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Islamic
Jihadists Using Switzerland as Base
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Swiss
analysts say the initiative of "Ummah Schweiz" is an effort to
establish "parallel" legislative body in Switzerland that will be a
mouthpiece for the Islamic fundamentalists, who are seeking to impose Sharia
law on the country. With representatives in all 26 cantons, the group will be
fully functional in 2013.
Radical Muslim groups are using Switzerland as
a base from which to promote Islamic jihad in Europe and beyond.
Islamists in Switzerland are providing
jihadists with logistical support, and also stepping up their use of Internet
websites there to spread Islamic propaganda as well as to incite their
supporters to commit acts of terrorism and violence.
Swiss authorities have identified at least 10
trips by Islamists from Switzerland to jihadi training camps overseas just
during the past 12 months.
One finding of
Swiss
Federal Police Annual Report for 2011 (in German), published in Bern on
June 21, is that although Switzerland was not a direct target of Islamic
terrorism in 2011, the Swiss Federal Police Office, also known Fedpol, did
investigate a Swiss convert to Islam who used the Internet to discuss a
terrorist attack involving explosives against an American installation in
Germany. Although the report does not provide further details about the
investigation, it states that the suspect's being Swiss proved that "not
only people with immigrant backgrounds could be supporters of jihad."
In response to the rising threat from radical
Islam, Fedpol, recently launched a new specialist IT research department to
intensify efforts to monitor jihadist websites and their operators. Fedpol also
strengthened its cooperation with the Swiss Federal Intelligence Services.
In a related move, the
Swiss
Federal Justice Ministry on June 30 announced that Switzerland has refused
to take back a Jordanian refugee who, after he was found to have links to
Islamist rebels in Somalia, had been given asylum.
The refugee, 19-year-old Magd Najjar, had been
caught in May and charged in Nairobi, Kenya, on June 6 for links to Islamist
Al-Shabaab rebels affiliated
with al-Qaeda, and who openly state that they want to impose Islamic Sharia law
in Somalia.
"Clear evidence shows that he visited
regions of Somalia where jihadist groups are involved in conflict (against the
government). It also appears that he had contact with Islamist elements in
Switzerland," the Justice Ministry said in a statement.
Swiss law states that refugees can lose their
asylum status if they threaten or compromise national or international
security.
Separately, leading Islamic groups in
Switzerland say they want to establish a single national representative body
that will enable all of the country's Muslims to "speak with one
voice."
The organizers say their new
"parliament" will be called "Umma Schweiz" [The Islamic
Nation in Switzerland"] and be based on the principles of Islamic Sharia
law. The headquarters of the organization will be located in Basel with
"representatives" in all 26 cantons (or "states") of
Switzerland. The first "test vote" of Umma Schweiz will be held in
the fall of 2012; the group will be fully functional in 2013.
Ummah, an Arabic word that means
"nation," refers to the entire Muslim community throughout the world.
In recent years, Muslims have stepped up efforts to unify the globally
fragmented ummah in an effort to revive an Islamic Caliphate or empire. Many
Muslim scholars view the
political
unification of the ummah as a prerequisite to the consolidation of global
Muslim power and the subsequent establishment of an Islamic world order.
Swiss analysts say the initiative is an effort
to establish a "parallel" legislative body in Switzerland that will
be a mouthpiece for Islamic fundamentalists, who are seeking to impose Sharia
law on the country, according to an
exposé
published by the newspaper
Basler Zeitung.
The effort to unify Muslims in Switzerland
comes amid calls by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) to establish an umbrella organization for all Swiss Muslims to counter
discrimination.
The OSCE, which sent three observers to
Switzerland in November 2011, warned that Muslims in the country are being
exploited by "the extreme right and populist parties." The OSCE also
noted that Muslims in Switzerland are increasingly unifying around their religious
identity, according to the
Swiss
Broadcasting Corporation. "Groups like Bosnians and Albanians, who
were previously defined by their ethnicity, are now identified by their
religion," the OSCE report says.
