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The Islamic
State of Iraq and Al-Sham
by Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
MERIA
December 11, 2013
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INTRODUCTION:
THE IDEOLOGY
The group under consideration in this paper–like al-Qa'ida central under
Usama bin Ladin and subsequently Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Tehrik-e-Taliban of
Waziristan, and others–is part of what one might term the "global
jihad" movement. This movement is not a coherent whole organized by a
strict central hierarchy, but rather one defined by a shared ideology. This
ideology aims firstly to reestablish a system of governance known as the
Caliphate–an Islamic form of government that first came into being after
Muhammad's death under Abu Bakr and saw its last manifestation in the
Ottoman Empire–across the entire Muslim world. From there, the intention is
to spread the Caliphate across the entire world.[1]
This worldview is one of many answers formulated to answer a question
posed in the wider Muslim world: Namely, what has been the cause of decline
of the Muslim world–and the Arab world in particular–in contrast to the
apparent success of the West since the nineteenth century? The answer
formulated by ideologues of the global jihad movement is that the cause of
this decline is rooted in the Muslim world's deviation from the path of
Islam by not applying Islamic law to governance in its totality. This is to
be contrasted with the "Islamic Golden Age" in Islam's first five
centuries or so–idealized in different ways by others not of this
orientation–when the Muslim world was supposedly uncontaminated by foreign
influences. Of course, given that era's exploitation of the classical Greek
heritage through the translation movement under the Abbasids- the global
jihad movement's portrayal of this era is blatantly unhistorical.
Nonetheless, the perception is what matters.
In light of the ISIS' ambitious goals, it is imperative to consider the
group's fortunes in Syria, which in turn will allow policymakers to assess
what threat, if any, the group poses to the wider international order in
the long-term.
BACKGROUND:
QUARRELS AT THE LEADERSHIP LEVEL
Prior to the announcement of ISIS by the leader of Iraq's al-Qa'ida
affiliate, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the main al-Qa'ida-aligned group operating
in Syria was Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) under the leadership of Abu Muhammad
al-Jawlani. JN, which had initially been established in January 2012 with
financial and manpower support from the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI),[2] had
enjoyed a fair degree of success throughout Syria in conducting operations
and establishing a foothold in areas freed from regime control.
The success was partly rooted in the manner in which JN has portrayed
its efforts in Syria–namely, as a defensive jihad to protect the Muslim
population in the face of oppression.[3] Thus, outreach to locals became
and still remains an important part of JN's strategy. For example, media
reports widely noted JN's running of bakery services for locals in places
such as Aleppo,[4] and one jihadi news outlet–the Himam News
Agency–regularly puts out videos of JN's provision of public services in
towns such as Binnish in Idlib, where JN fighters run garbage collection
and disposal.[5]
In terms of JN's overall position in Syria, while it was clear that the
group had a presence in operations throughout the country from Dar'a in the
far southwest to Hasakah in the far northeast, the evidence suggested that
the group was best established in the Aleppo and Deir al-Zor governorates.
However, it by no means follows from this assessment that JN somehow
controlled a substantial amount of territory in either of these provinces.
Moreover, JN had faced a degree of resentment and backlash from locals, as
occurred in the town of Mayadin in the Deir al-Zor governorate–though such
demonstrations of opposition could easily be met with counter-rallies by JN
supporters.[6] In March 2013, JN along with the Salafi battalion Harakat
Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya played a key role in the takeover of the
provincial capital of the Raqqa Governorate in the north.
April 2013 then saw the unexpected development of the announcement by
ISI leader Baghdadi of a merger between ISI and JN to form ISIS. In the
speech released on April 8, 2013, by ISI's official outlet al-Furqan Media,
Baghdadi described Jawlani as "one of our soldiers" and stated
that Jawlani had established his organization "from our sons."[7]
Baghdadi went on to explain that while there had been no explicit statement
of the links between ISI and JN, the time had now come to declare that JN
was simply an "extension" of ISI "and a part of it."[8]
Thus, Baghdadi announced the "cancellation of the name Islamic State
of Iraq and the cancellation of the name Jabhat al-Nusra, and the joining
of the two under one name: the "Islamic State of Iraq and
al-Sham."[9]
Baghdadi's words, therefore, confirmed long-standing suspicions among
Western intelligence officials that JN had been established as the Syrian
arm of the ISI, something that was also corroborated in a prompt response
released by JN's official media wing al-Manara al-Bayda ("The White
Minaret") on 10 April.[10] In his response, Jawlani denied that either
he or anyone in JN had been consulted on or had sought the announcement of
Baghdadi's merger, while admitting that the beginnings of JN lay in ISI, as
indicated by the following remark: "We accompanied the jihad in Iraq
as military escorts from its beginning until our return [to Syria] after
the Syrian revolution."[11]
Jawlani further stated, "We learnt lessons from our experience
there [in Iraq] concerning what is the secret of the hearts of the
believers in the land of al-Sham under the banner of Jabhat al-Nusra… I did
not want to leave Iraq before seeing the banners of Islam flying on high
over the land of the two rivers but the speed of events in ash-Sham
interfered between us and what we wanted."[12] Jawlani also spoke of
"our brothers in jihad in Iraq" and respectfully addressed ISI's
leader as "Sheikh Baghdadi, may God protect him." He then
concluded by reaffirming JN's pledge of allegiance to al-Qa'ida's central
leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, affirming that the "banner of Jabhat
al-Nusra will remain."[13]
The controversy over whether ISI and JN should be merged remained
unaddressed until June 2013. During that time, both JN and ISI's media arms
stopped releasing official content. In addition, tracking the activities of
JN and those going by the name of ISIS required reliance on unofficial
media, most notably YouTube videos.[14]Zawahiri then issued a letter in
early June 2013 urging for the separation of ISI and JN, while stressing
that the two organizations should cooperate.[15] Yet Baghdadi rejected the
ruling of separation in a speech entitled "Remaining [Steadfast] in
Iraq and al-Sham," wherein he insisted that Zawahiri's letter had
problems of legitimacy and methodology, hinting at a cast of doubt of
authenticity on the letter.[16]
Then another audio recording was released by al-Furqan Media, featuring
a speech by Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Adnani al-Shami, a Syrian jihadi
believed to be from Idlib[17]and identified by al-Furqan Media as the
official spokesman for ISIS.[18] Adnani reaffirmed Baghdadi's rejection of
Zawahiri's ruling in more forceful terms, insisting on "one front, one
leadership," and that "the borders will not separate between the
two [i.e., the jihad fronts in Iraq and Syria]." Adnani also vowed
that ISIS would target the "Rafidites" (Shi'a) with bombs
"from Diyala to Beirut."[19] On multiple occasions, Adnani
references the "defection" (inshiqaq) that has hurt the
ranks of the mujahidin in Syria–a not-so-subtle attack on Jawlani's refusal
to accept a merger with ISI to form ISIS.
As of the writing of this article, no further directives have been
issued from Zawahiri in an attempt to resolve the dispute. Indeed,
Baghdadi's rejection of his ruling essentially amounts to a humiliation of
Zawahiri. In Iraq itself, written statements are no longer put out in the
name of ISI, but ISIS. Further, while officially approved jihadi forums
such as Shamukh Islam were initially deleting posts put out in ISIS' name
after Zawahiri's ruling, this is no longer the case. Nonetheless, al-Furqan
Media, which now puts out videos on ISIS activities in both Iraq and
Syria,[20] still explicitly avoids describing itself as the media arm of
ISIS, but instead keeps a silence on the naming controversy in its videos.
