Taqiyya
Revisited: A Response to the Critics
by Raymond
Ibrahim
Jihad Watch
February 26, 2009
http://www.meforum.org/2094/taqiyya-revisited
Having written at length on various aspects of Islam, it is
always my writings concerning doctrinal deceit that elicit (sometimes
irate) responses. As such, the purpose of this article is to revisit the
issue of deceit and taqiyya in Islam, and address the many ostensibly
plausible rebuttals made by both Muslims and non-Muslims.
The earliest rebuttal I received appeared last year, days
after I wrote an essay called "Islam's
doctrines of deception" for the subscription-based Jane's Islamic
Affairs Analyst. Due to the controversy it initiated among the
intelligence community and abroad, the editors were quick to publish an
apologetic counter-article by one Michael Ryan called "Interpreting Taqiyya."
For starters, Ryan is not a careful reader: he says I fail
to mention ijma (consensus) among the ulema, even though I repeatedly cite
and delineate the ulema's (quite consensual) verdicts supporting taqiyya;
he sardonically suggests that, of course all people, not just Muslims,
engage in deception during war—a point I stressed; and he evinces shock
that I say Islam has no "common sense" and is "legalistic," when I simply
wrote that sharia law is not based on common sense but rather the 7th
century words of Muhammad, which may or may not rely on what we would
today call "common sense." (I had in mind anecdotes of Muhammad saying camel urine
heals, people should cover their mouths when yawning (lest
Satan dive down their throat), men cannot wear gold, only silver, and
in order to be in each other's company, women
should "breast-feed" strange men ).
Next, Ryan makes the usual (and ultimately superficial)
arguments without any backing: that I "cherry-picked citations from the
Quran"; that I focused on a "very narrow use of the term taqiyya"; and
that there are "other respected jurists who disagree" with the notion of
taqiyya I stressed.
Unfortunately, he overlooks the fact that, right or wrong,
none of this denies that there are Koranic references that do permit
deception; that, even if there are "broader" definitions for taqiyya, the
"narrow" one I delineated is still valid; and that if there are "respected
jurists who disagree," there are still more who agree.
As expected, whereas I listed and quoted several
authoritative jurists justifying taqiyya, Ryan makes only flat
counter-assertions whose plausibility rests solely in the fact that they
comport with the epistemology of the Western, secular reader, who cannot
comprehend that a religion would actually mandate temporal conquests and
permit deceit in their furtherance.
For instance, he makes comforting assertions such as "[I]t
is manifestly not true that Muslims as a whole desire eternal warfare with
non-Muslims," even though I never argue that Muslims desire eternal
war but rather that sharia mandates it. Regarding a verse I cited
as being relied on by the ulema in support of taqiyya (2:73), he writes,
"To this reader, the verse inspires admiration rather than any other
emotion." Odd that an article in a publication geared to the intelligence
community and dedicated to analyzing Islam would bother evoking "emotions"
in the first place—further revealing that Ryan's rebuttal relies more on
"shared feelings," not facts.
Moreover, like most of Islam's apologists who are obsessed
with portraying the "true-peaceful-and-tolerant" face of Islam, Ryan
overlooks the pivotal fact that it matters very little if the entire
Muslim world believes in jihad and deception. What matters is that some
Muslims have, do, and always will. If 19 surreptitious jihadists managed
to cause horrific deaths and destruction on 9/11, insisting that not all
Muslims accept these doctrines is neither relevant nor reassuring.
Ryan next spends time making the argument that the word
taqiyya "never appears in the Quran. The root in other forms appears in
various contexts, but it never means dissimulation." As for taqiyya's
cornerstone verse (3:28), Ryan, presuming the mantle of mufasir (exegete),
and after quoting an English translation, writes: "The English 'guard
against' is a translation of a verb that is taken from the same root as
the word taqiyya but it has nothing to do linguistically with lying or
deception [emphasis added]."
Absolutely true. But of course, all this overlooks the fact
that the Koran is not the all-in-all in Islam; more important in
determining right and wrong (i.e., in articulating sharia) are the
hadith-derived sunna, and the indispensable tafsirs and ijma (exegeses and
consensus) of the ulema. And these do use the word "taqiyya" and
do define it as lying and deception.
Moreover, there is widespread consensus among the ulema.
According to Imam Tabari, whose multi-volume exegesis is a standard
reference work in the Islamic world, 3:28 means: "If you [Muslims] are
under their [infidels'] authority, fearing for yourselves, behave loyally
to them, with your tongue, while harboring inner animosity for them."
Regarding 3:28, Ibn Kathir recommends the advice of Muhammad's companion:
"Let us smile to the face of some people while our hearts curse them."
