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Israel's
Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Efraim Inbar
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2014 (view PDF)
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About 90 percent of Israel's foreign trade is carried out
via the Mediterranean Sea. The East Mediterranean is also important in
terms of energy transit. Close to 5 percent of global oil supply and 15
percent of global liquefied natural gas travels via the Suez Canal
while Turkey hosts close to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the
Bosporus Straits and two international pipelines.
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About 90 percent of Israel's foreign trade is carried out via the
Mediterranean Sea, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for
the Jewish state's economic well-being. Moreover, the newly found gas
fields offshore could transform Israel into an energy independent country
and a significant exporter of gas, yet these developments are tied to its
ability to secure free maritime passage and to defend the discovered
hydrocarbon fields. While the recent regional turmoil has improved
Israel's strategic environment by weakening its Arab foes, the East
Mediterranean has become more problematic due to an increased Russian presence,
Turkish activism, the potential for more terrorism and conflict over
energy, and the advent of a Cypriot-Greek-Israeli axis. The erosion of
the state order around the Mediterranean also brings to the fore Islamist
forces with a clear anti-Western agenda, thus adding a civilizational
dimension to the discord.[1]
The East
Mediterranean Region
The East Mediterranean is located east of the 20o meridian
and includes the littoral states of Greece, Turkey, Syria, Lebanon,
Israel, Gaza (a de facto independent political unit), Egypt, Libya, and
divided Cyprus. The region, which saw significant superpower competition
during the Cold War, still has strategic significance. Indeed, the East
Mediterranean is an arena from which it is possible to project force into
the Middle East. Important East-West routes such as the Silk Road and the
Suez Canal (the avenue to the Persian Gulf and India) are situated there.
In addition, the sources for important international issues such as
radical Islam, international terrorism and nuclear proliferation are
embedded in its regional politics.
Turkish
policy, fueled by Ottoman and Islamist impulses, has led to strains in
the relationship with Israel.
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The East Mediterranean is also important in terms of energy transit.
Close to 5 percent of global oil supply and 15 percent of global
liquefied natural gas travels via the Suez Canal while Turkey hosts close
to 6 percent of the global oil trade via the Bosporus Straits and two
international pipelines. The discovery of new oil and gas deposits off
the coasts of Israel, Gaza, and Cyprus and potential for additional
discoveries off Syria and Lebanon, is a promising energy development.
Breakdown of
the U.S. Security Architecture
The naval presence of the U.S. Sixth Fleet was unrivalled in the
post-Cold War period, and Washington maintained military and political
dominance in the East Mediterranean.[2] Washington also managed the
region through a web of alliances with regional powers. Most prominent
were two trilateral relationships, which had their origins in the Cold
War: U.S.-Turkey-Israel and U.S.-Egypt-Israel.[3] This security architecture has
broken down.
Hamas leader Ismail Haniya (left) meets with Turkish
president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. With the Islamist Erdoğan at its helm,
Turkey supports Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot; helps Iran evade
sanctions; assists Sunni Islamists moving into Syria; propagates
anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic conspiracies while, at home, the regime
displays increasing authoritarianism.
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In the post-Cold War era, Ankara entered into a strategic partnership
with Jerusalem, encouraged by Washington.[4] The fact that the two strongest
allies of the United States in the East Mediterranean cooperated closely
on strategic and military issues was highly significant for U.S.
interests in the region. Yet, the rise of the Islamist Justice and
Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) since its electoral
victory of November 2002 has led to a reorientation in Turkish foreign
policy which, under the AKP, has distanced itself from the West and
developed ambitions to lead the Muslim world.[5] With Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at
its helm, Turkey supports Hamas, a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot; helps
Iran evade sanctions; assists Sunni Islamists moving into Syria and mulls
an invasion of Syria; propagates anti-U.S. and anti-Semitic conspiracies
while the regime displays increasing authoritarianism at home. Moreover,
Turkey's NATO partnership has become problematic, particularly after a
Chinese firm was contracted to build a long-range air and anti-missile
defense architecture.[6]
Turkish policy, fueled by Ottoman and Islamist impulses, has led to an
activist approach toward the Middle East and also to strains in the
relationship with Israel. This became evident following the May 2010
attempt by a Turkish vessel, the Mavi Marmara, to break the
Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. In October 2010, Turkey's national
security council even identified Israel as one of the country's main
threats in its official policy document, the "Red Book." These
developments fractured one of the foundations upon which U.S. policy has
rested in the East Mediterranean.