Besides al-Furqan Media, some unofficial pro-ISIS outlets have come to
the forefront, such as al-Sham media (which put out a string of purported
ISIS videos in May 2013, and is based in Raqqa) and Baqiyya Media (named
after Baghdadi's speech that rejected Zawahiri's ruling). In any event,
Baghdadi has successfully challenged Zawahiri in that in practice ISIS is
now accepted as a reality on the ground alongside JN.
As a final prefatory note, the Baghdadi-Jawlani fitna aside, it should
be emphasized that as al-Qa'ida affiliates, both ISIS and JN are ultimately
committed ideologically to a transnational project for a caliphate that
should first span the Muslim world and then dominate the entire world.
However, it is undoubtedly true that ISIS in Syria is much more open about
these goals than JN.[21] The question now arises of how ISIS' relationship
with other groups plays out on the ground.
ISIS AND OTHER
REBELS: RELATIONS AND OPERATIONS
JN AND ISIS
In light of the quarrels at the leadership level between Baghdad and
Jawlani, the immediate issue that comes to mind is ISIS' relationship with
JN on the ground. A common paradigm of analysis in this case is to posit a
polarized dichotomy whereby ISIS is an entity composed of foreign fighters
as opposed to a native Syrian JN. This view is primarily based on some
media reports that estimate that 80 percent of muhajirin (foreign
fighters) in Syria have joined the ranks of ISIS.[22]
In this author's view, the estimate is likely to bear a good degree of
resemblance to the reality on the ground, but it would be erroneous to
conclude from it that ISIS is primarily a group of foreign fighters. To be
sure, from the current author's own documentation of claimed martyrs for
ISIS up to the beginning of July 2013,[23] as well as examination of
subsequent records on this issue,[24] it can be shown that at the minimum,
foreign fighters are disproportionately represented in its ranks and
constitute the most experienced and effective fighting force within ISIS,
while perhaps playing a key role in leadership in various localities. Yet
in Raqqa province, one anti-ISIS activist identified as Ahmed al-Asmeh told
the news site Syria Deeply that only "30 percent of their
[ISIS'] members are muhajiroun [foreigners]."[25] Likewise, a reporter
who visited the northern ISIS stronghold of Jarabulus in the Aleppo
governorate along the border with Turkey found that most of ISIS' members
in the town are native Syrians.[26]
In short, therefore, the strict dichotomy of ISIS as a group of foreign
fighters versus a native Syrian JN is not accurate. As far as relations on
the ground go, the relationship defies a simple polarity reflecting the
tensions at the leadership level. The current author has already documented
the ISIS-JN relationship in a number of governorates: notably Aleppo,
Raqqa, Deir al-Zor, and Dar'a.[27] Details of the relationship by
governorate need not be repeated at length, but to summarize: In Aleppo and
the city of Deir al-Zor, the entities of JN and ISIS are clearly separate.
In Dar'a, only a JN presence is to be found. In the Raqqa governorate and
areas of the east outside Deir al-Zor, the boundaries between JN and ISIS
are more blurred, such that in many parts the two names and their symbols
can be considered interchangeable.[28]
That said, since having documented the JN-ISIS relationship in the Raqqa
province, it should be noted that in mid-July 2013, reports emerged among
activist circles that the ISIS commander in the city of Raqqa itself–known
as Abu Sa'ad al-Hadrami–had decided to renounce his position in ISIS and
reaffirm the banner and name of JN as a separate identity and the only
legitimate one, withdrawing from the city in the process with a number of
mujahidin under his stead. Hadrami, who had previously been identified as
JN's amir in Raqqa[29] prior to the announcement of ISIS, was said to have
defected from ISIS on account of his dissatisfaction with ISIS' conduct in
the city, specifically in relation to detaining rebels from rival
battalions (e.g. Farouq), which had sparked some demonstrations in the city
against ISIS and Ahrar al-Sham.
Hadrami was also said to be unhappy with the fact that continuing the
name of ISIS amounted to disrespectful disobedience of Zawahiri's
orders.[30] At the start of July 2013, signs of a split in the Shari'a
committee in Raqqa between JN and ISIS supporters were reported by
purported local sources to the pro-Asad Arabic news site al-Hadath
News.[31] The contingent reaffirming a separate JN identity under Hadrami
apparently took refuge in the city of town of Tabqa (also known as
al-Thawra). Confirmation of the JN-ISIS split within Raqqa province was
recently confirmed by a statement from JN announcing a return to the city
of Raqqa, yet it remains unclear whether this split applies across the
whole governorate.[32]
In terms of ongoing major operations, it remains to consider the two
governorates of Damascus and Hasakah as regards the JN-ISIS relationship,
the latter of which will be discussed on the subject of conflict with
Kurdish forces. In the Damascus area, it is quite clear that JN and ISIS
are separate entities. This is most apparent as the two groups launched
their own "revenge" operations in response to the alleged chemical
weapons attacks by the regime in the East Ghouta area. JN's initiative–as
announced by Jawlani in a statement through al-Manara al-Bayda–is
called "An Eye for an Eye" and has entailed operations not only
in the Damascus area[33] but elsewhere in the country, such as the Aleppo
governorate.[34]
The ISIS-led revenge initiative goes by the name of "Volcano of
Revenge." It has entailed firing a number of mortar rounds and
Katyusha rockets at regime-held areas of Damascus, including parts
identified as inhabited by Alawites, and even struck the vicinities of the
Russian embassy and the Four Seasons hotel, where UN weapons inspectors
were staying.[35] The operation was coordinated with a variety of
battalions operating in the Damascus area, including Ahrar al-Sham, the
Jesus Son of Mary Battalions, the Furqan Brigades, and the Brigades and
Battalions of the Beloved Mustafa.[36]Of these groups, Ahrar ash-Sham can
be identified as part of the Salafi Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), while the
Furqan Brigades are known for an Islamist but nationalist outlook under the
banner of the Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, the other two can be
identified as independent formations but ideologically sympathetic to ISIS.
Thus, the Jesus Son of Mary Battalions' logo features ISIS imagery, most
notably in its use of the central white logo with the inscription
"Allah, Prophet Muhammad" (see the Appendix, Figure 1). On
Facebook pages set up for various battalions and news networks, ideological
affinity is often indicated by banners featured at the top of the page. For
example, a pro-Asad page will normally feature the current flag of Syria.
In the case of factions sympathetic to ISIS' project of a transnational
Islamic state, alignment will be shown by featuring the ISIS banner, known
as the "Banner of Tawhid" in jihadi circles, with the first half
of the Islamic shahada underneath: "There is no deity but God."
This is the case for the Jesus Son of Mary Battalions (see Appendix, Figure
2). As for the Brigades and Battalions of the Beloved Mustafa, sympathy for
the ISIS project is indicated by a statement released in June 2013 urging
"our brothers and our sons to join immediately and enter the arenas of
jihad." The statement featured an image of Syria under the ISIS banner
(Appendix, Figure 3).
