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Turkey may be an exception. The military has deep roots in
society, and its influence predates the founding of the republic. But
rather than hinder democratization, Turkey's military remains an important
component in the checks and balances that protect Turkish democracy.
Herein lies an irony: European officials have made diminishment of
military influence a key reform in Turkey's European Union accession
process. This may be a noble goal, but by insisting on dismantling the
military role in Turkish society without advancing a new mechanism to
guarantee the constitution, well-meaning reformers may actually undercut
the stability of Turkey as a democracy.
From Turkey's founding, the military assumed responsibility
for guaranteeing the republic's constitution. Article 35 of the Turkish
Armed Service Internal Service Code of 1961 declared that the "duty of the
armed forces is to protect and safeguard Turkish territory and the Turkish
Republic as stipulated by the constitution."[2] Indeed, such an interpretation had its roots in the
constitution. Turkey's first constitution was written in 1921, and since
the formal proclamation of the republic, the country has had three
additional constitutions—in 1924, 1961, and 1982. Until the constitutional
amendments of 2001, each placed responsibility in the military's hands for
the protection of the Turkish state from both external and internal
challenges. The constitution of 1982, for example, prohibited contestation
or constitutional review of the laws or decrees passed by the military
when the republic was under its rule from 1980 until 1983. This
effectively provided the military with a legal exit guarantee following
their coup in 1980.[3] Specifically,
article 15 stated, "No allegation of unconstitutionality can be made in
respect of laws, law-amending ordinances and acts and decisions taken in
accordance with the law numbered 2324 on the law on the constitutional
order."[4]
The Turkish military has used this sense of constitutional
authorization to justify interference in the political realm, on some
occasions. It seized power in 1960 and 1980 when polarization and economic
instability paralyzed the country's political system, and it also forced
the resignation of governments in 1971 and 1997. While the Turkish
constitution certainly does not endorse coups, Turkish popular distrust of
politicians has generally led the public to support military action.
This constitutional role began to unravel, however, in
September 2001, when the Turkish parliament amended the constitution to
ensure that the Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) review any
decisions involving maintenance of freedoms and allegations of
unconstitutionality.[5] Therefore, the
military may not act upon allegations of unconstitutional acts until there
has been prior court review. Other structural factors augment the Turkish
military's role. On July 23, 2003, the Grand National Assembly passed a
reform package which called for a civilian to lead the powerful and
historically military-led National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik
Kurulu, MGK), a body which advises—but, more realistically, directs—the
president in the formation of his security policies, policies which in
Turkey traditionally span internal and external threats. On August 17,
2004, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer appointed former ambassador to the
U.K., Mehmet Yiğit Alpogan, to head the MGK.[6] Nevertheless, the military remains a force wielding
more political power than it does in Western democracies. The commander of
the Turkish General Staff, for example, answers directly to the prime
minister and is not subordinate to the minister of defense, nor are the
appointments to senior military posts subject to the affirmation of
politicians.
The Ottoman Military Tradition
The augmented role of Turkey's military, both in politics
and as a catalyst for reform, has deep historical roots. It is true to say
that throughout much of Ottoman history, the military stymied reform. The
Janissaries, the sultan's household troops and bodyguard, remained a force
resistant to change into the early nineteenth century, but in 1826, Sultan
Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) broke their power,[7] enabling him first to reform the military and then
to begin Westernization of the empire. Mahmud's reforms continued, with a
few brief interruptions, throughout the remainder of the century.
While there was general recognition in Ottoman domains that
the Empire had to modernize, there was also public criticism that the
sultan's reforms subordinated Ottoman tradition to European ways.[8] The reforms of Mahmud II may not have
won broad public support, but they did nevertheless sow the seeds of
liberty in Ottoman society. With ideas of political and social liberty
beginning to permeate the Ottoman world, a number of Ottoman nationalists
and government bureaucrats formed a group in 1865 called the Young
Ottomans, which sought to transform the sultanate into a constitutional
republic with an elected parliament. The Young Ottomans used the printing
press to disseminate works on liberty, justice, and freedom.