Perhaps Ryan thinks his non-Muslim, that is, infidel,
exegesis of 3:28 will be more acceptable to the average Muslim than the
exegeses of the pious Tabari, Ibn Kathir, and other ulema? And what
"consensus" does he have in mind when the Muslim author of the
authoritative Al Taqiyya Fi Al Islam asserts, "Practically every
Islamic sect agrees to it [taqiyya] and practices it. We can go so far as
to say that the practice of taqiyya is mainstream in Islam, and that those
few sects not practicing it diverge from the mainstream"?
Ironically, and despite all the above, Ryan closes his
article by saying
"It would be fundamentally incorrect to suggest that the
strained positions of Osama bin Laden and other extremists somehow grow
out of normal or mainstream Muslim thought: Al-Qaeda's deception does
not grow out of valid religious duty. [Yet Muhammad said, "War is
deceit."] If we fail to make the distinction between radical Islamists and
valid, thoughtful and authoritative views of expert Muslim jurists,
[apparently the many I delineated in my original essay don't count] we
risk undermining one of the most promising tools to defeat radical
thought. I am referring to recent successful programmes by the Saudis and
Egyptians to persuade what the West might call radical jihadists
that their extremist activities are actually against the canons of
Islam as interpreted by mainstream jurists [emphasis added]."
What "successful programmes" have been initiated by the
Saudis and Egyptians to de-radicalize Muslims? Is he referring to Saudi
Arabia's rehabilitation through tennis,
finger-paints, and GameBoys—which has by and large not
been successful? And again, which "expert" and "mainstream" jurists is
he talking about?
In short, Ryan's points crumble in face of the fact that,
all philology, sophistry, and appeals to emotions aside, in mainstream
Islam, what ultimately matters is how the ulema—especially the "mainstream
jurists" he continues evoking—have understood and articulated the doctrine
of taqiyya.
Regarding my more recent "War and Peace—and Deceit—in Islam," others have written
to me complaining that, by not juxtaposing more "moderate interpretations"
to the mainstream ones I delineated (e.g., Tabari, Ibn Kathir, al-Qurtubi,
al-Razi, al-Arabi, et al), I am supposedly "distorting." While there are
in fact "moderate interpretations," most of these come from minority
sects—such as the Ahmadiyyas or the Quraniyuns—who, as they make up a
trivial percentage of the Islamic world, and are in fact often accused of
and persecuted for apostasy by mainstream Muslims, are definitely not
representative of the latter.
Other critics express dismay as to how I can interpret
certain verses as being supportive of taqiyya. Of course, being neither a
Muslim nor one of the ulema, I hardly ever interpret this or that verse as
being supportive of taqiyya/deception, but rather always attribute such
exegeses to the appropriate jurist, scholar, or theologian—the ulema, who
have the final say in mainstream Islam. (Ironically, being only a 4,000
word essay, I only supplied a tithe of the numerous albeit subtle taqiyya
decrees and interpretations I have surveyed in Arabic texts dedicated to
this topic.)
Still other critics point to strange English translations of
the Koran that do not capture the actual meaning of the Arabic—definitely
not the way the ulema understand it—in an effort to obfuscate the doctrine
of taqiyya. For instance, some have written to me insisting that Koran
3:28 has "absolutely nothing" to do with deceit. As evidence, they quote
the following translation from the website IslamUSA.org: "Let not the believers take the
disbelievers for friends in preference to the believers unless you very
carefully guard against evil from them."
The original Arabic says absolutely nothing about "guarding
against evil from them." (Is IslamUSA.org practicing taqiyya in
regard to ayat al-taqiyya, or the verse of taqiyya?) Instead, the original
Arabic most literally says, "Let believers not take infidels for friends
in place of the believers; whoever does this shall have nothing left with
Allah—unless you but guard yourselves against them, taking precautions."
In other words, it does not warn Muslims against befriending infidels due
to the latter's proclivity for evil (which may contaminate Muslims who do
not actively "guard" against it), but simply because they are infidels,
non-Muslims—by default, the enemy. As for "guard[ing] yourselves"
and "taking precautions," once again, however one wants to interpret
these, the fact is, the ulema have already settled and interpreted it as
aforementioned: deceit.
(Incidentally, is it not curious that while people are
nitpicking about what the latter half of that verse means, no one seems to
be interested in the far from ambiguous former half, where Muslims are
simply commanded to not befriend non-Muslims in the first place? Is that
not, in and of itself, demonstrative of Islam's position vis-à-vis the
other, the infidel?)