Despite the ISIS-alignment, the two groups have also coordinated with JN
and more mainstream groupings like Liwa al-Islam as part of a new series of
revenge operations entitled "Ayyam al-Qadisiyya" in the Damascus
area.[37] However, elsewhere in the Damascus region, multiple reports have
emerged from jihadi sources of joint JN-ISIS operations. The most notable
case is that of the Sayyida Zaynab area, where both groups are said to be
fighting the Iranian proxy Shi'i militia group known as Liwa Abu al-Fadl
al-Abbas [LAFA].[38] For example, on August 17, 2013, a local outlet for
ISIS in the southern Damascus region reported a joint JN-ISIS-Liwa al-Islam
operation in the Sayyida Zaynab area, claiming a death toll of more than
250 Shi'i militiamen.[39] However, there is nothing to corroborate anything
resembling these figures from LAFA sources.[40]
On the other hand, the same ISIS outlet has featured photos of LAFA
militiamen that ISIS has purportedly killed in the Sayyida Zaynab area in
this period, and it would seem that pro-LAFA sources do corroborate the
individual cases to an extent, such as one LAFA fighter called Abu Hadi
Hassan (Appendix, Figure 4). Yet given that the operations against LAFA in
mid-August 2013 were reported as joint ISIS-JN-Liwa al-Islam, it is possible
that Abu Hadi could have been killed by a fighter from either of the latter
two battalions, or perhaps in a joint operation by all three groups.
On August 30, 2013, the local ISIS outlet also released a video showing
the carrying out of a joint JN-ISIS car bomb operation against LAFA in
Sayyida Zaynab. Besides displaying the car used to trigger the explosion,
scenes were also shown from the Sayyida Zaynab area of gunfire.[41] In
short, one might accept the idea of JN-ISIS collaboration (perhaps with
other battalions) in the Sayyida Zaynab area, with the caveat that local
sources affiliated with ISIS are prone to exaggerate the scale of
operations against LAFA and the death tolls therein.
Another notable area of JN-ISIS cooperation comes in the Qalamoun area
of rural Damascus. Here, this cooperation has come in the form of working
with another battalion called "The Green Battalion." This group
is an independent militia[42] led by Saudi muhajirin and ideologically
aligned with ISIS (Appendix, Figure 5). It is thus a similar formation to
the western rural Homs battalion Jama'at Jund al-Sham, which was founded by
Lebanese muhajirin sharing ISIS' ideology but independent from ISIS
(Appendix, Figure 6, cf. Figure 7).
These two groups can thus be distinguished from the prominent group of
foreign fighters known as Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa Ansaruhu [JMWA], which has
been a front group for ISIS under the direction of ISIS' amir for Aleppo,
northern Idlib, Raqqa, and Latakia–Abu Umar al-Shishani.[43] In any case, the
joint JN-ISIS operation in Qalamoun with the Green Battalion was first
reported by the latter group in a Facebook posting on August 7, 2013:
"Jabhat al-Nusra and the Green Battalion undertook with the help of
the Islamic State… in the assault on the storehouses of Danha in rural
Damascus."[44]
To sum up, the relationship between JN and ISIS in Damascus can be
described as comprising separate entities that are clearly capable of
cooperating with each other and working with other battalions. More
generally, there is nothing to suggest as of yet signs of overt conflict
emerging between JN and ISIS, where the two are clearly separate
entities–regardless of how unhappy many JN members may feel about
Baghdadi's April announcement of a merger.
ISIS and FSA
As regards ISIS' relations with battalions under the banner of the FSA,
this article is primarily concerned with how they have played out in the
Raqqa and Aleppo governorates, where vast amounts of territory are under
rebel control.[45] Previously, the current author has documented the
expansion of ISIS into rural areas of Aleppo and Idlib, particularly in the
border areas.[46] This has entailed clashes with battalions under the
banner of the FSA, such as the "Family of Jadir" in Jarabulus,
from whom ISIS seized power in mid-June 2013, and FSA groupings in
al-Dana.[47]
Elsewhere, ISIS clashed in August 2013 with the Raqqa branch of a group
of brigades under the banner of FSA known as Ahfad al-Rasul
("Descendants of the Prophet," AAR). The ISIS presence has also
sparked civilian protests against the group in a number of localities,
including al-Dana, Manbij, and Azaz.[48]
It would appear that the clashes began after AAR tried to ride the wave
of discontent in the form of sit-ins and rallies against both Ahrar al-Sham[49]
and ISIS on account of the long-standing issue of detention of rival
rebels. AAR's sympathies were shown by the fact that its Facebook page for
Raqqa shared a video of these demonstrations in early August 2013.[50]
Clashes were reported by the Lebanese news site to have begun on August 8,
2013, with some ten people killed on both sides.[51]
A video was then circulated in pro-ISIS circles purporting to show the
confession of an officer in AAR's ranks admitting to having received
support from France, in particular to fight the ISIS.[52] From this alleged
confession (which was quite clearly made under duress), pro-ISIS circles
began to refer to AAR as "Ahfad Faransa" ("descendants of
France"), and eventually denounced them as "apostates." They
also accused AAR of trying to form a Sahwa ("Awakening")
movement, supposedly equivalent to the anti-al-Qa'ida trend that took off
in Iraq among Sunni militiamen from 2007 onwards.
ISIS supporters used similar terminology to denounce their FSA opponents
in the Idlib town of al-Dana, but it should be noted that neither AAR in
Raqqa nor the FSA fighters in al-Dana referred to themselves as a Sahwa
movement. Indeed, considering the word's connotations of working with
Americans and the Iraqi government, the latter of which in Syria is widely
viewed as an Iranian agent by virtue of its support for the Asad regime, it
is hardly surprising that rebels deemed "mainstream" should want
to avoid using this term to describe themselves.
By August 14, 2013, ISIS had killed a prominent AAR commander in the
Raqqa area by the name of Fahad Husayn al-Kajwan, and had expelled AAR from
its headquarters in the city of Raqqa.[53] AAR, however, continued to fight
with ISIS elsewhere in the province, attacking an ISIS checkpoint in the
town of Tabqa.[54]
By August 17, however, AAR announced that it would cease all operations
against ISIS, "to preserve frontline unity."[55]An AAR commander
who spoke with Swedish analyst Aron Lund also confirmed that the AAR-ISIS
clashes were limited to the Raqqa area and that the two groups had
cooperated elsewhere: most notably in the failed Latakia offensive into the
Alawi heartland. One should further note in particular here the role of
Ahrar al-Sham: as this author's friend Shami Witness noticed, the group essentially
stood aside and let ISIS do the "dirty work" of eliminating a
common foe.
In some other parts of the Aleppo and Raqqa governorates, ISIS has
maintained friendly relations with battalions under the FSA banner, most
notably the then FSA Military Council in Aleppo, headed by one Colonel
Oqaidi, who refused to denounce the ISIS and admitted that ISIS was the
group that led the rebel takeover of the Mannagh airbase.[56] It is of
course true that the FSA-banner groups, such as the Northern Storm Brigade,
had besieged the Mannagh airbase for quite some time. Nonetheless, the
contributions of ISIS and its then front group JMWA proved decisive in the
eventual fall of the airbase. Early on after the fall of the airbase,
pro-ISIS outlets released photos attempting to demonstrate that the ISIS
had led the takeover of Mannagh (Appendix, Figures 8 and 9).
