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U.S. Policy Options in Syria
A briefing by Gary C. Gambill
February 27, 2012
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Gary Gambill holds a B.S. in mathematics from
the University of Wisconsin, Madison, an M.A. in Arab studies from Georgetown
University, and is A.B.D. from N.Y.U. He is a former editor of the Middle
East Intelligence Bulletin and the Middle East Monitor, a former employee
of the Middle East Forum, and is now an independent editor. Gambill has been
a country editor on Syria and Lebanon for Freedom House and has written
extensively on Syria and Lebanon. On February 27, 2012, he briefed the Middle
East Forum via conference call about US policy options in Syria.
Bashar Assad "can't win," Gambill
argued, because he now lacks the power to pacify his opposition—something he
had in abundance until last year. His position is made ever more tenuous by
his Alawite origin, viewed as heretical by Syria's majority Sunni population.
Gambill attributed the Assad regime's ability
to seize and hold power for forty-one years to several primary strengths.
First, it has established a brutal police state that slaughtered dissidents
by the thousands, notably in Hama in 1982 by Bashar's father, Hafez, and Homs
today. Second, it has been highly effective at penetrating all walks of
Syrian society. Third, its embrace of a virulently anti-Zionist and
anti-American foreign policy succeeded in both splitting the opposition and
lending it an aura of legitimacy. Fourth, both the West and the predominantly
Sunni Arab world have appeased Assad's regime and ignored the abuses of his
rule. Lastly, Assad's ability to retain the support not just of Alawites but
also of other non-Sunni minorities, mainly the Christians, has proved
crucial. Most of these factors no longer apply, not least since the
"barrier of fear" has been crossed.
Should the U.S. seek to stop the bloodletting
and accelerate Assad's fall through direct military intervention? Gambill's
answer is a resounding no.
The status quo is untenable because the other
Arab countries, including those that have urged Washington to confront Iran,
and even Turkey, will not allow continued instability and bloodshed on their
borders. Any confrontation between Tehran and the Arab states should be
allowed to run its course. If Assad is fated for defeat, and his fall would
remove Iran from "Syria's orbit," there is no rationale for U.S.
intervention.
Nor should Israel be unduly alarmed by
Assad's demise, though the likely Islamist domination of the successor
regime. Bashar's diversionary anti-Zionist foreign policy and rhetoric was
just that—a diversion from his Alawite origin—and an unnecessarily radical
stance for any Sunni-dominated government to assume.
Assad's willingness to murder his own people
is an albatross for both his regime and his Iranian allies. If America can do
nothing to decisively improve the situation, it is in our best interests to
stand by and watch Iran struggle with the very same dilemma.
Summary account by Alex Berman.
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