Others have written to me, absolutely flabbergasted that
I say Koran 4:29 or 2:195, which command Muslims to not
"kill/destroy themselves," encourages taqiyya. For the record, I
said no such thing; the ulema have—such as the classical exegete Fakhr
al-Din al-Razi (see Tafsir al-Kabir, vol.10, p.98). According to him,
since Muslims are commanded to not "destroy themselves," disclosing any
truths that might lead to their destruction is forbidden. Thus a mujahid
("jihadist"), according to Razi, must conceal his identity, since infidels
might "destroy" him if they were to discover what he was about. And so, in
this sense, 4:29 and 2:195 do permit deception.
Others are scandalized that I wrote Allah himself is
described in the Koran as being the best "deceiver" or "schemer." They
write to me insisting that the Koran uses no such language (based on their
trusty English translations), but rather portrays Allah as the best
"planner" or "plotter"—the words used, for instance, in the widely quoted
translations of Yusuf Ali and Shakir. So, who am I to ascribe the word
"deceiver" or "schemer" to Allah?
Simple: in the original Arabic, the word translated
(actually, euphemized) into English as "planner/plotter"—makar—most
literally denotes (and, to Arabic ears, connotes) deception. Moreover,
according to the definitive Hans Wehr Arabic-English dictionary, the
trilateral root "m-k-r" means "to deceive, delude, cheat, dupe, gull,
double-cross." One who takes on the attributes of "m-k-r"—such as Allah in
the Koran—is described as "sly, crafty, wily, an impostor, a swindler." In
colloquial Arabic, a makar is a sly trickster.
My reliance on one canonical hadith as supportive of deception has also
come under fire: Muhammad said, "If I take an oath and later find
something else better, I do what is better and break my oath." He also
encouraged Muslims to do the same.
Many have written to me insisting that I "shamelessly" took
these hadiths "out of context." For the record, then, here is the context:
Some Muslims came to Muhammad requesting camel mounts to ride, but "he
took an oath that he would not give us any mounts, and added, 'I have
nothing to mount you on.'" Later, some mounts fell into the prophet's
share of war plunder, and he gave these to the men. Overcome by altruism,
one of the men reminded Muhammad of his oath to which the latter replied,
"If I take an oath [to not give the men mounts] and later find something
else better [the opportunity to give mounts presents itself], I do what is
better and break my oath."
Now, if Muhammad swore he would not give mounts, but then
when he was able to, he broke his oath ("to do what is better"), why
should, say, jihadists fighting to make Allah's word supreme, after giving
oaths to infidels (e.g., peace-treaties of sulh, truces, etc) not break
their oaths when they too are able "to do what is better"? After
all, what is "better": breaking an oath so some men can have camels to
ride, or breaking an oath to make Islam—the embodiment of all
good—supreme?
Once again, and whichever way one interprets this
oath-breaking hadith, the fact remains: breaking truces with infidels has
a long lineage in Islam. The authoritative Encyclopaedia of Islam, for
example, simply states: "[T]here can be no question of genuine peace
treaties [between Muslims and non-Muslims]… only truces, whose duration
ought not, in principle, to exceed ten years, are authorized. But even
such truces are precarious, inasmuch as they can, before they expire, be
repudiated unilaterally should it appear more profitable for Islam to
resume the conflict"—that is, if the opportunity to do "something better"
presents itself.
In closing, it should be noted that the most revealing
aspect of the recent, and atypical, barrage of disgruntled e-mails
regarding my "War and Peace—and Deceit—in Islam," is that no Muslim (minus
fringe Ahmadiyyas, etc.) has written to deny the more troubling aspects of
the essay. For instance, while many nitpicked over the aforementioned,
none have denied the fact that Muhammad permitted lying in certain
situations, affirmed that "war is deceit," and permitted Muslims to
deceive and assassinate infidels—all according to canonical (sahih)
hadiths (hence the reason mainstream Muslims cannot refute them).
Moreover, the main point of my essay was not to demonstrate
that Islam permits deceit during war—a phenomenon I indicated also
prevails among many non-Muslim strategists as well—but to show that, for
Islam, warfare with non-Muslims is eternal, "until all chaos
ceases, and all religion belongs to Allah (Koran 8:39). Yet no one wrote
denying this classical Islamic formulation of the world into Dar al-Harb
and Dar al-Islam, which must be in perpetual war until the latter subsumes
the former (except of course Michael Ryan, but he is simply another
non-Muslim apologist).
Usually, silence is not necessarily indicative of assent;
however, when large numbers of people take it upon themselves to criticize
certain (minor) aspects of an argument, it seems reasonable to assume that
their silence regarding the more revealing and problematic issues—such as
perpetual jihad—is, in fact, implicit assent.
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