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Top Stories
AP:
"The head of the United Nations nuclear watchdog announced his
agency would resume talks with Iran on Friday, and said for the first
time that the agency believes the country had done demolition work at a
military facility that may have been a site for the secret development of
nuclear arms. Diplomats and officials accredited to the International
Atomic Energy Agency had spoken of similar work previously, describing it
as an apparent attempt to clear the site of evidence of clandestine
weapons-related work. IAEA head Yukiya Amano's confirmation lent weight
to the suspicions. Mr. Amano didn't specify the focus of coming talks on
Friday between officials from his agency and a senior Iranian envoy. Iran
denies any interest in developing nuclear weapons, and says all of its
atomic activities are under IAEA purview and meant to power reactors or
for medical research. Mr. Amano said his agency isn't getting adequate
cooperation from Iran, in opening comments to a meeting of the IAEA's
35-nation board. 'Iran is not providing the necessary cooperation to
enable the agency to provide credible assurance about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to
conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities,' he
said." http://t.uani.com/MbYikE
Reuters:
"A fast-growing Iranian mobile-phone network managed to obtain
sophisticated U.S. computer equipment despite sanctions that prohibit
sales of American technology to Iran, interviews and documents show. MTN
Irancell, a joint venture between MTN Group Ltd of South Africa and an
Iranian government-controlled consortium, sourced equipment from Sun
Microsystems Inc, Hewlett Packard Co and Cisco Systems Inc, the documents
and interviews show. MTN owns 49% of the joint venture but provided the
initial funding... People involved in Iran's telecommunications industry
say U.S. computer components remain widely available in Iran today.
'There's nothing you can get in the U.S. or Dubai that you can't get in
Iran,' Chris Kilowan, who was MTN's top executive in Iran from 2004 to
2007, said in an interview. He said MTN's parent company, MTN Group, was
directly involved in procuring U.S. parts for MTN Irancell, which
launched in 2006 and is now Iran's second-largest mobile-phone operator."
http://t.uani.com/LlFIWL
AP:
"Iran has played many political roles in Baghdad since the fall of
Saddam Hussein: spoiler to American-crafted administrations, haven for
Iraqi political outcasts and big brother to Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki's Shiite-led government. Now add a new description as emergency
repairmen trying to keep al-Maliki's coalition from splitting at the
seams. Shiite powerhouse Iran appears desperate to save the patchwork
administration it helped create in late 2010 to pull Iraq out of its last
major political crisis. Tehran is calling in favors among its allied
factions in Iraq, and exerting its significant religious and commercial
influence to try to block al-Maliki's opponents from getting a
no-confidence motion. On Monday, one of the linchpin partners in
al-Maliki's government, Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, traveled to Iran
for talks, government officials said. A day earlier, al-Sadr urged
al-Maliki to 'do the right thing' and resign, but it remains unclear
whether al-Sadr will bow to Iranian pressure in the end." http://t.uani.com/LuSJir
UANI
in the News
Nuclear
Program
WSJ: "Iran's president will attempt to
shore up support from Russia and China during a closely watched summit of
Central Asia leaders beginning Wednesday in Beijing, just as concerns
rise over Tehran's nuclear program... China's and Russia's close economic
and strategic ties to Iran will play a central part in this week's talks,
with Iran looking for support as it deals with rising pressure from the
U.S. and Europe over its nuclear ambitions. Washington has expressed
increasing worries that Iran is developing nuclear weapons, while Tehran
insists its efforts are peaceful." http://t.uani.com/KJV1Ne
Sanctions
Reuters:
"South Africa's elite Hawks police unit has opened an investigation
into allegations of corruption at mobile phone giant MTN relating to its
purchase of a cellular licence in Iran, a police spokesman said on
Tuesday. The police probe follows a $4.2 billion U.S. civil claim filed
in March by Turkish operator Turkcell accusing Africa's largest mobile
firm of bribing Iranian officials with cash and promises of weapons to
secure the licence, which was originally awarded to Turkcell. 'There are
allegations of corruption. That's exactly what we're investigating,'
Hawks spokesman MacIntosh Polela said. MTN executives were also accused
in the U.S. court papers of promising to get Pretoria to vote favourably
about Tehran's nuclear programme at international forums trying to curb
Iran's suspected pursuit of nuclear weapons." http://t.uani.com/M8GNG2
Reuters:
"Turkey has steeply cut oil imports from Iran in May and June, a
source at the country's sole refiner told Reuters, to avoid U.S.