Stability in the East Mediterranean also benefited from the
U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli triangle, which began when President Anwar Sadat
decided in the 1970s to switch to a pro-U.S. orientation and subsequently
to make peace with Israel in 1979. Egypt, the largest Arab state, carries
much weight in the East Mediterranean, the Middle East, and Africa.
Sadat's successor, Husni Mubarak, continued the pro-U.S. stance during
the post-Cold War era. The convergence of interests among the United
States, Egypt, and Israel served among other things to maintain the Pax
Americana in the East Mediterranean.
Washington
has offered confused, contradictory, and inconsistent responses to the
Arab uprisings.
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Yet, the U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli relationship has been under strain
since Mubarak's resignation in February 2011. Egypt's military continued
its cooperation with Israel to maintain the military clauses of the 1979
peace treaty. But the Muslim Brother-hood, which came to power via the
ballot box, was very reserved toward relations with Israel, which the
Brotherhood saw as a theological aberration. Moreover, the Brotherhood
basically held anti-U.S. sentiments, which were muted somewhat by
realpolitik requirements, primarily the unexpected support lent it by the
Obama administration.[7]
The Egyptian army's removal of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in July
2013 further undermined the trilateral relationship since the U.S.
administration regarded the move as an "undemocratic"
development. Washington even partially suspended its assistance to Egypt
in October 2013, causing additional strain in relations with Cairo. This
came on the heels of President Obama's cancellation of the Bright Star
joint military exercise and the Pentagon's withholding of delivery of
weapon systems. The U.S. aid flow has now been tied to "credible
progress toward an inclusive, democratically-elected, civilian government
through free and fair elections."[8] Israeli diplomatic efforts to
convince Washington not to act on its democratic, missionary zeal were
only partially successful.[9] These developments have
hampered potential for useful cooperation between Cairo, Jerusalem, and
Washington.
The turbulence in the Arab world since 2011 has also underscored the
erosion in the U.S. position. This is partly due to the foreign policy of
the Obama administration that can be characterized as a deliberate,
"multilateral retrenchment … designed to curtail the United States'
overseas commitments, restore its standing in the world, and shift
burdens onto global partners."[10] It is also partly due to
Washington's confused, contradictory, and inconsistent responses to the
unfolding events of the Arab uprisings.[11] Furthermore, the ill-conceived
pledge of military action in Syria in response to the use of chemical
weapons by Assad and the subsequent political acrobatics to avoid
following through elicited much ridicule.[12]
This was followed by the November 2013 nuclear deal, hammered out
between U.S.-led P5+1 group and Iran, that allows the Islamic Republic to
continue enriching uranium as well as weaponization and missiles—the
delivery systems—that has been viewed in the East Mediterranean (and elsewhere)
as a great diplomatic victory for Tehran. Regional leaders have seen
Washington retreat from Iraq and Afghanistan, engage (or appease) its
enemies Iran and Syria, and desert friendly rulers. All have strengthened
the general perception of a weak and confused U.S. foreign policy.
North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits
Lebanon, a state dominated by the radical Shiite Hezbollah. Beirut has
already laid claim to some of the Israeli-found offshore gas fields,
shown above. Moreover, Syria, an enemy of Israel and long-time ally of
Iran, exerts considerable influence in Lebanon.
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Drained by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and blessed with new
energy finds, Washington does not want to get dragged into additional
conflicts in a Middle East that no longer seems central to its interests.
As it edges toward energy independence, Washington is apparently losing
interest in the East Mediterranean and the adjacent Middle East. This
parallels Obama's November 2011 announcement of the "rebalance to
Asia" policy.[13]
The rise of China is an understandable strategic reason for the
reinforcement of U.S. military presence in Asia. While little has been
done to implement the Asia pivot, cuts in the U.S. defense budget clearly
indicate that such a priority will be at the expense of Washington's
presence elsewhere, including the East Mediterranean. The U.S. naval
presence in the Mediterranean dwindled after the end of the Cold War and
the mounting needs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.[14] At the height of the Cold War,
the Sixth Fleet regularly comprised one or two aircraft carrier task
forces; today it consists of a command ship and smaller vessels such as
destroyers. While the U.S. military is still capable of acting in the
East Mediterranean, the general perception in the region is that the
Obama administration lacks the political will and skills to do so.