Noteworthy also from the fall of the Mannagh airbase is a video released
by the battalion Liwa al-Fatah, described by one writer as a "moderate
Islamist"[57] group. A quick glance at the video quickly demonstrates
that in analysis, the term "moderate Islamist" in this context is
quite meaningless. First, Abu Jandal al-Masri, the leader of the JMWA
contingent–identified immediately by the speaker who filmed the video as
synonymous with ISIS–is seen to be embracing a member of Liwa al-Fatah. Abu
Jandal then proclaims, "I swear by God we will not leave a single
Alawite alive in Syria… state of Islam, state of the Caliphate." This
is all proclaimed to the assent of "God is great" from the other
fighters, including the Liwa al-Fatah member who filmed the video.[58]
Another prominent FSA battalion in the Aleppo area with which ISIS
generally maintains cordial relations is Liwa al-Tawhid, whose ideological
orientation is in line with that of the Ikhwan.[59] In July 2013, rumors
began circulating–in origin from pro-Supreme Military Command circles
(affiliated with General Salim Idriss)–that the rebel icon from Jarabulus,
Abu Furat, had been killed by "Islamists" (i.e., JN/ISIS).
However, Liwa al-Tawhid soon issued a statement denying that this was so,
describing such rumors as an attempt by Western powers to stir up fitna
(discord) in rebel ranks through the Arabic news channel al-Arabiya.[60]
More recently, an image was put out showing a member of Liwa al-Tawhid in
Aleppo engaging in a friendly arm-wrestling match with an ISIS fighter
(Appendix, Figure 10). Yet not all supporters of Liwa al-Tawhid view ISIS
favorably. Some held a demonstration in the northern Aleppo town of Marea
calling for the expulsion of ISIS from the town, under the slogan,
"The people want Liwa al-Tawhid."[61]
In short, the foregoing data should demonstrate that there can be no
sweeping answers to the question of ISIS-FSA relations, but rather point to
a good deal of variation according to locality. Not all the potential
conflicts that can arise are necessarily rooted in ideology, and by no
means do all battalions under the banner of the FSA oppose ISIS simply
because of their transnational vision. The issue of FSA-ISIS relations is
also relevant to the question of conflicts with Kurdish forces, to which
will be covered in the following section.
ISIS and the Kurds
Prior to the announcement of ISIS, clashes between jihadi fighters and
Kurdish forces–most notably the People's Protection Groups (YPG) affiliated
with the PYD–had not been unknown. For example, clashes between JN allied
with a battalion of muhajirin known as Ghuraba al-Sham and the PYD had
erupted in the northeastern border town of Ras al-Ayn (Hasakah province) in
November 2012.[62] However, these clashes tended to be localized and never
erupted into an overall wider conflict. To be sure, the conflict in Ras
al-Ayn persisted for quite some time, but by the end of February 2013, a
truce had been successfully negotiated, thanks to the efforts of Christian
opposition activist Michel Kilo.[63]
A dramatic shift occurred in July 2013 with the renewed outbreak of
clashes in Ras al-Ayn between YPG forces and fighters deemed members of
ISIS/JN. This culminated in the expulsion of the latter from the town, with
rumors that YPG fighters, after taking over the ISIS/JN headquarters, had
defiled the banner of jihad by trampling on it with their shoes.[64] One
should note the way in which this incident and subsequent events in
al-Hasakah involving jihadi-YPG fighting have been reported. That is, the
names of JN/ISIS are generally used interchangeably with frequent claims of
joint operations. Based the current author's own research on the JN-ISIS
relationship in eastern Syria that looked at the town of al-Shaddadi in the
Hasakah province,[65] the apparent confusion and claims of joint operations
in Hasakah appear to be the result of the fact that the boundaries between
JN and ISIS are blurred, as is the case in the Deir al-Zor governorate
outside the city of Deir al-Zor.
In any case, following the expulsion of JN/ISIS from Ras al-Ayn,
fighting between JN/ISIS and YPG forces quickly expanded, not only
throughout Hasakah province but also the Raqqa and Aleppo governorates,
where YPG forces existed in various localities–albeit not with the
connections that exist in the northeast Hasakah governorate. For example,
prior to the clashes, ISIS had tolerated a limited PYD presence in its
northern stronghold of Jarabulus, even after defeating the Family of Jadir.
However, once the fighting in Ras al-Ayn erupted, ISIS rallied supporters
in Jarabulus to denounce the PKK (seen in jihadi circles as synonymous with
and identical to the PYD).[66]In collaboration with local FSA groupings,
ISIS proceeded to crack down on the PYD presence in the Jarabulus area,
arresting numerous Kurds who were charged with being PKK/PYD activists.[67]
YPG forces proceeded to launch an offensive against ISIS in a village near
the town of Jarabulus,[68] but were ultimately unsuccessful.
Other battalions quickly joined in taking ISIS' side against the
PKK/PYD. Thus, on August 2, 2013, a group of battalions from an area
stretching from Manbij to Jarabulus (where YPG forces have been most active
in the Aleppo governorate) issued a joint statement against the PKK/PYD,
saying that there is no doubt that the PKK was a "party affiliated
with the idolatrous, criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad."[69] As a
result, the coalition decided on a policy of "cleansing out the armies
of the PKK present among our lines… considering the highway road between
Manbij and al-Hasakah a military zone requiring liberation from PKK
checkpoints… stopping all negotiations and political meetings between us
and any front considered to be representing the PKK." Signatories to
this statement included the ISIS, Liwa al-Tawhid, Ahrar al-Sham, Liwa
al-Yarmouk,[70] and Suqur al-Sham.[71]
As can be seen, battalions of a variety of ideological affiliations have
taken ISIS' side against the PKK/PYD. Dislike of the latter was further
corroborated in Colonel Oqaidi's interview with NOW Lebanon, where
he likewise accused the PYD of being an agent for the Asad regime.[72] It
is this allegation that proves crucial to the rhetoric of ISIS and other
rebel factions against the PYD in an attempt to show they are not against
Kurds as a people. Thus the joint statement against the PKK/PYD also has
the signatories emphasize that they have nothing against Kurds who are not
connected with the PKK.[73]
In a similar vein, this author's own discussions with ISIS supporters and
jihadi sources have shown a tendency among these circles to portray the PYD
as a marginal communist apostate group with little popular support among
Syrian Kurds. Likewise, conflict in the Raqqa governorate's Turkish border
town of Tel Abyad between PKK/PYD forces on one side versus ISIS/JN in
alliance with Ahrar al-Sham and some FSA groupings–which culminated in the
expulsion of the PKK/PYD from the town[74]–saw repeated allegations against
ISIS/JN, in particular of systematic looting and destruction of Kurdish
property.[75] In response to these repeated claims, ISIS released a
statement indicating that its fighters were obliged to protect the property
of Muslim brothers, whether Kurdish or Arab, but presumably excluding those
affiliated with the PYD/PKK and thus deemed apostates.[76]
As of the writing of this article, the overall picture in the conflict
is that YPG forces have suffered serious setbacks in both the Aleppo and
Raqqa governorates. Yet they are still holding their own in the Hasakah
province. Nonetheless, there have been no major advances by either side, as
JN/ISIS has been unable to retake Ras al-Ayn, despite repeated attempts at
bombarding YPG positions in the town.[77] Indeed, one ISIS source claimed
that ISIS in alliance with FSA battalions had rooted out the PKK/PYD
presence from more than 90 percent of the northern Raqqa countryside around
the Tel Abyad area and vowed that the PKK/PYD would be eliminated entirely,
including from the Hasakah governorate.[78] Some new mujahidin umbrella groupings
have been declared dedicated to achieving this objective as well, including
in the northern Aleppo countryside[79]and Qamishli area in the Hasakah
province.[80]
On some occasions, truces have been announced between FSA-SIF groups and
Kurdish forces on account of mediation from delegations claiming to be the
"Kurdish Supreme Council" (KSC), but these delegations have never
been more than small groups of local Kurds acting unilaterally, and so the
truces have lacked real authority and quickly collapsed. Indeed, the
coalition of Kurdish opposition groups called the Kurdish National Council
(KNC) thus requested that all groups should stop using the KSC name
unilaterally.[81] In turn, the PYD, believing Turkey to be the main venue
of financial and armed backing to JN/ISIS, has reached out to Ankara in the
hope of achieving some sort of ceasefire, or at least a cessation of aid
from Turkey to JN/ISIS.[82]
At this stage, successful mediation and a long-lasting truce are
unlikely. The conflict has escalated beyond localized clashes and has quite
clearly taken on the form of an existential, ideological struggle, with
JN/ISIS circles making it abundantly clear that they deem the PYD/PKK
"apostates" who should be annihilated. Conversely, many Kurds–both
pro- and anti-PYD–view this conflict as an ethnic Kurdish-Arab war.