sanctions after official trade data showed stubbornly high imports in
April... Turkey's only crude buyer, refiner Tupras, has a term contract
with Iran that expires in August allowing it to lift 180,000 bpd.
However, according to official trade data it bought an unusually high
270,000 bpd of Iranian crude in March and fresh data for April showed
imports at 249,000 bpd. A source at Tupras said volumes have in fact been
much smaller as April data included some purchases made in March. He
added that if counted by loading dates, April imports have been just
107,000 bpd and in May they amounted to 142,000 bpd. 'The plan for June
is the same -- 142,000 bpd,' the source said, adding that the company
planned to keep its imports at around 80 percent of contracted volumes
after July." http://t.uani.com/K9VLxh
Opinion &
Analysis
David Albright
& Andrea Stricker in ISIS: "Is Iran building a
third gas centrifuge enrichment plant? This question has been on
the minds of Iran watchers in governments around the world since former
Iranian nuclear chief Ali Akbar Salehi claimed on August 16, 2010 that
'studies for the location of 10 other uranium enrichment facilities' had
ended, and that 'the construction of one of these facilities will begin
by the end of the (current Iranian) year (March 2011) or start of the
next year.' Succeeding nuclear head Fereydoun Abbassi-Davani said in
mid-2011 that construction on additional enrichment plants was delayed by
two years. Now, one year later, what is the status of a new centrifuge
plant in addition to the Natanz and Fordow centrifuge plants? Is the
plant still deferred for another year or has Iran changed its mind once
again and begun building a third centrifuge plant in secret? It
would not be the first time, as witnessed by Iran's past secret
construction of the Natanz centrifuge site, the Kalaye Electric
centrifuge research and development plant, and the deeply buried Fordow
centrifuge facility. Since March 2007, Iran has taken the position that
it does not have to notify the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
if it begins construction of a nuclear facility, but the IAEA says that
Iran has a legal obligation to do so under its current safeguards
agreement. Iran's provision of information about the construction of any
new enrichment sites is pertinent to instilling confidence about the
peaceful nature of its nuclear activities and satisfying international
concern that it could decide to make weapon-grade uranium in secret. The
IAEA states that Iran has a legal obligation to comply with modified Code
3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards
Agreement. Modified Code 3.1 provides for the submission to the IAEA of
design information for new facilities as soon as the decision to
construct, or to authorize construction of, a new facility has been
taken, whichever is the earlier. The IAEA notes in its May 2012 Iran
safeguards report that 'Iran remains the only State with significant
nuclear activities in which the Agency is implementing a comprehensive
safeguards agreement but which is not implementing the provisions of the
modified Code 3.1.' In 2003, Iran accepted modified Code 3.1 but
reneged unilaterally in March 2007. Since then, the IAEA has called on
Iran to comply with its legal obligations, which states that Iran cannot
unilaterally abandon its safeguards obligations under modified Code 3.1.
The May 25, 2012 IAEA safeguards report reiterated the IAEA's legal
position: 'In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement,
agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is
there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of
provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the
modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran
is further bound by operative paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution
1929 (2010) to comply fully and without qualification with its IAEA
Safeguards Agreement, including through the application of modified Code
3.1.' ... ISIS has assessed that international concern over Iran's
ability to breakout in secret should increase in 2013 due to the possible
construction of a hidden centrifuge enrichment site and simultaneously
growing stocks of 3.5 and 19.75 percent low enriched uranium that would
allow the speedier production of weapon-grade uranium." http://t.uani.com/KJJmhm
David Albright,
Andrea Stricker & Christina Walrond in ISIS: "In
the May 25, 2012 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Iran
safeguards report, inspectors continue to raise questions about the
original and future purpose of the formerly secret Fordow Fuel Enrichment
Plant (FFEP) near the city of Qom. Suspicions remain over the timing of
its construction and whether its original purpose was intended to be the
enrichment of uranium up to weapons-grade for use in nuclear weapons.