The possibility that European allies in NATO or the European Union
will fill the U.S. position in the East Mediterranean is not taken seriously.
Europe is not a real strategic actor since it lacks the necessary
military assets, a clear strategic vision, as well as the political will
to take up the U.S. role. Others, such as Russia, which has long
maintained a base in Syria, might.
Growing
Islamist Presence
Elements of radical Islam are increasingly powerful around the East
Mediterranean basin. The Muslim-majority countries have difficulties in
sustaining statist structures, allowing for Islamist political forces to
exercise ever-greater influence. Indeed, Islamist tendencies in Libya,
Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Turkey all threaten the current
unrestricted access to the area by Israel and the West.
The
Egyptian military's grip over the Sinai Peninsula is tenuous. Full
Egyptian sovereignty has not been restored.
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Libya remains chaotic three years after the uprising against Mu'ammar
al-Qaddafi. Such lack of order may lead to the disintegration of the
state and allow greater freedom of action for Muslim extremists.[15] Libya's eastern neighbor,
Egypt, is now ruled again by the military, but it is premature to
conclude that the Islamist elements will play only a secondary role in
the emerging political system. They still send multitudes into the
streets of Egyptian cities to destabilize the new military regime. Apart
from the important Mediterranean ports, Egypt also controls the Suez
Canal, a critical passageway linking Europe to the Persian Gulf and the
Far East that could fall into the hands of Islamists.
Even if the Egyptian military is able to curtail the Islamist forces
at home, its grip over the Sinai Peninsula is tenuous. Under Gen. Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi, attempts to dislodge the Sunni jihadists roaming Sinai
have increased, but full Egyptian sovereignty has not been restored. This
could lead to the "Somalization" of the peninsula, negatively
affecting the safety of naval trade along the Mediterranean, the
approaches to the Suez Canal, and the Red Sea. Nearby Gaza is currently
controlled by Hamas, a radical Islamist organization allied with Iran.
Containment of the Islamist threat from Gaza remains a serious challenge.
North of Israel, along the Mediterranean coast, sits Lebanon, a state
dominated by the radical Shiite Hezbollah. It has already laid claim to
some of the Israeli-found offshore gas fields. Moreover, Syria, an enemy
of Israel and long-time ally of Iran, exerts considerable influence in
Lebanon. The Assad regime remains in power, but any Syrian successor
regime could be Islamist and anti-Western.
Further on the East Mediterranean coastline is AKP-ruled Turkey. A
combination of Turkish nationalism, neo-Ottoman nostalgia, and
Islamist-jihadist impulses has pushed Ankara away from a pro-Western
foreign orientation toward an aggressive posture on several regional
issues. Turkey is interested in gaining control over the maritime gas
fields in the eastern Mediterranean, which would limit its energy
dependence on Russia and Iran and help fulfill its ambitions to serve as
an energy bridge to the West. This puts Ankara at loggerheads with
Nicosia and Jerusalem, which share an interest in developing the
hydrocarbon fields in their exclusive economic zones and exporting gas to
energy-thirsty Europe. Indeed, Ankara also flexed its naval muscles by
threatening to escort flotillas trying to break the Israeli blockade on
Gaza.
West of Turkey is Greece, a democratic, Western state with a stake in
the protection of the Greek Cypriots from Muslim domination. However, it
has limited military ability to parry the Turkish challenge alone and is
wracked by economic problems. Many East Mediterranean states also would
likely favor the return of Cyprus to Turkish (and Muslim) rule. This
preference introduces a civilizational aspect to the emerging balance of
power.
A New
Strategic Equation
Russian warships arrive at the Syrian port city of Tartus,
January 8, 2014. The Russians have retained a naval base at Tartus and
have gradually increased fleet size and stepped up patrols in the East
Mediterranean, roughly coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian
civil war. Moscow also gained full access to a Cypriot port and recently
announced the establishment of a Mediterranean naval task force
"on a permanent basis."
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There is now a power vacuum in the East Mediterranean and an uncertain
future. Several developments are noteworthy: a resurgence of Russian
influence, the potential for Turkish aggression, the emergence of an
Israeli-Greek-Cypriot axis, an enhanced terrorist threat, greater Iranian
ability to project power in the region, and the potential for wars over
gas fields.