Meanwhile, battalions under the FSA or SIF banner remain convinced that the
PYD in particular is an agent for the Asad regime. This is the case even
though, from an analyst's point of view, the fairest assessment is that the
PYD is eager to maintain exclusive control over its strongholds and Kurdish
areas more generally, and therefore is willing to cut deals with regime
forces and rebel groups to achieve that goal–while being prepared to take
on both should they encroach on PYD territory.
In the meantime, it is clear that the conflict has provoked the upsurge
in Kurdish refugees to Iraq. Unsurprisingly, Turkish media outlets
affiliated with the AKP government put the refugee surge down to alleged
repression on the part of the PYD.[83] While there may be some truth to the
testimony cited in Turkish media, it seems more likely that the bulk of the
upsurge has been due to JN/ISIS/FSA/SIF seizure of Kurdish areas in the
Aleppo and Raqqa governorates in particular, as well as continued
bombardment and attacks on Kurdish areas in the Hasakah governorate in
particular.
The seizure of territory has provoked rumors from pro-PYD circles above
all of large-scale massacres of Kurds and policies of forced Arabization.
Regardless of the truth of these claims (and the stories of massacres are
generally uncorroborated), there is a sufficient climate of fear created to
prompt a flight of refugees into the safe haven of Iraqi Kurdistan, whose
government is now contemplating closer security cooperation with Baghdad in
light of the perceived common threat of al-Qa'ida.[84] A further side
effect of this conflict is that it has undoubtedly bolstered the PYD's
image in Syrian Kurdistan as the protector of the Kurds, as YPG forces are
doing the bulk of the fighting against JN/ISIS and other groups. In short,
it is a bleak situation, despite the KNC's backtracking on its withdrawal
from Syrian opposition frameworks in mid-August 2013 as well as the
decision to join the Syrian opposition coalition in-exile on
preconditions.[85]
CONCLUSION:
ISIS' FUTURE
From the above, it should be apparent that ISIS' relations with other
rebel groups are by no means a case of "al-Qa'ida vs. everyone
else." Two general principles can be drawn. First, in the conflict
with the PYD/PKK in particular, one cannot expect other rebel
groups–whether under the banner of the FSA, SILF, SIF and the like–to side
with the PYD/PKK against the ISIS. Second, SIF groups like Ahrar al-Sham,
whose discourse blurs the national/transnational distinction over wider
goals, will not openly side with ISIS' opponents–Kurdish or FSA–in an event
of conflict. This is even as some Ahrar al-Sham leaders harbor reservations
about ISIS.[86] Among those under the banner of FSA, the staunchest
opponents of ISIS remain those with close ties to SMC leader Salim Idriss,
who has accused ISIS of being agents for the Asad regime.[87]
Compared with ISIS' fortunes in Iraq, ISIS has been far more successful
in Syria than the Iraqi branch could ever have hoped. The main factor
behind this success is undoubtedly the good degree of continuity between JN
and ISIS in terms of outreach to locals. Granted, where ISIS and JN are
clearly separate entities, JN's provision of services is more extensive than
that of ISIS.
Nonetheless, it is clear that ISIS in Syria has learned from the
mistakes of its predecessors and understands that "winning hearts and
minds" is a key part of expanding its control. For instance, ISIS has
provided toys and days of fun for children during and after Ramadan,[88]
along with iftar (evening meal that breaks the fast during Ramadan)
dinners (Appendix, Figure 11) and food aid. ISIS has even introduced a
rationing system of basic necessities in parts of Aleppo (Appendix, Figure
12), and it provides bus services and schools for children (Appendix,
Figure 13).
Despite these advances for ISIS, the current author still maintains the
assessment from back in March 2013 that such strongholds are only likely to
exist in the north and east of Syria.[89] The picture elsewhere in the
country is still one of generalized chaos, and one must be wary of
sensationalist claims that al-Qa'ida-aligned factions somehow dominate the
armed opposition.
Could there be a Sahwa-style movement against ISIS eventually? One need
not completely rule out the possibility, but the only plausible context in
which such a development could arise is in a post-Asad order with an
extensive foreign troop presence on the ground, perhaps needed for at least
a decade in order to build up a viable post-Asad centralized security
force. For now, however, it is implausible to suggest that other rebels
will team up with either the PYD or regime forces to fight ISIS. This is
even as intra-rebel rivalries, including between ISIS and other groups, are
inevitable now and in the future, regardless of whether there is a Sahwa
movement.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford
University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
NOTES
[1] See more on this issue vis-à-vis ISIS in Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,
"The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham's Messages and
Self-Presentation in Syria and Iraq," Jihadology, September, 9,
2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/09/09/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash-shams-messages-and-self-presentation-in-syria-and-iraq/
(accessed September 9, 2013).
[2] The official name of the al-Qa'ida branch in Iraq.
[3] This issue of presentation of jihad is discussed in Aymenn Jawad
Al-Tamimi, "Jihad in Syria," Syria Comment, March 22,
2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/jihad-in-syria-by-aymenn-jawad-al-tamimi/.
The issue of presentation is particularly relevant when one considers that
JN's full name, Jabhat al-Nusra li Ahl al-Sham, translates to
"Protection/Victory Front for the People of al-Sham."
[4] See, for example, Kelly McEvers, "Jihadi Fighters Win Hearts
and Minds by Easing Syria's Bread Crisis," NPR Radio, January
17, 2013, http://www.npr.org/blogs/thesalt/2013/01/18/169516308/as-syrian-rebels-reopen-bakeries-bread-crisis-starts-to-ease.
[5] Himam News Agency, "Jabhat al-Nusra: Cleaning Services in the
Town of Binnish – Idlib," July 11, 2013, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ut86JXg_R_I
(accessed August 31, 2013). The outlet also published a video on JN's
making and provision of bread for fighters in East Ghouta. See "Jabhat
al-Nusra: Making of Bread and Its Provision to the Mujahidin on the Fronts
in East Ghouta, Rural Damascus," July 23, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2J9q0oCvHlI
(Accessed August 31, 2013).