Moreover, new questions center on whether Iran will dramatically increase
its production of 19.75 percent low enriched uranium (LEU) at this deeply
buried site or even produce highly enriched uranium (HEU), which is
enriched uranium containing more than 20 percent uranium-235. The IAEA
has repeatedly questioned the completeness and veracity of Iran's statements
regarding the Fordow centrifuge plant. Since the West uncovered the
secret construction of this plant in 2009, Iran has provided only partial
information about the facility. Iran provided the IAEA some information
in 2011 regarding the initial timing of and circumstances relating to its
decision to build the FFEP at an existing defense establishment. The IAEA
re-stated in its May 25, 2012 Iran's safeguards report that it still
needs additional information from Iran in connection with this facility,
particularly in light of the difference between the original stated
purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being
used. Adding to concerns are Iran's multiple changes to the site's
Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) on the FFEP, a key document in
implementing IAEA safeguards... Iran's decision to build a relatively
small, deeply buried enrichment facility without first informing the IAEA
suggests that Fordow was intended to be used to make weapon-grade uranium
(HEU enriched to over 90 percent) for nuclear weapons, or to provide Iran
with that option. Compounding concerns about the site's original purpose,
according to senior officials close to the IAEA, inspectors who made
visits to the Fordow site soon after its revelation in the fall of 2009
noted that Iran had remodeled portions of the facility. Inspectors
suspected that the plant was intended for producing weapon-grade
uranium. The changes in the plant seen by inspectors combined with
Iran's multiple DIQs on Fordow have added credence to the assessment that
after realizing it was caught in 2009 building the facility in secret,
Iran rushed to proclaim a civilian purpose for it with the IAEA... Iran's
multiple DIQs have increased suspicions that Iran re-purposed the site
from a military to a civilian one. Certainly, countries can change their
minds about the purpose of a nuclear facility. However, Iran has altered
the stated purpose of the Fordow facility so many times over such a short
period of time that it raises significant questions regarding its
original purpose... Given its lack of need for more 19.75 percent LEU,
Iran should agree to cap LEU production at five percent and freeze the
number of enriching centrifuges at Fordow to the current level of four
cascades of IR-1 centrifuges. In the end, unless Iran wants nuclear
weapons, the Fordow enrichment site is unnecessary for its civilian
nuclear program and greatly increases Iran's risk of military
strikes." http://t.uani.com/MbM8YZ
Olli Heinonen in
NPEC: "In the early 1990's, during IAEA Board
discussions on strengthening the Agency's safeguards, former DG Hans Blix
advocated 'transparency visits' to clarify questions and ambiguities on
several states' nuclear programs. The IAEA conducted several of such
visits to North Korea, South Korea, Iran, Taiwan and South Africa. Such
visits were also carried out at a later date to remove some ambiguities
in Japan and elsewhere. The outcomes of the various 'transparency visits'
carried out were of mixed success. In the case of North Korea and Iran,
it had not rung the alarm bell on the clandestine activities of their
nuclear programs. Instead, transparency visits to Iran in the 1990s
provided a false sense of security, both internally within the IAEA as
well as externally to the larger international community. The IAEA
provided assurances through press statements following each of the
various transparency visits made to Iran without inspectors taking
environmental samples (with one exception) or conducting more technical
investigations. This significance cannot be understated since inspectors
did come up with proof of undeclared nuclear material. Short of an
implemented Additional Protocol that provides the legal basis for more
intrusive inspections, transparency visits also remained at the behest of
the 'goodwill' of the inspected state. The limitations of transparency
visits were moreover not well understood by the Board and the public. As
such, it was not obvious that assurances made by the IAEA through press
statements etc. that no evidence were found concerning external reports
of undeclared nuclear activities undertaken in Iran at sites visited by