Currently, there are more than 300 Muslim
associations in Switzerland, and several umbrella organizations, but none is
regarded as representative of Muslims as a whole.
The Muslim population in Switzerland has more
than quintupled since 1980; it now numbers about 400,000, or roughly 5% of the
population. Most Muslims living in Switzerland are of Turkish or Balkan origin,
with a smaller minority from the Arab world. Many of them are second- and
third-generation immigrants firmly establishing themselves in Switzerland.
The new Muslim demographic reality is raising
tensions across large parts of Swiss society, especially as Muslims become more
assertive in their demands for greater recognition of their Islamic faith.
With three floors, the planned mosque would be
the biggest in Switzerland. In addition to a prayer room for more than 500
worshippers, the building would have conference and training rooms, shops,
underground parking and a garden.
Swiss citizens have been pushing back against
the rise of Islam in their country. In November 2009, for example, Switzerland
held
referendum
in which citizens approved an initiative to insert a new sentence in the Swiss
constitution stipulating that "the construction of minarets is
forbidden."
The initiative to ban minarets was approved
57.5% to 42.5% by some 2.67 million voters. Only four of Switzerland's 26
cantons or states opposed the initiative, thereby granting the double approval
that now makes the minaret ban part of the Swiss constitution. The minaret ban
represented a turning point in the debate about Islam in Switzerland.
In a related victory for free speech in
Switzerland, the Swiss Federal Court in Lausanne on May 21 ruled that a
citizens group called
Movement
against the Islamization of Switzerland (SBGI) has the legal right to set
up information booths in Swiss cities and distribute literature that is
critical of Islam.
The City of Freiburg had prevented the group
from setting up an information booth because it said that by doing so it would
provoke violence and unrest.
The Federal Court upheld SBGI's complaint that
the authorities had impinged on its freedom of expression as well as on freedom
of information. Although Swiss law does grant local authorities powers to ban
demonstrations from public spaces, the court confirmed that they may not do so
simply because they disapprove of the ideas being communicated.
Soeren
Kern is Senior Fellow for European Politics at the Madrid-based
Grupo de Estudios Estratégicos / Strategic Studies Group. Follow him on Facebook.
Syria:
UN's Newest Champion of Human Rights
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Syria is
now running for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council. The U.S. caved in to the
demands of Syria's allies, who also abuse human rights.
According to
UN Watch, an independent human rights group based in
Geneva, Syria is now running for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council:
"The murderous regime of Bashar al-Assad is a declared candidate for a
seat on the 47-nation U.N. body, in elections to be held next year at the
193-member General Assembly."
The Syrian regime will be one of four nations
from the 53 block of Asian nations running as part of a fixed slate of
"faux elections" for the Council, in which regional groups plan,
devise and orchestrate uncontested elections -- precisely the same way some of
the current human rights luminaries on the Council, such as Saudi Arabia,
China, Russia and Cuba "won" their positions.
Unless another Asian country is nominated,
Syria will win a three-year term on the UN body
charged with strengthening the promotion and protection of
human rights around the world. As the decision is up to the block of Asian
nations themselves to determine who will run, the United States cannot propose
an alternative candidate. The US can, however, put "pressure" on the
United Nations – if it wished -- and as it supposedly did in 2011 after
receiving news about Syria's original attempt for a seat on the Council. Kuwait
then ran instead, and Syria agreed to put its application on hold.
News of Syria's candidacy broke after UN Watch
discovered that Syria was vying for a seat from a US-sponsored and EU-backed
draft resolution, debated last week in Geneva. The
resolution sought to pre-empt Syria's candidacy by declaring it ineligible on
the basis that it "fails to meet the standards for Council
membership" as set forth in its founding charter.
According to Hillel Neuer, the Executive
Director of UN Watch, no sooner was the draft resolution submitted, than it was
met with immediate resistance by Syria's allies and fellow human rights abusers
on the Council, including Russia, China, Cuba and Egypt -- all of whom were
"
totally
opposed."
These nations may well have deduced that if a
human rights violator such as Assad could be declared ineligible, they could be
next.