[6] Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Jihad in Syria."
[7] Al-Furqan Media, "Announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq and
ash-Sham: Speech by the Commander of the Believers Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
May God protect him," YouTube, April 8, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HPQxA3catY
(accessed August 31, 2013).
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Al-Manarah al-Bayda, "Speech by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani,"
April 10, 2013, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QXZ3YpzF4Mw
(accessed August 31, 2013).
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State
of Iraq and ash-Sham," Brown Moses Blog, May 17, 2013, http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/05/jabhat-al-nusra-and-islamic-state-of.html.
[15] For a full translation of Zawahiri's letter, see Aymenn Jawad
Al-Tamimi, "Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri Annuls Islamic State of Iraq and
ash-Sham,"
June 9, 2013, http://www.aymennjawad.org/2013/06/sheikh-aymenn-al-zawahiri-annuls-islamic-state
(accessed August 31, 2013).
[16] Al-Furqan Media, "Remaining [Steadfast] in Iraq and
al-Sham," YouTube, June 14, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I7AvJvC8vfs
(accessed 31 August, 2013).
[17] See, for example, National Iraqi News Agency, "Al-Baghdadi
Appoints Adnani as Amir of Islamic State in Iraq and Levant," August
18, 2013, http://www.ninanews.com/english/News_Details.asp?ar95_VQ=GJHIHH.
It should be noted that the claim that Baghdadi appointed Adnani as ISIS
amir was widely reported in Iraqi media, but there exists no evidence in
jihadi circles to corroborate this claim.
[18] Al-Furqan Media, "Speech by Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, Spokesman
in the Name of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: 'Scatter Them and
What They Believe'," YouTube, June 20, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lWZKnOzFXn4
(accessed August 31, 2013.
[19] It should be noted that the phrase "from Diyala to
Beirut" was used recently in pro-ISIS circles (e.g., by ISIS Twitter
user @reyadiraq) to celebrate the bombings that struck a Hizballah
stronghold in southern Beirut on August 15, 2013. It appears that observers
have not yet realized that the origin of this ISIS slogan goes back to
Adnani's speech in June 2013.
[20] For example, note an al-Furqan Media video released as part of a
recent series entitled "Messages from Ard al-Melaham [Syria:
literally "The Land of Epic Battles"]." It features an
interview with a man who is supposedly ISIS' eldest fighter. He is
introduced as one of those who took part in the ISIS-led capture of Mannagh
military airbase in the Aleppo governorate. He mentions that one of his
children is imprisoned in Iraq. However, nowhere is an affiliation to a
group named ISIS affirmed in the video. See "Messages from Arḍ
al-Melaham 1: Shaykh al-Mujahid Abu Omar al-Ansari," YouTube, August
20, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y0QJOrQaMCg
(accessed December 3, 2013).
[21] For a detailed discussion of this issue, see: Aymenn Jawad
Al-Tamimi, "The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham's Messages and
Self-Presentation in Syria and Iraq," Jihadology, September 9,
2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/09/09/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash-shams-messages-and-self-presentation-in-syria-and-iraq/.
[22] See, for example, Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, "Syria's al-Nusra
Front–Ruthless, Organized and Taking Control," The Guardian,
July 10, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/10/syria-al-nusra-front-jihadi.
[23] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The ISIS Cavalcade: Round-Up of Some
Claimed Martyrs for the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham," Jihadology,
July 1, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/07/01/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad-the-isis-cavalcade-round-up-of-some-claimed-martyrs-for-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash-sham/.
[24] That said, a trickle of reported native Syrian martyrs for ISIS has
begun to appear. For example, the pro-ISIS outlet al-Saqeel Media reported
on August 13, 2013, the martyrdom of one Abu Muhammad al-Hamawi, whose name
clearly implies origins from Hama, where he was in fact martyred. See https://www.facebook.com/Alsaqeel/posts/367168850078405.
Cf. the case of Hamid al-Sayyid from the Idlib town of Binnish, reported by
ISIS source @zhoof21 on August 17, 2013, to have been killed in ISIS'
clashes with rival rebel battalion Liwa Ahfad al-Rasul in Raqqa: https://twitter.com/zhoof21/status/368494016444125184/photo/1.
[25] Alison Tahmizian Meuse, "In Raqqa, Islamist Rebels Form a New
Regime," Syria Deeply, August 16, 2013, http://beta.syriadeeply.org/2013/08/raqqa-islamist-rebels-form-regime/#.UiKKBmakUu8.
[26] Youssef Shaikho, "Jarablos: From Syrian City to Islamic
Emirate," The Damascus Bureau, July 12, 2013, http://www.damascusbureau.org/?p=5569.
[27] See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Musings of an Iraqi Brasenostril
on Jihad," Jihadology, http://jihadology.net/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad/.
[28] Kata'ib Junud al-Haq in Abu Kamal–likely behind the recent clashes
with Abu Kamal's local Ahfad al-Rasul affiliate, Liwa Allahu Akbar–has been
a good example of JN-ISIS crossover in the eastern border areas (on paper,
the group previously claimed JN affiliation prior to Baghdadi's April 2013
statement, then declared itself a part of ISIS, and finally switched back
to JN affiliation in name after Zawahiri's statement, while preserving ISIS
banners and imagery).
Yet it should be noted that recently the group has reaffirmed an exclusive
JN identity by dropping all traces of ISIS imagery from its emblem and
indicating the JN affiliation explicitly. Contrast these three logos, the
one on the far left a logo from February 2013; the one in the middle
introduced in April 2013, after Baghdadi's announcement of an ISI-JN
merger; and the final one a reworking of the one on the left. It has been
used before April 2013, but was being used again as of September 2013 (see
Figure 13 in the Appendix).
[29] "The Amir of Jabhat al-Nusra in Raqqa Abu Sa'ad al-Hadrami,
May God Protect Himself," Free Syrian Army Forum, April 1,
2013, http://syrianarmyfree.com/vb/showthread.php?t=39928.
[30] "Liberated Raqqa… Clashes Between Armed Battalion and Great
Popular Protests and a Girl Holds a Sit-In Demonstration Alone in front of
the State of Iraq and ash-Sham Headquarters," Syria Frontline Blog,
August 11, 2013, http://syria.frontline.left.over-blog.com/article-119493981.html.
[31] "In Raqqa… Jawlani vs. Baghdadi: Jabhat al-Nusra Defects and
the Shari'a Committee Is Turning into a Wrestling Arena," al-Hadath
News, July 1, 2013, http://www.alhadathnews.net/archives/88058.
[32] Aleppo Islamic News Network, "Jabhat al-Nusra Statement on Its
Return to the Province of Raqqa," September 13, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=1400517533510327&set=a.1376419709253443.1073741831.1375938215968259&type=1&theater
(accessed September 15, 2013).
[33] See, for example, al-Manarah al-Bayda, "376: Within the Series
of Operations 'Eye for an Eye': Demolition of the Tu'ma Checkpoint on the
Zamlaka-al-Qabun Road Connecting to Damascus," August 26, 2013, http://justpaste.it/4lox.
[34] Ibid, "382: Within the Series of Operations 'Eye for an Eye':
Assault and Cleansing of the Village of al-Himam in the Eastern Aleppo
Countryside," August 30, 2013, http://justpaste.it/5i6c.
