In this mailing:
How
The Palestinian Authority Fights Corruption
Be the first of your
friends to like this.
The
Palestinian Authority government has also warned Palestinian journalists
against helping Western correspondents cover the crackdown. If Abu Rihan were a
Chinese dissident imprisoned in Beijing, his case would have been endorsed by
human rights groups around the world and the mainstream media in the West. Had
Abu Rihan been arrested by the Israeli authorities for such a crime, his story would
most likely have made it to the front page of many respected newspapers. The
Palestinian Authority does not want anyone to report about corruption and abuse
of power out of fear that this would affect financial aid from the US, EU and
other countries.
Jamal Abu Rihan is a Palestinian blogger and
activist who is being held in a Palestinian Authority prison in the West Bank.
Security forces belonging to the Palestinian
Authority government arrested Abu Rihan after he created a Facebook group
called "The People Want to End Corruption."
Demanding reform and democracy has become a
crime in the territories under the control of the Palestinian Authority. Direct
and indirect criticism of Palestinian Authority leaders has also become a crime
that can land journalists, bloggers, cartoonists and political opponents in
prison.
Instead of going after top officials suspected
of embezzling public funds and abusing their powers, the Palestinian Authority
government has chosen to wage an unprecedented clampdown on those who dare to
raise their voices in support of transparency and freedom of speech.
Abu Rihan's anti-corruption group on Facebook
has won the backing of more than 6000 followers. These people clicked
"like" and joined the group within days of its launching. Some of the
followers, especially those living under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
Authority, now fear being thrown into prison for committing the crime of
demanding an end to corruption.
The arrest of Abu Rihan and others is aimed at
sending a warning to Palestinians against criticizing their government and
leaders.
The Palestinian Authority government has also
warned Palestinian journalists against reporting about the crackdown or helping
Western correspondents cover the crackdown on journalists and bloggers.
In the past few weeks, Palestinian security
forces summoned a number of Palestinian journalists for questioning about their
ties with Western journalists and media outlets.
Palestinians say that the campaign of
intimidation and harassment against the media is designed to prevent
"negative reporting" about the Palestinian Authority government. The
Palestinian Authority does not want anyone to report about corruption and abuse
of power out of fear that this would affect financial aid from the US, EU and
other countries.
The clampdown has thus been successful and most
Palestinian and international journalists seem to have understood the warning.
That is why the case of Abu Rihan, for example, has received almost no
attention in the Palestinian and Western media.
If Abu Rihan were a Chinese dissident
imprisoned by the authorities in Beijing, his case would have been endorsed by
human rights groups around the world and the mainstream media in the West. Had
Abu Rihan been arrested by the Israeli authorities for such a crime, his story
would have most likely made it to the front page of many respected newspapers.
But when it comes to violations of freedom of
expression in the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is given a pass by many
Americans and Europeans. By arresting reformists and critics, the Palestinian
Authority is once again proving that it is not serious about combating
corruption and reforming its institutions.
The crackdown on journalists, bloggers and
political activists also serves as a reminder that the Palestinian Authority
government is not different than most of the dictatorships in the Arab world.
What
if a Rational Iran Says, "Yes"?
Be the first of your
friends to like this.
If the West
takes no action, each Iranian target will remain a target: dissident Iranians,
Sunnis including the Saudis, European capitals, Americans and American
interests, Western-oriented South Americans, Israel and Jews. Russia and China
will support Iran with no concern for American disapproval. Hezbollah, Hamas,
Syria, Venezuela and Nicaragua will have their patron intact.
LTG Benny Ganz, Israel's Chief of Staff, turned
heads when he told the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz that the Iranians are
rational and, in his view, have not taken a decision about moving from nuclear
capability to nuclear weapons. The second is supposed to prove the first.