In what can only be described as a pitiful
display of U.S. foreign policy which has become the hallmark of this
Administration, the U.S. caved in to the demands of Syria's allies who also
abuse human rights; the U.S. in the
final
resolution dropped the reference calling for Syria's ineligibility. The
watered-down resolution was ultimately
adopted
Friday by a vote of 41 in favor, 3 against (Russia, China and Cuba) and 3
abstentions (India, Philippines and Uganda).
It is unclear if the U.S. received any
concessions in return for dropping the clause. At the very least, one would
hope that the American vote was linked to an undertaking that a fifth Asian
nation would run for UNHRC elections in 2013, thereby necessitating an actual
vote instead of automatic appointment for Syria. However, this remains to be
seen.
After the vote, Eileen Donahoe, the U.S. Ambassador
in Geneva
tweeted that she was
"celebrating" because "today was a good day." No, a cause
to celebrate would have been if the U.S. had stood its ground to ensure that
Assad would never have a chance to sit on the Human Rights Council.
Syria's candidacy should not have come as a
major revelation: it had declared its intention to run for the Council over a
year go, in May of 2011. Although the Syrian regime at that time stepped out of
the race at the last minute to make way for another champion of human rights,
Kuwait, Syria's UN Ambassador, Bashar Ja'afari, made clear that the regime was
"
reconsidering our priorities" and would run for the
Council again in 2013.
At the time that Syria first declared its
candidacy, which happened to coincide with the beginning of Assad's murderous
rampage, Ja'afari
said, "Promotion and protection of human rights are of
the highest importance to Syria." The actions of the Syrian regime,
however, speak otherwise, with as many as
18,000
people having been mercilessly slaughtered by Assad's forces.
But for Ja'afari and the regime which he
represents, the term "human rights" does not even enter their
lexicon; Ja'afari previously
said, "[t]he so-called turmoil does not affect our
candidacy." He added, "[t]hese are two different issues." If the
UNHRC's record is anything to judge by, he is right.
That Syria is even able to be nominated for the
UNHRC, let alone stand in a strong position to win a seat, is reflective of the
endemic problem with the body: not only is disregarding human rights no barrier
to becoming a member; even actively assaulting human rights is no barrier to
becoming a member.
The UNHRC was formed in 2006 specifically to
create a new body to tackle human rights abuses in light of the failures of its
discredited predecessor, the UN Human Rights Commission, which was largely
criticized for its one-sided obsession with Israel and the
make-up of its members, which included the likes of Sudan,
Zimbabwe, and Saudi Arabia. Libya even chaired the Commission in 2003.
The "new" Commission, the Council,
however, is nothing more than a carbon copy of its predecessor: it continues
its obsession with Israel, passing resolution after resolution repeatedly
attacking the sole democracy in the Middle East, while giving a pass to
wholesale abusers of human rights such as China, Russia, Cuba and Saudi Arabia.
It is high time that the U.S. stopped lending
legitimacy to, and funding, a non-transparent and unaccountable body that is
adversarial to both human rights and the West. The U.S. should withdraw its
involvement (and funding) from the Council altogether -- as had been the policy
under the Administration of George W. Bush.
President Obama has apparently decided instead
to seek a
second
term on the Council, while American taxpayers continue unconditionally to
fund 22% of the budget of the United Nations, which has increasingly become the
antithesis of everything the United States stands for: free speech, rule of
law, equal justice under the law, democracy, separation of religion and state,
and individual liberty and human rights.
In announcing the decision last March to seek a
new term, U.S. State Department spokesman Mark Toner
said:
"We believe that U.S. engagement in the Human Rights Council has directly
resulted in real progress." The reality could not be any more different.
The Council has maintained its unremitting anti-Israel obsession. Violators of
human rights, who have an automatic majority at the UN, continue to sit in
judgement of democracies, including the United States. Meanwhile around the
world, the pleas of millions of the real victims of human rights abuses go
unanswered.
The Administration's attempt to reform the
Council are at best naïve, at worst damaging to United States' national
security interests, and illustrative of the Obama Administration's willingness
to outsource American foreign policy to unaccountable international
organizations.
