expanded by sampling the
statements of other terrorist leaders. Bin Laden and Zawahiri continue to
employ periodic statements calling for continued global jihad and
justifying attacks in the name of Islam, which Gadahn also reworks for an
American audience.
Four statements from each of the three
individuals were analyzed to evaluate the factors of phraseology and
recurrent common themes.[8] Common
themes and phraseology in these statements are limited, a finding
consistent with those of James W. Pennebaker and Cindy K. Chung,
psychologists who have carried out a computerized text analysis of
Al-Qaeda transcripts evaluating the linguistic and content-related styles
of both bin Laden and Zawahiri.[9]
Osama bin Laden's statements are consistent in
theme and phraseology even if the news hook accompanying each audio or
videotape may differ. Bin Laden focuses his content on the United States
and its allies and provides absolute statements ostensibly accepted by the
mainstream Islamic community, although he appears to construct these
statements carefully to reach different constituencies.[10] Table 1 outlines bin Laden's phraseology and
themes.
Bin Laden blends politics and theology.
Catalyzing each statement is a noteworthy event such as a political
campaign, a shift or attack in either Iraq or Afghanistan, or the
publishing of cartoons about Muhammad in a Danish newspaper. A
disorganized treatise sprinkled with unvarying phrases and themes often
follows each statement. Analysis reveals an air of insecurity and a belief
in conspiracy. Phrases aimed to "convince" rather than "convey" are
replete throughout the texts. Bin Laden attempts to convince the Muslim
people as well as American citizens to rise up and question their rulers.
Some of the phraseology reveals apparent "strain" as he presents his case
against certain regimes. He also appears to exploit the Islamic texts to
justify his arguments, often in the context of admonishing Muslims not to
disobey God. He further attempts to argue that the "apostate governments"
have worshipped others apart from God, which would constitute
shirk.
Zawahiri, bin Laden's chief deputy, also uses a
number of consistent words and themes (see Table 2) to explain the
conditions that will end jihad against the West. These include repentance
to God, accepting Islam, implementing Islamic law, participating in jihad,
and finally, breaking apart the United States.
Gadahn has issued many lengthy statements, both
independently and jointly with Zawahiri, which together provide a sense of
common words and themes (see Table 3). While Gadahn may not be a household
name as are bin Laden or Zawahiri, he is important as a reflection of a
radical American convert who learned the language of jihad from Muslim
extremists. As such, he reflects the trickle-down theory that argues that
a radical Islamist is not always an extremist but learns militancy because
of the linguistic and ideological environment in which he is immersed.
The example of Gadahn brings home the reality
of radicalization regarding Western converts. Gadahn is an American who
stumbled onto Islam, was radicalized, and adopted the "language of jihad"
without effort. He also has learned the political and military intent of
the organization and virulently stands for the cause. As such, Gadahn will
sometimes provide a list of "demands" that in his estimation would lead to
the end of violent jihad against Western civilization, including the
withdrawal of all non-Muslims from Muslim lands, a termination of all aid
and support to "apostate" countries and Israel, allowing Muslims to
establish a pan-Islamic state, a cessation of any interference in
education and media in the Islamic world, and the freeing of all Muslim
prisoners.
Islamist terrorists often adapt consistent
themes and phrasing that they justify through Islamic text references (see
Table 4), which followers then use to justify terrorism. This does not
mean that the themes represent the content of certain Qur'anic verses, but
rather that they are interwoven throughout the text with provided Qur'anic
references.
In "Computerized Text Analysis of Al-Qaeda
Transcripts," Pennebaker and Chung examine fifty-eight Al-Qaeda
transcripts, looking specifically at statements made by bin Laden and
Zawahiri. While their findings focused on relational nuances and changes
between bin Laden and Zawahiri, their identification of high-frequency
words, the co-occurrence of words, pronouns, usage, and emotive words also
can enhance the understanding of word usage as a single indicator of
militancy. Pennebaker and Chung specifically focused on certain themes to
include the Islam/Israeli conflict (Factor 3) and geographical
co-occurrence (Factor 5). The words listed in Table 5 co-occurred often
with each other. Such findings reinforce the conclusion that the analyses
that sampled bin Laden's, Zawahiri's, and Gadahn's speeches are
representative.
The Hamas charter, like the Al-Qaeda leaders'
statements, uses an Islamist patina to justify the group's actions.
Article III, for example, reads, "In all that, they fear God and raise the
banner of jihad in the face of the oppressors, so that they would rid the
land and the people of their uncleanliness, vileness, and evils." Article
VIII states that "God is its target, the Prophet is its model, the Qur'an
its constitution: Jihad is its path, and death for the sake of God is the
loftiest of its wishes," and Article XIII argues that, "There is no
solution for the Palestinian question except through jihad. Initiatives,
proposals, and international conferences are all a waste of time and vain
endeavors. The Palestinian people know better than to consent to having
their future, rights, and fate toyed with."[11]
The Hamas charter and Al-Qaeda speeches enable
derivation of a template consisting of eight common words and nine common
themes that can aid law enforcement to identify Islamists who, if speaking
with candor, might be at risk of straying into terrorism.