If rational means having an appreciation for
the consequences of actions and an ability to take steps to reach a desired
end, the Iranians are rational. It bears noting that the "end" may
not be using, or even having, nuclear weapons. Perhaps the goal is keeping the
"international community" (represented by the P5+1) focused on
nuclear-activity-short-of-weapon-making while the regime further entrenches
itself at home, harasses the West, and pursues its ultimate goal of
transnational Shiite expansion.
The rational position for Iran would be to
encourage the world to focus on whether or not it might do something now
or later, rather than on what it is actually doing now – which, to the
shame and the detriment of the West, indeed looks like Iranian policy.
Iran continues to oppress its own people –
including 676
executions
in 2011, a 10-year-high with many of them performed in public. Iran is engaged
in the illegal export of weapons [see
here,
here,
here].
It provides arms, money and advisors to Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah; exports
arms to
Africa;
and has a hand in the
Bahrain
uprisings. Iran is heavily engaged in
South
America, particularly in Venezuela, but also across the continent in
various political, military and economic endeavors. It supports the Taliban in
Afghanistan and steals oil from Iraqi
oil fields.
Israel believes Iran is producing long-range
missiles
that can strike the West, and India reports that Iran is producing short-range
anti-ship
missiles.
At so many levels, Iran is a problem for and a
threat to the West, its interests and its allies. Yet the focus is almost
entirely on the terms of uranium enrichment and whether Iran has made a
decision to build nuclear weapons. A second, Western, focus consists of arguing
with Russia and China over the proper level of concern about Iran's nuclear
program. A third Western preoccupation is keeping Israel out of the
conversation.
So consider what would happen if Iran actually
said it agreed to the P5+1 terms on its nuclear program. Take the strictest
version of the possible terms: closing the Fordow plant, halting enrichment at
higher levels, moving enriched uranium out of the country, permitting
unfettered inspections by the IAEA. Add your own.
Three things you know:
- Iran will
require an exchange of terms
- Iran will
either comply with its commitments or not; and
- The larger
picture will deteriorate.
Nothing is free – Iran will have demands
including the end of sanctions and international isolation. Not immediately, of
course, or even quickly, but sanctions would be lifted. Iran was circumventing
them anyhow, but the ability legally to purchase currently restricted
technologies would speed the upgrade of Iran's arms industry. The end of
banking sanctions and the oil embargo would allow the treasury to finance
Iran's interests at home and abroad. Iran wins.
The likelihood of Iran complying with its
commitments is minimal. But there would be hundreds if not thousands of hours,
days and weeks of new negotiations over whether and how the agreement is
holding up. Once a deal is struck, the Western powers will be loath to cancel
it, even when they know Iran is cheating. If the Israeli-Palestinian
"peace process" is any guide (and it is) the P5+1 will try almost anything
(modifying the terms, bribing the recalcitrant party, denouncing anyone who
points out evidence of cheating) to avoid admitting that it was snookered. Iran
wins.
If the West takes no action on the other
Iranian activities, but allows the regime to reclaim its place in the family of
respectable nations, each Iranian target will remain a target: dissident
Iranians, Sunnis including the Saudis, European capitals, Americans and
American interests, Western-oriented South Americans, Israel and Jews. Russia
and China will support Iran with no concern for American disapproval.
Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria (unless we act quickly), Venezuela and Nicaragua will
have their patron intact. Iran wins.
The whole thing is so rational as to make you
wonder why Gen. Ganz's words caused such an uproar.
Shoshana Bryen is Senior Director at The
Jewish Policy Center. She was previously Senior Director for Security Policy at
JINSA and author of JINSA Reports from 1995-2011.
Elections
in France, a Country in Sharp Decline
Be the first of your
friends to like this.
France is
country where the reports of the inevitable failure of the pension systems were
presented to successive governments for over 25 years without a decision being
proposed or taken. In the main mosques, Imams have been making explicit appeals
to vote for François Hollande.