Russia: The power vacuum makes it easier for Moscow to
recapture some of its lost influence after the end of the Cold War. While
U.S. and European navies in the region have steadily declined for years
as this theater has been considered of diminishing importance, Russia has
retained its Tartus naval base on the Syrian coast and has gradually
improved its fleet size and stepped up patrols in the East Mediterranean,
roughly coinciding with the escalation of the Syrian civil war.[16] Moscow's new military
footprint in the East Mediterranean has been underscored by multiple
Russian naval exercises. During his visit to the Black Sea Fleet in
February 2013, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu stressed that the
"Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to
Russia's national interests" and that continued fallout from the
Arab upheavals increased the importance of the region. Shortly after, he
announced the establishment of a naval task force in the Mediterranean
"on a permanent basis."[17]
Moscow also gained full access to a Cypriot port.[18] A member of the European Union
but not NATO, and painfully aware that the West is not likely to offer a
credible guarantee against potential Turkish aggression, Nicosia has come
to consider Moscow a power able to provide a modicum of deterrence
against Ankara.[19]
Russian diplomacy and material support have also been crucial to
keeping Syria's Bashar al-Assad in power, making Moscow a tacit ally of
Iran.[20]
No less important, Russia has increased its leverage in Egypt—the most
important Arab state—following the military coup. According to many
reports, a large arms deal, to the tune of U.S. $2-3 billion, and naval
services at the port of Alexandria, were discussed between the two
countries at the beginning of 2014. If these deals do indeed materialize,
this would represent an important change in Egyptian policy. It is not
clear whether the Western powers fully understand the strategic
significance of Egypt moving closer to Russia.
Despite its problems with Muslim radicals at home, Moscow has also
maintained good relations with Hamas. In contrast to most of the
international community, which considers Hamas a terrorist organization,
in 2006, the Russian government invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow for
talks.[21]
In 2010, together with Turkey, Russia even called for bringing Hamas into
the diplomatic process attempting to achieve an Israeli-Palestinian
agreement.[22]
Finally, Russia—an energy producer—has shown interest in the newly
Russian
support has been crucial to keeping Syria's Assad in power, making
Moscow a tacit ally of Iran.
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discovered offshore energy fields.[23] In July 2012, Russian
president Vladimir Putin visited Israel to discuss the gas fields, among
other things. In December 2013, Moscow signed a 25-year energy deal with
Syria that opens the way for its eventual move into the gas-rich East
Mediterranean.[24]
Turkey: The Russian encroachment has been paralleled by
greater Turkish assertiveness. Under certain conditions, Ankara may be
tempted to capitalize on its conventional military superiority to force
issues by military action in several arenas, including the Aegean,
Cyprus, Syria, and, perhaps, Iraq. The potential disintegration of Syria
and the possible establishment of an independent Greater Kurdistan could
be incentives for Turkish intervention. The collapse of the AKP's earlier
foreign policy, dubbed "zero problems" with Turkey's neighbors,
could push Ankara into open confrontation. Aggressive Russian behavior in
Crimea could reinforce such tendencies.
Similarly, Turkey's appetite for energy and aspiration to become an
energy bridge to Europe could lead to aggressive behavior. Turkish
warships have harassed vessels prospecting for oil and gas off Cyprus. [25] Cyprus is also the main
station for a Turkish desired pipeline taking Levant Basin gas to Turkey
for export to Europe. Ankara might even be tempted to complete its
conquest of Cyprus, begun when it invaded and occupied the northern part
of the island in 1974.
Ankara has embarked on military modernization and has ambitious
procurement plans. Turkish naval power is the largest in the East
Mediterranean.[26]
In March 2012, then-navy commander Admiral Murat Bilgel outlined Turkey's
strategic objective "to operate not only in the littorals but also
on the high seas," with high seas referring to the East
Mediterranean. The December 2013 decision to purchase a large 27,500-ton
landing dock vessel capable of transporting multiple tanks, helicopters,
and more than a thousand troops, reflects its desire to project naval
strength in the region.[27]
Israel, Cyprus, and Greece: Turkey's threats and
actions have brought Israel, Cyprus, and Greece closer together. Beyond
blocking a revisionist Turkey and common interests in the area of energy
security, the three states also share apprehensions about the East
Mediterranean becoming an Islamic lake. Athens, Jerusalem, and Nicosia
hope to coordinate the work of their lobbies in Washington to sensitize
the U.S. administration to their concerns. Battling an economic crisis,
Greece wants the new ties with Israel to boost tourism and investment,
particularly in the gas industry, while deepening its military
partnership with a powerful country in the region.[28] Moreover, the emerging
informal Israeli-Greek alliance has the potential to bring Israel closer
to Europe and moderate some of the pro-Palestinian bias occasionally
displayed by the European Union.