Operationalizing Linguistic Indicators
The above analysis highlights eight common
words or variants and nine themes (see Table 6). Iconic believers may pick
and choose among such themes, but, regardless of how they dress their
treatise, such themes recur. Indeed, they are necessary to weave the
underlying logic of militancy. The primary tones are manipulative,
coercive, and sometimes threatening. In many of the statements, the
speaker talks about the Day of Judgment, God's favor, and His actions.
In an interview setting, interrogators
differentiate between the concepts of conveyance and convincing. When an
individual is unequivocally telling the truth about a particular incident,
he will "convey" the facts of the situation to the interrogator. In
general, if an individual is guilty or seeking to obfuscate information,
he will try to "convince" the interrogator of his innocence.
Islamist extremist tracts, whether they
sympathize with Al-Qaeda or Hamas, often try to convince rather than
convey. Potentially, this derives from the militant believers' intent to
convince those outside the extremist faction to follow their exclusionary
belief system. It may also be the result of a lack of assuredness in one's
own beliefs. Nevertheless, a factor of questionability appears present in
most of the militant statements evaluated. This, in turn, presents an
opportunity for the officer or agent who is interviewing a Muslim in their
community who may be conflicted about Islam. If they are not yet sold on
following the way of violent jihad, this may be an opportunity for the
officer to recruit him to assist law enforcement. Various Islamist
terrorists—including 9/11 hijackers Mohammad Atta and Ziad Jarrah—have
been conflicted in their belief systems in the past.[12]
Disambiguation, or establishing a single
semantic interpretation, is another common factor. Extremists provide
numerous statements leaving their audience with little doubt as to the
speaker's beliefs. There is no question that non-Muslims or those from
Western societies should be the primary target of jihad. These
nonbelievers are conceptually divided from the "true believers." This
transcends the remainder of the statements where comments are made
frequently about the unequivocal purity of Islamic law and how it should
be followed by all countries. Mujahideen, on the other hand, are those
that are fighting for Islam in the truest sense of the term. It is
essential that the officer or agent understand this binary thinking.
Listening for and recognizing this assumption in the interviewee's
comments may prove an important factor in trying to identify the
individual as a militant believer. Not only will the Islamist terrorist
see the world in black and white, but he may view the interrogator as a
nonbeliever and as a result carry out the interview in a certain manner.
Overall, the militant believer sees the world with no gray areas. (See
Table 7.)
In line with this binary associative thinking,
some in the psychoanalytical realm may relate this to the borderline
personality theory in which the patient "splits" everything in the world
they come into contact with into good and evil.[13] Although splitting may be a Western characteristic
of a psychological disorder, it cannot be concluded that all militant
Islamic believers have such a malady. Nevertheless, it is important for
the interrogator to recognize the modal characteristic as it may pertain
to the overall evaluation of a potential militant believer.
Conclusion
Investigators face a challenging compendium of
issues when countering terror. Techniques and approaches abound, yet it
little compares to the benefit of obtaining reliable information from an
individual within a certain community. Today, investigators find
themselves conducting interviews and interrogations in the Arab and
Islamic culture, which brings with it great challenges and nuances. One
technique to be utilized is that of listening for and identifying
indicators of Islamic militancy. As identified above, there are specific
themes and text words that are common among true militant believers.
Knowing what they are and listening for them may assist the investigator
in the totality of his investigation. Also, simply listening for various
Islamic texts and the references to them may be indicators as well for the
agent or officer.
Nevertheless, investigators should not limit
their statement analysis to studying those that are included in this paper
but should continue their evaluation of exegesis on a long-term basis. The
more knowledge and experience gained, the better prepared the investigator
will be to thwart terrorist activities and planning in his community.
Overall, if investigators work together, sharing knowledge and techniques
that are proven to be effective, a synergistic benefit will be realized
throughout the global war on terror.