An observer from North America trying to
analyze the French presidential elections would probably be bewildered to
discover that among the 10 candidates in the first round, three were
Trotskyites advocating a Leninist revolution ; a disciple of Lyndon La Rouche ;
a former Norwegian judge who appears to think she is an environmental
Robespierre (Eva Joly) ; a populist from the extreme right (Marine Le Pen) ; a
moderate who would find his place in the left wing of the American Democratic
Party (François Bayrou) ; a Gaullist speaking as if it were still 1965 (Nicolas
Dupont Aignan) ; a very « socialist » Socialist (François Hollande), and the
outgoing President Nicolas Sarkozy, a Bonapartist who, in the UK, would be to
the left of the Labour Party.
The observer would then be appalled to hear
that no candidate defended free-market principles ; that all of the candidates
harshly attacked the financial world, multinational corporations, and
globalization; that, of the two finalists, one is the outgoing President who
was rejected by a large proportion of the population, and who for five years
ruled without any clear direction; and that the other finalist is a Socialist
whose program appears to have been written before the development of the
Internet. He would be even more appalled by seeing that, faced with this
distressful choice, the French population seemed to want to turn to the Socialist
candidate, even knowing that he is supported by the Trotskyists and the
Norwegian judge.
Moreover, after learning that the populist (Le
Pen)'s program was written by people from the most nationalist wing of the
Socialist Party, came in third, he would wonder how this country can still be
one of the major world economies. He would not be wrong.
France is very sick indeed. It remains
relatively prosperous, but it is a country in sharp decline.
France's problems date from long before the
presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy. France is a deeply sclerotic country where no
budget has been balanced since 1974, and where public expenditures have risen
continuously in recent decades to represent a crippling 56% of its gross
domestic product -- the highest figure in the developed world. It is a country
whose public debt is growing far faster than the public debt of its main
economic partners in Europe, and will hit 87% of GDP this year (actually 146%,
if what France owes to the European Union is included). It is a country where
reports on the inevitable failure of pension systems were presented to
successive governments for over 25 years without a decision being proposed or
taken. It is a country where the unemployment rate has remained around 10% for
40 years as if that situation were normal ; and where the number of people
living in poverty is between eight and ten million out of a population of 65
million. It is also a country where, for over 40 years, more than half of those
entering university exited without any qualifications, and where two-thirds of
all higher education diplomas are worthless on the labor market. Graduates with
Master's degree become fast-food servers or cashiers in a supermarket -- if
a position is available. It is a country where intellectual work has gradually
lost all substance and feeds only the leftist libraries of the rest of the
world. The latest of such French exports consists of «postmodern » theories
elaborated by Michel Foucault or Jacques Derrida, and the writings of «
specialists on Islam,» who asserted in 2000, that jihadis had disappeared.
Under Nicolas Sarkozy, the situation has
worsened. None of the promises he made when he was elected has been kept, an
oversight that could explain the feeling of distrust towards him by so many
voters. Sarkozy's slogan in 2007 was "work more to earn more": in
five years, discouraged by heavy taxation and regulation, labor productivity in
France has only stagnated. Hundreds of companies have left the country; the
reality now is that there are fewer jobs, and that purchasing power has
deteriorated. The only actions taken by Sarkozy were embarrassingly
insignificant : the legal age of retirement was increased from age 60 to age 62
-- cementing the current system in place as late as 2010 with just a
two-to-three years' respite -- and the name of the social aid for the
poorest was changed but not its operating mode.
Nicolas Sarkozy never tried to explain to the
French people the economic and geopolitical changes taking place on the planet.
He has confessed several times that he never read a book on economics –
although you could have hoped that other people in the government might have --
another oversight that became more and more noticeable. A recently published
survey shows that while in countries as diverse as China, the United States,
Germany and India, the number of people who understand the virtues of the
market economy is significantly higher than 60%, the figure for France falls to
31%.
Besides Sarkozy's incompetence, one factor that
aggravates the situation in France is the ever more technocratic functioning of
the unelected, undemocratic European Union, and, since 2008, the European
single-currency's difficulties – exactly the same problems convulsing other
European nations.