the IAEA, were not derived as a result of rigorous safeguards carried
out. The danger of providing a sense of complacency had telling consequences
on implementing safeguards in Iran years down the road as we are now
witnessing. The Secretariat should be clear that transparency implies
openness, communication, and accountability. Occasional visits by
diplomats or invitations to IAEA officials do not replace Iran's
Nonproliferation Treaty, UN Security Council and IAEA obligations. Since
Iran continues to remain in deficit in fulfilling those international
requests, it is in equal deficit in its transparency with regard to its
actions and nuclear activities. In proliferation cases such as Iran where
there remains risks involved for a breakout scenario with the presence of
enrichment and unresolved military dimensions on its nuclear program, the
case for effective nuclear verifications is both at the same time more
important as well as more challenging. For the case of Iran, an
'Additional Protocol-plus' type of agreement implemented in a cooperative
manner by Iran would be required. There are also important distinctions
to be made between Iran and other countries that conduct enrichment or
have a developed nuclear fuel cycle. Japan, Germany and the Netherlands,
for example, are presented as 'latent or virtual nuclear weapon states'.
There are four differences in these countries compared to Iran: there are
no indications of nuclear weapon development related R&D; these
states are in compliance with the terms of their safeguards agreements;
they are applying additional protocols; and they do not appear to have
uranium enrichment excess to their needs. Prevailing conditions in these
countries may change over time. With proper safeguards in place,
detection should be easier to pick up at an early stage." http://t.uani.com/LlG9QO
James Lewis in
NYT: "Do U.S. cyberattacks on Iran protect us or
endanger us? We could better ask if having a downed pilot paraded through
the streets of Tehran is preferable to cyberattack, or whether it is
better to risk the losses that would accompany the series of attacks
needed to destroy well-defended nuclear facilities. With Stuxnet, there
are no television shots of burning buildings, weeping victims or tortured
pilots. The politics of cyberattack as an alternative are compelling,
although the attacks themselves lack the destructiveness of their kinetic
brethren. The risks of Iran retaliating are not increased. The regime
already blamed Stuxnet on the United States and Israel. In any case, we
have been in sporadic covert conflict with Iran for decades, beginning
with the hostages and embassy bombings, Iranian attacks in Iraq, and recent
plots -- using proxies to provide a tissue of deniability -- against
United States diplomats. Nor do cyberattacks against Iran increase the
risk of damaging cyberattacks against the United States. It is true that
we are defenseless; efforts to make us safer are hamstrung by
self-interest, ideology and the gridlock of American politics. But we are
no more vulnerable today than we were the day before the news. If someone
decides to attack us, they may cite Iran as precedent, but it will only
be to justify a decision they had already made. We could ask whether the
United States creates more problems for itself when it makes public a new
weapon while potential opponents keep it secret. Four other countries can
launch sophisticated and damaging cyber attacks -- including China and
Russia -- and plan to use them in warfare. Another 30 nations are
acquiring cyber weapons, including Iran and North Korea. There is a very
old argument for disarmament that holds that if the United States were to
renounce some weapons -- usually nuclear weapons -- the world would be a
better place. This utopianism has a revered place in American political
thinking, but when humans invent weapons they rarely give them up,
especially useful weapons whose components are easy to acquire.
Cyberattack is now part of warfare, no different from any other weapon.
The publicity around Stuxnet may complicate U.S. efforts to get
international rules for the use of cyberattack, but the White House
decided that tampering with Iran's nuclear program was more important
than possible risk to slow-moving negotiations." http://t.uani.com/M3FULn
Ephraim Asculai in
JPost: "According to the May 25, 2012, report of the
director- general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), his
agency requested access to the Parchin site in Iran, long suspected of
hosting a test facility related to the development of nuclear explosives.