[35]Baqiyya Media, "Day One of Operation 'Volcano of
Revenge,'" https://ia801901.us.archive.org/19/items/VolcanoOperation/day1.jpg.
The attack on the Four Seasons took place at 9:30 a.m. on August 27, 2013;
while the attack on the Russian embassy took place at 10:15 a.m. No
casualties appear to have occurred as a result of either strike.
[36] Baqiyya Media, List of Groups Participating in "Volcano of
Revenge," August 27, 2013, https://twitter.com/Baqiya_Media/status/372302620838211584/photo/1.
[37] "Urgent: Battle of Ayyam al-Qadisiyya," August 31, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/YOUSUFDIAB/posts/426782150774822,
(accessed September 3, 2013).
[38] Credit goes to the author's colleague Phillip Smyth for coining
this acronym. It should be noted that not all those who may use the ISIS
banner in the Sayyida Zaynab area identify themselves as members of ISIS.
On May 25, 2013, a statement was released by a spokesman for the battalion
"Commandos of the Soldiers of God" [Maghawir] announcing joint
operations with Ahfad al-Rasul and "other battalions" against
LAFA in Sayyida Zaynab. See "Announcement of an Attack on the
Headquarters of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas in Sayyida Zaynab," YouTube,
May 25, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K4QXmbJ-zcU&feature=youtu.be
(accessed September 1, 2013). While Maghawir use the FSA flag in their
logo, their sympathies for ISIS are quite apparent with the appearance of
the banner of Tawhid in the video. Further, in late June 2013, a video
emerged on YouTube, showing Maghawir fighters raising the ISIS banner over
a Damascus mosque. The group's rhetoric has also repeatedly referred to
Shi'a as "Rafidites." See "Raising of the Banner of Jihad
over the Mosque of the Companion Abu Obeida bin al-Jarrah After Its
Liberation," YouTube, June 23, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VFp55-qMwBk
(accessed September 1, 2013).
[39] "Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham: Damascus, Southern
Region," August 17, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/DwltAlaslamFyAlraqWalshamAlmntqtAljnwby/posts/621198794578679.
Prior to the announcement of ISIS, there has been JN-Liwa al-Islam
cooperation in the Sayyida Zaynab area. For example, see this discussion on
the jihadi forum al-Platform Media from January 6, 2013, http://alplatformmedia.com/vb/showthread.php?t=17803.
[40] Cf. discussion with Phillip Smyth on this issue.
[41] Ibid, August 30, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?v=627461047285787
(accessed September 1, 2013).
[42] Corroborated by discussion with ISIS sources.
[43] That JMWA is a front group for ISIS is shown by numerous lines of
evidence. Besides the overlap of Abu Umar al-Shishani's positions in ISIS
and JMWA, jihadi sources always identify the two as synonymous. For
instance, see this jihadi forum thread discussing JMWA/ISIS providing
religious instruction to children in an Idlib village: "Islamic State
of Iraq and al-Sham: Snapshots from Qur'an Memorization Circles in the
Village of Salwa," Yemen-Forum.net, July 17, 2013, http://www.ye1.org/vb/showthread.php?t=735092
(accessed September 1, 2013). As an epilogue note to this article, it
should be pointed out that JMWA has subsequently split between those under
Umar al-Shishani, who are now just under ISIS, and those following one
Salah al-Din al-Shishani, who has retained the JMWA name and affirmed the
group's new independence from ISIS.
[44] The Green Battalion's Facebook page, August 7, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/alkatebaalkhadraa/posts/1391729221053168
(accessed September 1, 2013).
[45] The contrast here is with what some commentators term "the
southern front" (i.e., Damascus and Dar'a). To an extent, ISIS/JN
relations with other battalions have been dealt with in the preceding
section. With JN in particular, it is clear that the group can coordinate
operations with a variety of battalions, as demonstrated in this author's Jihadology
post on their activities in Dar'a. The same is true to a lesser extent for
ISIS. Yet the lack of substantial rebel holdings of territory in Damascus
and Dar'a in comparison with the north, together with the fact that the
ISIS' presence is significantly smaller in the southern areas, means that
FSA-ISIS relations in the south cannot be discussed in nearly the same
depth as northern and eastern areas.
[46] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "The Islamic State of Iraq and
ash-Sham Expands into Rural Northern Syria," Syria Comment,
July 18, 2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash-sham-expands-into-rural-northern-syria/.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Ibid. The most recent gesture of dissatisfaction from these three
towns comes from Manbij, where a group of rebels describing themselves as
the Manbij military council urged ISIS to turn over its large headquarters
in the town to the authority of the council. See Aleppo News Network,
"Revolutionary Military Council in Manbij Considers the Islamic State
a Faction Like the Other Military Factions," Halab News, August
26, 2013, http://halabnews.com/news/34583.
The statement likely reflects the council's concerns about ISIS' expanding
power base in the town.
[49] See, for example, "Reporters Without Borders: Demonstration
Against Harakat Ahrar ash-Sham al-Islamiya in the Town of Raqqa,"
YouTube, August 10, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4pjPTyvF-8k.
This demonstration of course took place after the ISIS-Ahfad al-Rasul
clashes began, but the sentiment among opponents of ISIS is equally
directed at Ahrar al-Sham, which is the main rebel group controlling the
city.
[50] Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades in Raqqa, August 3, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=201765266649519&id=149528001873246.
[51] "Ahfad al-Rasul and the Islamic State wrestle over
Raqqa," al-Mada News, August 8, 2013, http://www.almada.org/news/index/22468.
[52] "Admissions of a Security Officer of Brigade 201 of Ahfad
al-Rasul and the Truth of Being Employed by France and Others for Waging
War on Islam," YouTube, August 9, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6k3W3gfRHp8&sns=tw.
[53] Raqqa News Network, August 13, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=571579696218657&set=a.461964663846828.101588.461902453853049&type=1&theater.
[54] Tel Abyad News Network, August 14, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/tall.abyad.news/posts/492294847528277.
[55] "Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades Announce an End to Their Operations
Against the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham," Aks Alser,
August 17, 2013, http://www.aksalser.com/?page=view_articles&id=34f248008e9def7744ca1759b91d5c4a&ar=843842874.
[56] "Col. Oqaidi on al-Qaeda, UN Inspectors, and Kurdish Militias,"
NOW Lebanon, August 20, 2013, https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/interviews/col-oqaidi-on-al-qaeda-un-inspectors-and-kurdish-militias.
Oqaidi subsequently resigned from his position, citing disunity among rebel
ranks and warlordism.
[57] Joanna Paraszczuk, "Getting a Story Right–Free Syrian Army,
'Jihadist Militants,' and the Capture of Menagh Airbase," EAWorldView,
August 8, 2013, http://eaworldview.com/2013/08/syria-analysis-getting-a-story-right-free-syrian-army-jihadist-militants-capture-of-menagh-airbase/.
[58] Liwa al-Fatah- Aleppo, "Jaysh al-Muhajirin wa al-Ansar–the
Mujahid Abu Jandal al-Masri in Mannagh Military Airport and a Message to
Bashar," YouTube, August 12, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtYqx9wqvLQ#at=140
(accessed September 2, 2013).
[59] Corroborated also from discussion with analyst Jonathan Spyer, who
has met members of the battalion on the ground, including its deputy
commander.