The « stability pact» developed a few weeks ago
under the auspices of Nicolas Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel is
supposed to save the system and avoid its implosion. It is based tax increases
combined with decreases in public spending. In countries already on the verge
of collapse, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, the « Pact » has only
intensified an already strong recession, and caused riots and strikes. The
French population, apparently concerned that its fate could soon be the same as
its southern neighbors', expressed its revolt by the ballot. Because no
relevant explanation was ever given, the French population adheres massively to
speeches which say that « Brussels cannot dictate everything from above, » and
that increasing state spending, and making the rich pay for it, will solve all
problems.
On May 6th, the Socialist candidate,
François Hollande, who constantly used this kind of speech during the campaign,
will probably be elected President. Voters' disillusionment will soon follow,
with consequences impossible to predict. The main Trotskyist candidate,
Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who received 12% of the votes, has repeatedly called for
Chavez-style insurrection.
If, as it seems likely, Nicolas Sarkozy is defeated,
his party will probably implode. This is what Marine Le Pen expects; she
apparently wants, on the ruins of the President's party, to build a «
nationalist right .» She proposes to leave the European Union and the euro, and
erect high protectionist trade barriers.
One theme that has been almost absent from the
entire election campaign is Islam and Islamization. Only Marine Le Pen has
spoken of it. Even though she was always careful to distinguish Islam and «
radical Islam, » she was immediately called a « racist. »
Slightly over a month has passed since the
worst series of jihadists' crimes -- and the worst anti-Semitic acts since the
Second World War -- were committed in France, but this seems already to have
been forgotten. In the main mosques in France, and just before the first round
of the election, Imams have been making explicit appeals to vote for François
Hollande.
The evolution of the rest of Europe was almost
never evoked, or only in a very negative way, or only by Marine Le Pen and the
Trotskyite candidates.
The day after the first round of the French
presidential election, the Dutch governing coalition fell: its fall came from
the refusal by Geert Wilders's Freedom Party to accept the recessionary
consequences of the « stability pact .»
In Spain, the conservative Prime Minister,
Mariano Rajoy, recently expressed a barely concealed desire to break free of
the « pact . » Spain has experienced negative growth for over three years ; its
unemployment rate is above 24%, and 52% among workers under 25 years of age.
In Greece, where the situation is far worse
than in Spain, elections will also be held on May 6th; the parties that have
every chance of winning in Greece also advocate a refusal of the « Pact .»
François Hollande has said he will not ratify
the « Pact » and has vowed to tame financial markets and Germany. If distrust
of France subsides, the financial markets will remind the Netherlands that they
exist and that they are not so easy to tame. Angela Merkel will also remind the
Netherlands that she exists, and that the opinion of the German people matters.
No one can answer if the euro will survive to
the end of the year, or what will remain in a few years of the feckless,
undemocratic, unelected European Union.
Turbulences are emerging throughout Europe;
France will likely play a role in worsening them.
Turks
Protest Erdogan's Re-Islamification Program
Be the first of your
friends to like this.
Erdogan's
AKP officials, however, alleging that a 15-year statute of limitations had
expired, announced in mid-March, that they would not prosecute the accused
perpetrators of the Sivas atrocity. Erdogan appears prepared to employ any form
of demagoguery to stigmatize the minority community of the secularist Alevis.
Much of the world appears seduced by the claims
to Islamic moderation of Turkey's Justice and Development Party (known as AKP),
led by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. But Turkish citizens and immigrants
in Western Europe seem to be expressing increasing dissatisfaction with the
government's policies on religion, the future of the country's secular
institutions, and an apparent disregard for the rights of minorities.
As Erdogan approaches the 10th
anniversary of his first assumption of the prime minister's post, in 2003, the
heterodox Muslim Alevi community, accounting for as many as a quarter of
Turkey's 85 million citizens at home and in its large diaspora, is
commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Sivas massacre, in 1993.
Alevis are a religious movement combining elements of Shia Islam, spiritual
Sufism, and pre-Islamic Turkish and Kurdish traditions, including shamanism.