Greece's George Papandreou (left) and Benjamin Netanyahu in
Athens, August 2010. Turkey's threats and actions have brought Israel
and Greece closer together . Battling an economic crisis, Greece wants
the new ties with Israel to boost tourism and investment, particularly
in the gas industry, while deepening its military partnership with a
powerful country in the region.
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Following Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Greece in August 2010,
cooperation between the two countries has been broad and multifaceted,
covering culture, tourism, and economics. One area of cooperation
discussed was the possibility of creating a gas triangle—Israel-Cyprus-Greece—with
Greece the hub of Israeli and Cypriot gas exports to the rest of Europe.[29] Such a development could
lessen the continent's energy dependence on Russia.[30] Another project that can
further improve the ties between the countries is a proposed undersea
electric power line between Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. Currently Israel
and Cyprus are isolated in terms of electricity and do not export or
import almost any power.
Israeli-Greek military cooperation has already manifested itself in a
series of multinational—Greek, Israel, and United States—joint air and
sea exercises under the names Noble Dina[31] and Blue Flag (which included
an Italian contingent).[32] Greece also cooperated with
Israel in July 2011 by preventing the departure of ships set to sail to
Gaza.[33]
International terrorism: Developments in the Arab states
of the East Mediterranean have increased the threat of international
terrorism. As leaders lose their grip over state territory and borders
become more porous, armed groups and terrorists gain greater freedom of
action. Moreover, security services that dealt with terrorism have been
negatively affected by domestic politics and have lost some of their
efficiency. Sinai has turned into a transit route for Iranian weapons to
Hamas and a base for terrorist attacks against Israel. Hamas has even set
up rocket production lines in Sinai in an effort to protect its assets,
believing Jerusalem would not strike targets inside Egypt for fear of
undermining the bilateral relations.[34] Syria has also become a haven
for many Islamist groups as result of the civil war.
Furthermore, as weakened or failed states lose control over their
security apparatus, national arsenals of conventional and nonconventional
arms have become vulnerable, which may result in the emergence of
increasingly well-armed, politically dissatisfied groups seeking to harm
Israel. For example, following the fall of Qaddafi, Libyan SA-7 anti-air
missiles and anti-tank rocket-propelled grenades reached Hamas in Gaza.[35] Similarly, in the event of a
Syrian regime collapse, Damascus's advanced arsenal, including chemical
weapons, shore-to-ship missiles, air defense systems, and ballistic
missiles of all types could end up in the hands of Hezbollah or other
radical elements.[36]
Salafi jihadist groups have reportedly attacked the Suez
Canal several times. In 2013, an Egyptian court sentenced 26 members of
an alleged terrorist group to death over plans to target ships in the
canal. In 2014, Egyptian authorities again tightened security around
the canal following fears that Muslim Brotherhood supporters of Mohamed
Morsi might attack ships in the waterway in protest over his trial.
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Finally, terrorist activities could adversely affect the navigation
through the Suez Canal, an important choke point. Salafi jihadist groups
have attacked the canal several times already.[37]
The Iranian presence: The decline in U.S. power, the
timidity of the Europeans, and the turmoil in the Arab world have
facilitated Iranian encroachment of the East Mediterranean. Indeed,
Tehran's attempts to boost its naval presence in the Mediterranean are
part of an ambitious program to build a navy capable of projecting power
far from Iran's borders.[38] Tehran would like to be able
to supply its Mediterranean allies: Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and
Hamas in Gaza. Entering the Mediterranean also enhances Iran's access to
Muslim Balkan states, namely Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo, giving Tehran a
clear stake in the outcome of the Syrian civil war. Assad's hold on power
is critical for the "Shiite Crescent" from the Persian Gulf to
the Levant, which would enhance Iranian influence in the Middle East and
the East Mediterranean. Tehran has also been strengthening naval
cooperation with Moscow, viewed as a potential partner in efforts to
limit and constrain U.S. influence.[39]
Tehran's
attempts to boost its naval presence in the Mediterranean are part of a
program to build a navy capable of projecting power far from Iran's
borders.