[60] "Important Statement," Liwa al-Tawheed, July 20,
2013, http://lewaaltawheed.com/?p=4238.
[61] Aleppo and Idlib News Network, "Aleppo: Marea: Demonstration
Demanding the Removal of the State of Iraq and ash-Sham," YouTube,
July 19, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NF7u5RdzaWw.
The ISIS presence in the town can be traced as far back as June 2013, when
a video was uploaded showing a demonstration in Marea in solidarity with
Baniyas, featuring an ISIS flag in the background: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8k1mwPRdKk
(accessed September 2, 2013).
[62] Justin Vela, "In Syria, Clashes Between Arab Rebels,
Kurds," The Washington Post, November 28, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-28/world/35508209_1_pyd-rebels-and-kurdish-militants-al-nusra.
[63] Omar Hossino and Kinda Kanbar, "How Michel Kilo Negotiated a
Tenuous Truce in Ras al-Ayn," Syria Deeply, March 5, 2013, http://beta.syriadeeply.org/2013/03/michel-kilo-negotiated-tenuous-truce-ras-al-ayn/#.UiULjmakUu8.
[64] Al-Jewar, "Workers Party [PKK] Tramples with Its Shoes on the
Banner of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Fierce Battles in Ras
al-Ayn," July 18, 2013, http://aljewar.org/news-45467.aspx.
[65] Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State
of Iraq and ash-Sham: Deir ez-Zor and the Wider East of Syria," Jihadology,
June 27, 2013, http://jihadology.net/2013/06/27/musings-of-an-iraqi-brasenostril-on-jihad-jabhat-al-nusra-and-the-islamic-state-of-iraq-and-ash-sham-deir-ez-zor-and-the-wider-east-of-syria/.
[66] "Demonstration of the Free Men of Jarabulus Against Division,
the PKK Party, and for Victory to the Islamists," YouTube, July 18,
2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=govsVF4Mofk
(accessed September 3, 2013). To make a more accurate distinction between
PYD and PKK forces, it should be noted that the PKK has a front-group
militia called Jabhat al-Akrad ("Kurds' Front"), which declares
affiliation with the FSA.
[67] "The Official Press Site of Abd al-Basit Ahmad al-Khalf,"
August 1, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/A.A.Alkhalaf1/posts/385890114867610
(accessed September 3, 2013).
[68] Via ISIS source @zhoof21: "ISIS: Aleppo: Continuation of
Clashes with YPG Apostates in the Village of Zor Maghar near
Jarabulus," August 6, 2013, https://twitter.com/zhoof21/status/364812498618179584/photo/1.
[69] Kata'ib al-Ahrar, "Important Statement from Battalions
Fighting in Aleppo as Regards the PKK Militias," August 2, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/KtaibAlahrar1/posts/508902399185411
(accessed September 3, 2013).
[70] A battalion formed in Manbij last year and with declared
affiliation to the FSA Military Council in Aleppo. See this video of the
statement of their formation: Omawi News, YouTube, September 24, 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XJ-llFeKKb0
(accessed September 3, 2013).
[71] Affiliated with the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front (SILF), a
coalition of rebel groups of which many have Ikhwani leanings, though Suqur
al-Sham has a more Salafi orientation and consists of many Syrian jihadi
veterans of the Iraq War.
[72] "Col. Oqaidi on al-Qaeda."
[73] Kata'ib al-Ahrar, "Important Statement from Battalions
Fighting in Aleppo."
[74] Orient News, "Return of Ordinary Life to the Town of Tel Abyad
After Violent Battles," YouTube, August 19, 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=YrXB_l9Adlw#at=37.
[75] See, for example, Tel Abyad News Network, August 19, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/tall.abyad.news/posts/494402173984211
(accessed September 3, 2013).
[76] Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, "Statement on Events in Tel
Abyad," Muslm.org, July 23, 2013, http://www.muslm.org/vb/showthread.php?516320.
[77] See, for example, @zhoof21, "ISIS: al-Hasakah: Striking the
Headquarters of the YPG Apostates in the Town of Ras al-Ayn with Mortar
Rounds and Artillery Shells," August 20, 2013, https://twitter.com/zhoof21/status/369607326778818560.
[78] "Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham: Damascus, Southern
Region," August 24, 2013, https://www.facebook.com/DwltAlaslamFyAlraqWalshamAlmntqtAljnwby/posts/624664640898761.
[79] Aleppo News Network, "Formation of an Operations Umbrella in
the Northern Countryside to Challenge the PKK and PYD," Halab News,
August 14, 2013, http://halabnews.com/news/33413.
[80] Ugarit News, "Hasakah: Statement of the Qamishli Liberation
Front," YouTube, July 18, 2013, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0DWQ5KkmNvE
(accessed September 3, 2013). The transnational jihadi outlook–likely the
result of JN/ISIS crossover this author has noted in the Hasakah
governorate (note the JN banner)–is made clear with the chanting at the
end: "The Caliphate is the promise of God."
[81] "Exclusive: KNC Decides to Withdraw from all Syrian Opposition
Frameworks," Welati.net, August 18, 2013, http://www.welati.info/nuce.php?ziman=ar&id=9381&niviskar=1&cure=5&kijan=.
[82] See, for example, Amberin Zaman, "PYD Leader to Turkey: Stop
Arms to Jabhat al-Nusra," al-Monitor, August 7, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2013/08/turkey-still-allowing-weapons-to-jabhat-al-nusra.html.
[83] See, for example, "PYD Forces Syrians to Seek Refuge in Iraqi
Kurdistan," Today's Zaman, August 25, 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-324526-pyd-forces-syrians-to-seek-refuge-in-iraqi-kurdistan.html.
[84] See, for example, "No Kurdish Peshmerga Forces in Baghdad's
Green Zone," Shafaaq News, August 6, 2013, http://www.ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2013/8/state7254.htm.
No formal initiatives have been implemented yet, but plans for cooperation
should the need be perceived to arise are on the table. Iraqi Shi'i
political figures have also played up rumors of jihadi massacres of Kurds
in Syria: e.g., Ali al-Dargham, "Sheikh Jalaluddin al-Saghir: The
Approach of Jabhat al-Nusra which Is Killing Kurds Is Takfiri," Buratha
News, August 19, 2013, http://www.burathanews.com/news_article_207465.html.
[85] See, for example, "Kurds Council Joins Opposition Coalition
with Preconditions," ZAMAN ALWSL, August 29, 2013, http://www.zamanalwsl.net/en/readNews.php?id=1267.
[86] The group is a huge movement, as analyst Charles Lister notes, so
some diversity of opinion about ISIS is hardly surprising.
[87] Associated Press, "In Syria, Infighting Between al-Qaida
Groups and Mainstream Rebels Undermining Revolt," Fox News,
July 15, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/07/15/in-syria-infighting-between-al-qaida-groups-and-mainstream-rebels-undermining/.
[88] See, for example, Max Fisher, "Al-Qaeda Faction in Syria Hands
Out Teletubbies and Spiderman Dolls," The Washington Post,
August 13, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/08/13/al-qaeda-faction-in-syria-hands-out-teletubbies-and-spiderman-dolls/,
crediting this author for unearthing ISIS' distribution of Teletubbies
dolls to children.
[89] Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Jihad in Syria."
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Topics: Radical Islam, Syria | Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
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