They do not pray in the manner of Sunni Muslims or worship in mosques. Rather,
their observances are centered on music, dance, and praise of God. Alevi
rituals are led by women and the Alevis are known as supporters of gender
equality.
Islamist fanatics set the Madimak Hotel in the
city of Sivas on fire while an Alevi cultural festival, featuring the late
author, Aziz Nesin (1915-95) who had translated Salman Rushdie's The Satanic
Verses into Turkish, was underway. Thirty-seven people died, including 33
Alevis, two hotel employees, and two among the mob of extremists who had
targeted the hotel. Nesin escaped the flames. But in addition to those burned
to death, 60 people were injured and 17 more died in demonstrations against the
fundamentalist assault.
Erdogan's AKP officials, however, alleging that
a 15-year statute of limitations had expired, announced in mid-March that they
would not prosecute the accused perpetrators of the Sivas atrocity.
Protests in Turkey – and in Turkish immigrant
communities, such as that of Bochum, Germany – against the AKP's attitude
toward the Sivas affair, reached a high point in Kadikoy, an Istanbul
neighborhood on the Asian side of the Bosporus on March 21st. At the
call of Alevi community organizations, tens of thousands assembled, holding
banners and chanting that "the Sivas case will not be closed until we say
so."
Turkish officials and media were dismayed at
the outpouring of citizens disaffected with AKP. News reports played down the
rally, at times referring to it as a "traffic obstruction." By March
28, the local public prosecutor's office in the interior province of Malatya,
south of Sivas, announced that it would commence a new probe into the slayings.
The Malatya authorities affirmed that the statute of limitations would not
apply in such an instance and that they would begin a long-overdue
investigation into the involvement in the fire of Islamist terror
organizations. The anger of the protestors, however, was not assuaged by the
news.
The AKP decision to end the national
government's prosecution of the Sivas killers is symbolic of other
objectionable aspects of Erdogan's rule – especially the continuing
re-Islamization of Turkish public life. While some refer to the process in
Turkey as a "creeping" religious involvement in state affairs, others
see the national judicial administration's choice to end the Sivas legal
proceeding as an acceleration on AKP's Islamist path.
It does not seem coincidental that suppression
of the Sivas prosecution by the national officials occurred at the same time
that AKP called for an educational reform providing expanded entry of children
as young as 10 into the "imam-hatip" schools for Islamic clerics and
Friday preachers In addition, the long-controversial infiltration of Turkish
police and judicial structures by followers of Fethullah Gulen, a
"soft" Islamist ideologue living in the U.S., is now visible in the
Turkish military. The army was once the guardian of Turkish secularism, after
the Ottoman empire, with its Islamic foundations, was dismantled in the 1920s.
Gulen's movement, which the journalist Ahmet Sik called "the imam's
army," aspires to control Turkey's recognized army. Sik, currently under
indictment for writing a book about the Gulen phenomenon, has recently been
released from detention.
The Kadikoy demonstration on March 29
predictably attracted other participants alongside the Alevis. The secularist
Republican People's Party, or CHP, were natural allies for the Alevis at the
rally. The radical left, represented by the Turkish Communist Party (TKP)
summoned its members and followers; they appeared on the streets with red
flags. The AKP makes no pretense of resolving the status of the Kurdish
minority, and Kurds turned out for the mass meeting. Fans of the Fenerbahce
football club, with its home stadium in Kadikoy, also showed up.
But the majority of demonstrators were Alevis.
They believe that even before the Sivas prosecution was declared closed, the
alleged murderers benefited from protection by the state.
The Kadikoy protestors pointed to problems of
Turkish society that are ignored by foreign governments and media. Turkey is
enjoying a period of economic growth; power has shifted away from the military
to civil society, and local authorities have been performing more efficiently
on local tasks.