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Wars over gas fields: The discovery of gas fields in the
East Mediterranean could potentially escalate tensions in this
increasingly volatile region. Competing claims to the gas fields by
Israel's former ally Turkey as well as by its neighbor Lebanon (still in
a de jure state of war) have precipitated a buildup of naval
forces in the Levant basin by a number of states, including Russia.
Israel's wells and the naval presence protecting them also offer new
targets at sea to its longstanding, non-state enemies, Hezbollah and Hamas.
Conscious of these threats, the Israel Defense Forces chief of staff,
Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, has approved the navy's plan to add four offshore
patrol vessels.[40] Israeli defense circles hope
that Israel's expanding navy, combined with continuous improvement of
land and air assets and increasing cooperation with Greece and Cyprus,
will give pause to any regional actor that would consider turning the
Mediterranean Sea into the next great field of battle. Indeed, the
Israeli navy is now preparing to defend the gas field offshore of Israel.[41]
The future role of Russia in these developments is not clear. Some
analysts believe that Moscow is interested primarily in marketing the
region's energy riches. Securing gas reserves in the East Mediterranean
will also help Moscow safeguard its dominant position as a natural gas
supplier to western Europe, which could be challenged by new competitors
in the region. Yet, delays and disruptions in moving gas to Europe might
further strengthen Russia's role as a major energy supplier to Europe and
keep prices high, which is beneficial for Moscow. Moreover, as the
Ukraine crisis indicated, geopolitics still is a dominant factor in
Russian decision-making.
Conclusion
Stability in the East Mediterranean can no longer be taken for granted
as U.S. forces are retreating. Europe, an impotent international actor,
cannot fill the resulting political vacuum. Russia under Putin is beefing
up its naval presence. Growing Islamist freedom of action is threatening
the region. Turkey, no longer a true ally of the West, has its own
Mediterranean agenda and the military capability to project force to
attain its goals. So far, the growing Russian assertiveness has not
changed the course of Turkish foreign policy. The disruptive potential of
failed states, the access of Iran to Mediterranean waters, and interstate
competition for energy resources are also destabilizing the region. But
it is not clear whether the Western powers, particularly the United
States, are aware of the possibility of losing the eastern part of the
Mediterranean Sea to Russia or radical Islam, or are
preparing in any way to forestall such a scenario. U.S. naiveté and
European gullibility could become extremely costly in strategic terms.
The Israeli perspective on the East Mediterranean region is colored by
its vital need to maintain the freedom of maritime routes for its foreign
trade and to provide security for its newly found gas fields. While its
strategic position has generally improved in the Middle East, Jerusalem
sees deterioration in the environment in the East Mediterranean. A
growing Russian presence and Turkish assertiveness are inimical to
Israel's interests. Developments along the shores of the East Mediterranean
also decrease stability and enhance the likelihood of more Islamist
challenges.
In civilizational terms, the East Mediterranean has served as a point
of contention in the past between Persia and the ancient Greeks and
between the Ottomans and Venetians. It is the location where the struggle
between East and West takes place. After the Cold War, the borders of the
West moved eastward. Now, they could easily move in the other direction.
Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for
Strategic Studies, is professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan
University and a Shilman-Ginsburg Writing Fellow at the Middle East
Forum.
[1] Samuel P.
Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1993, pp. 22-49.
[2] For more,
see Seth Cropsey, Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy
(New York: Overlook Duckworth, 2013).
[3] Jon B.
Alterman and Haim Malka, "Shifting Eastern Mediterranean
Geometry," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp. 111-25.
[4] Efraim
Inbar, The Israeli-Turkish Entente (London: King's College
Mediterranean Program, 2001); Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli
Relationship. Changing Ties of Middle Eastern Outsiders (New York:
Palgrave, 2004).
[5] Rajan Menon
and S. Enders Wimbush, "The US and Turkey: End of an Alliance?"
Survival, Summer 2007, pp. 129-44; Efraim Inbar,
"Israeli-Turkish Tensions and Their International
Ramifications," Orbis, Winter 2011, pp. 135-9; Ahmet
Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Konumu
(Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001).