It is time to disband this inversion of moral
values and replace the entire organization with a United Democratic Nations
before it makes an even further mockery of human rights.
Who
Is Being "Intransigent"?
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The Israeli
cabinet also agreed that east Jerusalem would not be returned to Jordan, which
had ruled it; that Egypt had no greater claim to Gaza than Israel has, and that
Jordan had no greater claim to the West Bank than Israel has, as all three
countries had acquired the areas through war.
Forty-five years after the Six Day War,
declassified transcripts were released this June of the Israeli cabinet and
government committee meetings in the days after war that ended on June 10,
1967. The documents provide a breathtaking insight into the efforts of Israeli
leaders to reach a peace settlement with the countries and groups which had
been at war with Israel. The evidence of the hard work and the varied opinions
on the part of the Israeli ministers, all eager to reach a peace treaty and an
understanding with the Palestinians and Arab states, presents a revealing
contrast to the long-term refusal of the Arab parties to come to the
negotiating table -- an attitude that was reiterated at the summit meeting of
the Arab League on September 1, 1967 in Khartoum, Sudan. As has now been
revalidated by the declassified transcripts, the Israelis were ready to
negotiate land for peace; the Arab leaders instead issued their statement of
the three "nos:" no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no
negotiations with Israel -- an unconditionally negative position taken by Arab
leaders that still persists.
The Arab and Palestinian intransigence, the
refusal to accept a peace agreement, has a long history and is all too
familiar. In 1922 the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine was officially
established. Under it a Jewish Agency, set up in 1929, and composed of
representatives of world Jewry, would assist the British administration in
establishing the Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Jewish Agency then organized
an infrastructure of political and social institutions that became the basis
for the state of Israel. The Arabs refused the offer to create a similar
Agency.
In 1922 the Arab leaders who refused to
participate with the Jews in any plan or in a joint legislature, in which
anyone other than the Arabs would have been the majority; rejected the proposal
for a Palestinian Constitution with a Legislative Council in which the Arabs
would have formed the majority, and boycotted the election for the Council.
In 1937 the Arab Higher Committee rejected the
idea of two states, first officially proposed by the British Peel Commission
Report. The Report had recommended a Jewish state in about 20 percent of
Palestine, about 5,000 square kilometers, while most of the rest was to be
under Arab sovereignty. The Report also suggested a transfer of land and an
exchange of population between the two states. The Peel Commission Report was
accepted, in principle, by the Jewish Agency, even though it meant that the
Jewish state would be a small one, but it was totally rejected by the Arab
Higher Committee, which called for a single state in all of Palestine.
In 1939, in the last attempt before World War
II, to reach some agreement, the British Colonial Secretary organized a Round
Table Conference in London that February. Failure was inevitable: the
representatives of the five Arab states and the Arabs in Mandatory Palestine
who were present refused any direct contact or discussion with the Jewish
representatives -- even to sit in the same room with them.
The Arabs also refused to accept United Nations
General Assembly Resolution 181(II) of November 29, 1947, which adopted the
recommendation of the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) that Western
Palestine -- the area outside of Jordan -- be partitioned into two states, one
Jewish, one Arab, with an internationalized Jerusalem as a corpus separatum,
or separate body. The Jewish state would have about 55 percent of the area, but
not the historic areas of Judea and Samaria. The Resolution was accepted by the
Jewish leaders, but rejected by the Palestinian Arabs and by six of the seven
member states -- Jordan being the exception -- of the Arab League, which at
that time had replaced the League of Arab States.
Arab refusal to enter into peace negotiations
persists to this day, inflexible as ever. The Palestinians decline to enter
into negotiations with Israel unless Israel first accepts the "pre-1967
borders" (borders that have never existed; they are merely the armistice
line of where the fighting stopped in 1949), agrees to Jerusalem as the capital
of a Palestinian state, and ends all construction in areas acquired by Israel
as a result of the 1967 war.