These changes, however, have done nothing to
help the Alevis. The Alevis continue to be denied recognition in Turkey as a
separate religious community. And they are not exempt from harassment. In
February, the Alevis community of Karapinar, south of Malatya, saw some 200
homes with the color red marked on their doors. Karapinar has been known for
the good relations between Sunni Muslims and Alevis, as well as between Muslims
and Christians. While the Alevis feared that the vandalism was a warning of
imminent aggression against them, the AKP interior minister, Idris Naim Sahin,
dismissed the defacing of Alevi houses as "the work of a couple of
kids."
But Alevi representative Huseyin Guzelgul noted
that AKP had similarly downplayed the 2005 bombings in southeastern Turkey of a
Kurdish-owned bookshop in which two people were killed and five injured. The
commander of the army at the time, Yasar Buyukanit, described one of the criminals
in that attack, military non-commissioned officer Ali Kaya, as someone he knew
and considered "a good guy." The bookstore bombers, including another
soldier, Ozcan Ildeniz, and a former Kurdish terrorist, Veysel Ates, were
caught at the scene. All three were found guilty early this year and each
sentenced to almost 40 years' imprisonment.
Guzelgul further recalled that Ogun Samast, the
17-year old murderer of journalist Hrant Dink, a Turkish citizen of Armenian
ethnicity, who was shot fatally in 2007, had been called "a good
kid." Police officers posed for photographs with Samast and a Turkish
flag. Samast was found guilty of murder and sentenced to 22 years and 10 months
in prison. Ten other men, including seven security officials, have also been
convicted of incitement, complicity, and, in the case of the security men,
failure to act on intelligence about plots against Dink. The journalist Nedim
Sener, like Ahmet Sik in the Gulen affair, has been kept under arrest for
writing a book about the Dink case. Like Sik, Sener has since been released but
still may be tried
Alevi leader Guzelgul said, "We want the
government to find out who those kids are and who made them mark the
homes." For Alevis, the marking of doors in Adiyaman recalled the
Kahramanmaras murders of 1978, when at least 111 Kurdish Alevis were
slaughtered in their houses. Witnesses to seven days of bloodshed and butchery
in the city of Kahramanmaras, accused the local police chief at the time,
Abdulkadir Aksu, now an AKP member of the Turkish parliament, of complicity in
the atrocities. Alevis say a conspiracy of Islamists, the Turkish secret
police, and the fascist Grey Wolves movement was responsible.
Slowly, the darker chapters in recent Turkish
history are being exposed and examined -- the demand of the Alevi leaders,
adherents, and cultural figures, such as the prominent Alevi traditional
musician Sabahat Akkiraz, who had performed at the Kadikoy event. Erdogan and
AKP , however, seem to feel that ten years in power will provide them with the
added strength needed fully to carry out their ideological program. As they
have held on to power, their ambitions have grown and become more openly
expressed, in their actions on Sivas, the "imam-hatip" schools, and
their continued prosecution of the so-called "deep state" within
Turkish society.
In foreign policy, Turkish officials have been
expressing concern for the suffering inflicted on the citizens of neighboring
Syria by the dictatorship of Bashar Al-Assad – formerly an Erdogan ally – and
many observers of the Syrian crisis argue that Erdogan and Turkey could play a
positive role in ending the conflict there. Erdogan, in contrast, seems to be
looking at Syria mainly as an opportunity to enhance the AKP's expansionist
ambitions for a "neo-Ottoman" revival of Turkish influence in the
Arab countries.
Erdogan has, in an ominous manner, tried to
equate the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis with the Arab Alawite sect ruling Syria.
He has falsely asserted that Kemal Kilicdaroglu, an Alevi and the leader of the
Republican People's Party, belongs to "the same religion" as the
Alawite dictator of Syria, Bashar Al-Assad. But Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, and
Syrian Alawites, although practicing variants of Shia Islam, are not the same.
They originated at different times and places in history, and their religious
views and practices are wholly distinct from one another. Still, Erdogan
appears prepared to employ any form of demagoguery to stigmatize the minority
community of the secularist Alevis.
No comments:
Post a Comment