Brig Barker is a supervisory special
agent in the FBI. The views expressed in this article are the author's
own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
Table 1: Bin Laden's Phrases and
Themes
| Text Words | Major Themes |
Crusaders Apostate governments Zionists Jihad Hypocrites Islamic state American agents Infidels Caliphate Duty Disobedience Counterpart with God (i.e., nothing can God's law Mujahideen Islamic awakening Crusader/Zionist control Grave sins Injustices Iniquities Tyranny Security Freedom | Occupation of Iraq Peaceful means/negotiations not an Establishment of an Islamic state Crusader war against the Islamic Palestine/Iraq/Afghanistan/Sudan/Somalia Learn from history's lessons Capable Muslims' duty to fight Time is fleeting/opportunity is now Do not disobey God's commands Abstaining from jihad is disobedience Apostate governments have left Islam Mujahideen are Islam's vanguard Apostate governments only act with U.S. Question Islamic country rulers Submission (complete) to God vs. secular U.S. president involved in |
Table 2: Zawahiri's Phrases and
Themes
Text Words | Major Themes |
Crusader-Zionist Materialistic crusader Infidel countries Mujahideen vanguards Ignorance Charlatans Religion-traders Occupation Banner of the Prophet Selling their blood Secular criminal regimes Raid (attack) | Depiction of support as attacks against Theft of Muslim oil Reject all agreements Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel Liberate Palestine Reject international resolutions Muslim nation is one nation Championing the cause of Muslims fighting Fighting should be based on Islamic Invitation to Islam Balfour Declaration Shari'a is God's |
Table 3: Gadahn's Phrases and Themes
Text Words | Major Themes |
Crusades Empire of evil Global crusade Crusader coalition Champions of Islam Defensive Jihad Zionist Jews Zionist Christians Occupied Palestine Baby killers War criminals Pawns Crusader domination Ignorance Uneducated Inquisition | Negotiations are not an option Demands must be met U.S. is on a death march Countries will run red with blood Evil nature of the U.S. Withdraw all non-Muslims from Muslim 56 apostate regimes Establish an Islamic state Unite Muslims Free Muslim captives Conflict between nation and religion Impeding the message/propagation of Israel slaughtering Muslims in Lebanon Islam is the religion chosen by God Qur'an abrogates the Torah and Gospels Islam is the final revealed religion, |
Table 4: Text Themes/Phraseology
Strength Steeds of war Fight the pagans Hypocrites People misled Obligatory Corruption Vanguard Occupiers Shari'a Liberate the homeland Oppression Suppression Fear God Day of Judgment Confronting the crusader war Mujahideen Fight for the faith Islam is the only acceptable religion to Abrogation of the Torah and Gospels One way to paradise Empty recitation without action Fear the coming day Deceivers No negotiation or |
Table 5: Factor 3 Words/Factor 5
Words
Crusade/Palestine |
Table 6: Common Words and Themes
Words and Variants | Themes |
Crusaders/infidels | Negotiations are not an option |
Zionists | Occupation of Muslim lands by |
Shari'a | Apostate governments |
Injustices/iniquities/materialistic | Mujahideen |
Ignorance (in terms of failure to | Obligation of every Muslim to carry out |
Islamic state | Western societies are evil by |
Jihad | Muslim prisoners must be freed |
Western policies | God chose Islam; all other religions are |
American support for |
Table 7: Militant Worldview
Topics | Option 1 | Option 2 |
Individuals | Muslims; following an exclusionary belief | Unbelievers; ignorant; oppressors; |
Nations | Dar al-Islam (the Realm of Islam): | Dar al Harb (the Realm of War, the |
Laws | Follow puritanical form of Shari'a | Corrupted by man |
Solution | Jihad against unbelievers | Negotiations not an option |
Religion | Islam is the religion selected by | All others are abrogated and |
Israel | Muslim land that is wrongly occupied; |
[1] K. Shiek
Pal, "Racial Profiling as a Preemptive Security Measure in the Post-9/11
World," Kennedy School Review, Spring 2005, pp. 119-29.
[2] Jeffrey Goldberg, "Inside Jihad U.; The
Education of a Holy Warrior," The New York Times, June 25,
2000.
[3] Raphael Patai, The Arab
Mind (New York: Hatherleigh Press, 2002), p. 51.
[4] Michael Bonner, Jihad in Islamic
History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 14.
[5] A.A. Maududi, Jihad
in Islam (Beirut: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 2006),
accessed Feb. 20, 2009.
[6] Sayyid
Qutb, "The Right to
Judge," quoted on IslamWorld.com, accessed Apr. 8, 2009.
[7] Susan H. Adams, "Statement Analysis: What Do
Suspects' Words Really Reveal?" FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin,
Oct. 1996.
[8] "Bin Laden's Speeches
2003-2006," Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Special
Dispatch, no. 1286,
Sept. 8, 2006; "Osama bin Laden," MEMRI, Special Dispatch, no. 838,
Dec. 30, 2004; "The Full Version of Osama bin Laden's Speech," MEMRI,
Special Dispatch, no. 811,
Nov. 5, 2004.
[9] James W.
Pennebaker and Cindy K. Chung, "Computerized Text Analysis
of Al-Qaeda Transcripts," in Klaus Krippendorff and Mary Angela Bock,
eds., A Content Analysis Reader (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage
Publications, Inc., 2008).
[10]
Denis McAuley, "The Ideology of Osama bin Laden: Nation, Tribe and World
Economy," Journal of Political Ideologies, Oct. 2005, pp.
269-87.
[11] "Hamas Covenant
1988," Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed Feb. 25, 2009.
[12] MSNBC, Nov.
24, 2008
[13] Marcia Kraft
Goin, M.D, "Borderline Personality Disorder: Splitting
Countertransference," Psychiatric Times, Nov. 1, 1998.
Related
Topics: Radical
Islam Summer 2009
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