[6] Tarik
Ozuglu, "Turkey's Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to
Interests," The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp.
153-64; Burak Ege Bekdil, "Allies Intensify Pressure on Turkey over
China Missile Deal," The Defense News, Feb. 24, 2014, p. 8.
[7] Liad Porat,
"The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt-Israel Peace," Mideast
Security and Policy Studies, no. 102, BESA Center for Strategic Studies,
Ramat Gan, Aug. 1, 2013.
[8] Tally
Helfont, "Slashed US Aid to Egypt and the Future of the Bilateral
Relations," Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington,
D.C., Oct. 13, 2013.
[9] Interview
with senior Israeli official, Jerusalem, Apr. 7, 2013.
[10]
Daniel W. Drezner, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy? Why We Need
Doctrines in Uncertain Times," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 2011,
p. 58.
[11]
Eitan Gilboa, "The United States and the Arab Spring," in
Efraim Inbar, ed., The Arab Spring, Democracy and Security: Domestic
and Regional Ramifications (London: Routledge, 2013), pp. 51-74.
[12] Eyal
Zisser, "The Failure of Washington's Syria Policy," Middle
East Quarterly, Fall 2013, pp. 59-66.
[13] "Pivot to the Pacific?
The Obama Administration's 'Rebalancing' toward Asia," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C., Mar. 28, 2012.
[14] Seth
Cropsey, "All Options Are Not on the Table: A Briefing on the US
Mediterranean Fleet," World Affairs Journal, Mar. 16, 2011;
Steve Cohen, "America's Incredible Shrinking Navy," The Wall
Street Journal, Mar. 20, 2014.
[15] Florence
Gaub, "A Libyan Recipe for Disaster," Survival,
Feb.-Mar. 2014, pp. 101-20.
[16] Thomas
R. Fedyszyn, "The Russian Navy 'Rebalances' to the
Mediterranean," U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Dec. 2013.
[17] Ibid.
[18]
InCyprus.com, Jan. 11, 2014.
[19]
Interviews with senior officials, Nicosia, Oct. 10, 2012.
[20] Zvi
Magen, "The Russian Fleet in the Mediterranean: Exercise or Military
Operation?" Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington,
D.C., Jan. 29, 2013.
[21] Igor
Khrestin and John Elliott, "Russia and the Middle East," Middle
East Quarterly, Winter 2007, pp. 21-7.
[22] The
Jerusalem Post, May 12, 2010.
[23] Thane
Gustafson, "Putin's Petroleum Problem," Foreign Affairs,
Nov./Dec. 2012, pp. 83-96.
[24] United
Press International, Jan.
16, 2014.
[25] For example,
see, Gary Lakes, "Oil,
Gas and Energy Security," European Rim Policy and Investment
Council (ERPIC, Larnaca, Cyprus), Oct. 23, 2009.
[26] "Turkey,"
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C., Dec. 24,
2012, pp. 19-25.
[27]The
Jerusalem Post, Feb. 4, 2014.
[28]
Bloomberg News Service (New York), Aug. 2011.
[29] The
Jerusalem Post, Sept. 10, 2013.
[30] Ibid.,
Aug. 2, 2011.
[31] The
Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Mar.
25, 2014.
[32] Arutz
Sheva (Beit El and Petah Tikva), Nov.
25, 2013.
[33]Haaretz
(Tel Aviv), July 2, 2011.
[34] The
Jerusalem Post, Dec.
11, 2011.
[35] Reuters,
Aug.
29, 2011.
[36] Defense
News (Springfield, Va.), Dec. 12, 2011.
[37] USA
Today, Nov. 4, 2013.
[38] Shaul
Shay, "Iran's
New Strategic Horizons at Sea," Arutz Sheva, July 30,
2012; Agence France-Presse, Jan. 17, 2013.
[39] Michael
Eisenstadt and Alon Paz, "Iran's
Evolving Maritime Presence," Policy Watch, no. 2224,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Mar. 13,
2014.
[40] Israel
Hayom (Tel Aviv), July 10, 2012.
[41] Defense
News (Springfield, Va.), Feb. 27, 2012.
Related
Topics: Israel & Zionism
| Efraim Inbar
| Fall 2014 MEQ
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