This was also one of the topics discussed between the director-general
and the Iranian delegation during the well-publicized May 14-15 Tehran
meeting. Although both sides said that an agreement was imminent, no
details were available. The Iranians also said that no access would be
granted to Parchin without an agreement on a 'structured approach to the
clarification of all outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear
programme.' Even prior to the IAEA report, there have been reports that
Iran was carrying out cleaning operations at the Parchin site, apparently
with the aim of removing any evidence of work related to the development
of nuclear weapons. A later report by the Institute for Science and
International Security (ISIS) presented satellite evidence that two small
buildings, in the vicinity of the suspect larger test building, were
razed. This, the report said, was reminiscent of the 2004 activity that
took place at the Tehran Lavizan- Shian site, where a complete R&D
site was razed to the ground and all topsoil removed to an unknown site.
This happened because the IAEA had proven its ability to take
environmental samples that proved that Iran was conducting illicit,
undeclared activities that proved its non-compliance with its NPT
obligations. It is therefore reasonable to assess that the Iranians had
learned their lessons, and will not permit any visits to any suspect site
until it is convinced that no negative evidence would be uncovered as a
result of that visit. They would also delay signing the agreement with
the IAEA on the 'structured approach' until all cleanup operations were
completed. Moreover, it is reasonable to guess that the Iranians would
use these negative results, if the visit took place, to demonstrate their
cooperation, and to claim that they convincingly proved that Iran had no
military nuclear program. This would become a no-win situation for the
IAEA, with a certain win for Iran. The IAEA must avoid this." http://t.uani.com/NezJsN
James P. Rubin in
FP: "We're not done with the possibility of an
Israeli strike on Iran. Given that the current round of negotiations with
the world's major powers will not fundamentally change Iran's nuclear
program, the question of an Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities
is likely to return to center stage later this year. In addition to
hard-headed diplomacy and economic sanctions, there is an important step
the United States can take to change Israel's calculations -- helping the
people of Syria in their battle against President Bashar al-Assad's
regime. Iran's nuclear program and Syria's civil war may seem
unconnected, but in fact they are inextricably linked. Israel's real fear
-- losing its nuclear monopoly and therefore the ability to use its
conventional forces at will throughout the Middle East -- is the
unacknowledged factor driving its decision-making toward the Islamic
Republic. For Israeli leaders, the real threat from a nuclear-armed Iran
is not the prospect of an insane Iranian leader launching an unprovoked
nuclear attack on Israel that would lead to the annihilation of both
countries. It's the fact that Iran doesn't even need to test a nuclear
weapon to undermine Israeli military leverage in Lebanon and Syria. Just
reaching the nuclear threshold could embolden Iranian leaders to call on
their proxy in Lebanon, Hezbollah, to attack Israel, knowing that their
adversary would have to think hard before striking back. That is where
Syria comes in. It is the strategic relationship between the Islamic
Republic and the Assad regime that makes it possible for Iran to
undermine Israel's security. Over the three decades of hostility between
Iran and Israel, a direct military confrontation has never occurred --
but through Hezbollah, which is sustained and trained by Iran via Syria,
the Islamic Republic has proven able to threaten Israeli security
interests. The collapse of the Assad regime would sunder this dangerous
alliance. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, arguably the most important
Israeli decision-maker on this question, recently told CNN's Christiane
Amanpour that the Assad regime's fall 'will be a major blow to the
radical axis, major blow to Iran.... It's the only kind of outpost of the
Iranian influence in the Arab world ... and it will weaken dramatically
both Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Gaza.' ... In
Lebanon, Hezbollah would be cut off from its Iranian sponsor, since Syria
would no longer be a transit point for Iranian training, assistance, and
missiles. All these strategic benefits combined with the moral purpose of
saving tens of thousands of civilians from murder at the hands of the
Assad regime -- some 12,000 have already been killed, according to
activists -- make intervention in Syria a calculated risk, but still a
risk worth taking. With the veil of fear now lifted, the Syrian people
are determined to fight for their freedom. America can and should help
them -- and by doing so help Israel and help reduce the risk of a far
more dangerous war between Israel and Iran." http://t.uani.com/Li7w3L
John Bolton in WT:
"Having apparently learned nothing from 10 years of futile
negotiations with Iran, President Obama seemed perilously close late last
month to yet another deal purportedly making 'progress' eliminating the
ayatollahs' nuclear weapons program. Fortunately, however, the recently
concluded Baghdad talks between Iran and the U.N. Security Council's five
permanent members and Germany (P-5+1) produced no substantive agreement.