In the Six Day War of June 1967, Israel
achieved a remarkably rapid victory over its Arab opponents; it left Israel in
control of the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, Gaza which had been ruled by
Egypt, the Jordan River, the Suez Canal, and the West Bank, so named by Jordan
which had "annexed" the area despite almost unanimous international
disapproval.
The Israeli documents just released also show
among Israeli leaders a startling readiness to compromise, which contrasts with
the total disinclination of Arabs and Palestinians to compromise. The documents
show clearly that, while there were acute differences among the Israelis about
the fate of the territories captured in 1967, almost all Israelis were eager to
trade land for peace.
The discussions and proposals were not
initially intended to be policy proposals; they were directives to Israel's
Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, who was participating in New York in the Special
Session of the UN General Assembly, called to resolve the Israeli-Arab
conflict. The ministerial discussions have to be put in the context of Israeli
concern about any UN action after the memory of at least two issues. The first
occurred when Israel was forced to withdraw from the Sinai after the Suez war
of 1956 and had to rely there on United States guarantees and the UN Emergency
Force (UNEF), which proved ineffective. The second was the speedy compliance in
May 1967 of U Thant, Secretary–General of the UN, without the required approval
of the UN General Assembly, to accede to Nasser's demand that the UNEF troops
in the Sinai be withdrawn. The Israeli ministers feared that pressure would
again be exerted on the state as in 1956 and May 1967, leaving Israel
vulnerable.
It is also relevant that the Israeli government
was a unity one under Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, and included members of Gahal
(Menachem Begin and Yosef Safir) and the Rafi party (Minister of Defense Moshe
Dayan). Not surprisingly, there were strong differences of opinion on the issues
of security, borders, refugees, and water -- all of which prevented agreement.
Consensus was reached, however, on some issues.
First, Israel should withdraw from captured territories only if the Arab
states agreed to make peace and end the boycott of Israel. Most important,
Israel would return the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria
in return for either a peace treaty or strong security guarantees. The Israeli
cabinet also agreed that east Jerusalem would not be returned to Jordan, which
had ruled it; that Egypt had no greater claim to Gaza than Israel had, and that
Jordan had no greater claim to the West Bank than Israel had, as all three
countries had acquired the areas through war.
Some ministers thought that the demand for
peace treaties was unrealistic. In the desperate effort to find positions that
would both lead to negotiation and also also protect the state of Israel, they
grappled with a variety of contradictory alternatives: control over the Gaza
Strip, freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran; demilitarization of the
Sinai and of the Golan Heights; control of the sources of the Jordan River;
rule over the West Bank; end of any Israeli rule in the West Bank; military
rule during a transition period; and self-rule for the Arab inhabitants of the
West Bank while Israel still concerns itself with foreign affairs and national
security.
Although there were differences on the issues
of the destiny of the West Bank, and on whether peace treaties should be based
on international frontiers, ministers all spoke of peace with security
arrangements. The positive answer to the security issue was finally approved by
a majority of one, 10 to 9: it was decided that a peace agreement should ensure
freedom of navigation in the Strait of Tiran, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez
Canal; the freedom of flight over them, and the demilitarization of the Sinai
Peninsula.
The formula agreed to by unanimity on June 19,
1967 was that "Israel proposes the conclusion of peace treaties with Egypt
and Syria on the basis of the international frontiers and Israel's security
needs." This proposal was presented to both Egypt and Syria, but no
positive response came from either. Instead, the Arab Summit leaders at
Khartoum announced on September 1, 1967 the three "nos."
As a result of Khartoum, Prime Minister Eshkol
wrote a month later, "I doubt whether the government would approve the
decision of June 19 exactly as it stands." In view of the continuing Arab
leaders' refusal to negotiate, the decision did indeed become invalid.
What these newly released Israeli documents
show in dramatic fashion is the eagerness of all the Israeli leaders, no matter
how they differed on specific issues, to reach peace agreements with their Arab
neighbors. If there is any hope for peace at this time among the Palestinians,
they might wish to reconsider.
Michael Curtis is author of Should
Israel Exist? A Sovereign Nation under Attack by the International Community.
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