Nonetheless, we are assured that the meetings were successful. Why? The
parties will hold a third meeting in this latest series this month, in
Moscow of all places. Perhaps the fourth will be in Tehran. Once again,
we have fallen into Iran's well-oiled trap of endless negotiations. While
no harmful agreement emerged from Baghdad, 'could have been worse' is not
an acceptable outcome in the existential struggle against nuclear
proliferation. By securing four more weeks, Iran won this round on
points. It gained more precious time, as it has over the past decade, to
expand its impressive nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile
infrastructure. Although sanctions advocates continue their efforts,
Iran's insouciant negotiating attitude belies their hopes. Even merely
offering concessions in negotiations undercuts the sanctions' coercive
effect. And when it comes to making concessions, the West's Iran
negotiators have competition only from the West's North Korea
negotiators. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) began last
month agreeing with Tehran over visits to the Parchin military base, site
of explosive testing critical to detonating nuclear weapons. While no
document was signed and several issues remained unresolved, this
'progress' purportedly showed Iran ready for serious P-5+1 talks. In
fact, the deal merely demonstrated Iran's confidence it had removed all
traces of any nuclear-weapons activity at Parchin, so IAEA inspectors
would uncover nothing. That confidence has been misplaced before, but
Iran's cover-up capabilities have improved over time. The Baghdad meetings
themselves were another tepid version of prior encounters, in which Iran
was presented with a choice between 'carrots and sticks.' Not
surprisingly, Iran complained about the inadequacy of the carrots and the
oppressiveness of the sticks, sending EU and U.S. negotiators home to
wonder what additional carrots might bring Tehran around to compromise,
'confidence-building measures' and, of course, further negotiations.
Afterward, U.S. negotiators rushed to Israel, as anonymous sources
breathlessly leaked, to provide reassurances that Mr. Obama still had
Israel's back. More likely, our diplomats argued that Baghdad had gone so
well that Israel shouldn't even think about pre-emptively striking Iran's
nuclear weapons program. Undoubtedly, the Israelis smiled politely while
deciding silently to ratchet up planning to do just that. This is a fine
irony because both Mr. Obama and Iran surely intended the talks to
produce precisely the opposite pressure on Israel to stand idle as more
diplomatic 'progress' unfolded. Then, as its days-old deal started
crumbling, the IAEA issued a new Iran report. The most eye-catching item
was evidence from the deeply buried Fordow facility of U-235 enrichment
up to 27 percent, which Iran quickly dismissed as a technical glitch. Alternatively,
of course, Iran could have been experimenting to find the most
efficacious path to weapons-grade U-235 levels. While the reasons for the
27 percent level are still obscure, the IAEA also reported perhaps more
significant news. At both Fordow and Natanz, production rates for
enriched uranium up to 20 percent have increased significantly, doubling
or tripling previous maximum levels. Stockpiles of 20-percent-enriched
uranium also have grown substantially, reducing the time needed for final
enrichment to weapons-grade levels. IAEA reports only recount activity at
known Iranian sites. If Iran has concealed operations or is working in
North Korea or Syria at other enrichment facilities, the situation is
much graver." http://t.uani.com/JIRGdf
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Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against
Nuclear Iran (UANI) a program of the American Coalition Against Nuclear
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email Press@UnitedAgainstNuclearIran.com
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