They made halting progress. In 1877, for example, the
Ottoman Empire had its first parliamentary election, but within months,
Sultan Abdul Hamid II (r. 1876-1909) disbanded the
parliament and shortly thereafter, in 1878, annulled the constitution
itself. Assessing the failure, emeritus Princeton historian Bernard Lewis
explains: "the reforming edicts had brought some changes in administrative
procedures, but had done nothing to protect the subject against arbitrary
rule."[9]
The only institution that could protect the populace against
arbitrary rule was the military. Although it had been able to overthrow
successfully the power vested in the sultan at certain times—as when the
Janissaries rose up against Sultan Selim III's (r. 1789-1807) military
reforms in 1807—it required the support of the populace, something
illustrated by the failure of an 1826 revolt.[10] Conversely, the Young Ottomans, while generally
supported by the populace, lacked the most crucial element to implement
their ideas: the support of the military. As Ismail Kemal, a leader of the
Albanian independence movement in 1912, stated, "By propaganda and
publications alone a revolution cannot be made. It is therefore necessary
to work to ensure the participation of the armed forces in the
revolutionary movement."[11]
Recognizing the need to have the support of both the
military and the people to facilitate a successful revolution, in 1906, a
group of young military officers, including Mustafa Kemal, who would later
take the single name Atatürk, created a revolutionary organization called
Vatan ve Hürriyet (Fatherland and Freedom) to advance political revolution
and reform in the Empire. They kept their group distinct from civilian
groups such as unionists and liberals who feared a concentration of power
in the central government.
On July 23, 1908, Sultan Abdul Hamid acquiesced to the
revolutionaries' demands and ushered in a new era of constitutionalism.
However, the İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and
Progress, CUP) was able to suppress the internal military mutiny and
restore order within the ranks by sending an army to the capital to end
the instability. By April 27, 1909, with the accession of Abdul Hamid's
brother Mehmed V (r. 1909-1918) to the throne, the army effectively
ensured that it would be involved in the establishment of a new
constitution and would inevitably remain involved in politics for an
extended period of time. However, the decision to return authority to
civilian hands set a precedent for what would soon become the
military-political symbiosis that distinguishes modern Turkey.[12]
Atatürk and After
In the wake of the Ottoman Empire's defeat in World War I,
the Allied powers, including France and Great Britain, sought to divide
Anatolia into zones of influence and to have Istanbul demilitarized under
international control. From chaos and defeat, Atatürk rallied troops to
take Istanbul, repel foreign forces, and crush rebellious factions.
Empowered by military success and growing nationalist sentiment, Atatürk
negotiated peace terms with the Allied powers and declared Turkey's
independence.[13] On October 13,
1923, the new parliament declared Ankara the capital and, shortly after,
the Grand National Assembly elected Atatürk president.[14]
The military founded the Turkish Republic with the support
of the people. The main reason for its success and the establishment of a
new government was Atatürk's pragmatic approach as he checked his own
power with moderate decision making.[15] Kemalism evolved to become a measured approach,
combining nationalism, populism, étatisme, laicism, and
reformism.[16] The Constitution of
1921 reinforced social, economic, and judicial equality; support for
state-owned industries; recognition of a secular political life; and the
idea that reform was necessary for the state to remain relevant to the
populace's needs.[17]
Atatürk formalized a separation of the military from
politics. Article 148 of the Military Penal Code prohibited serving
military officers from political party membership or activities and
declared that the military would be neutral in its support of the
political system. Simultaneously, however, the article empowered the
military to act as "the vanguard of revolution" with the right to
"intervene in the political sphere if the survival of the state would
otherwise be left in grave jeopardy." Article 34 of the Army Internal
Service Law of 1935 stipulated that the military was constitutionally
obligated to protect and defend the Turkish homeland and the republic,[18] a clause interpreted by generations
of Turkish officials to allow military leaders to intercede whenever the
internal politics of Turkey destabilize the republic.
Atatürk did not foresee military involvement in day-to-day
politics, and he certainly did not tolerate military interference with his
agenda. Rather, having arisen from the military, he used it as a power
base from which to enforce his reforms. Under Atatürk's successor, İsmet
İnönü, the question over the military's future role in politics gained
greater significance. The first question to arise was the role of the
chief of staff who, under Atatürk, reported directly to the prime minister
rather than the minister of defense. Given Turkey's strong premiership,
this made the military a more independent power base, one not subordinate
to a civilian defense minister. İnönü chose to continue this modus
operandi.[19]
After a successful election in July 1946, İnönü and the
Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) won majority
support although the Democrat Party (Demokrat Parti, DP)
established itself as a serious minority party. The Democrats dominated
the May 1950 elections, winning 470 seats to the CHP's 69. İnönü stepped
down, and power passed to Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and President
Celal Bayar. They relaxed restrictions on Islam's role in society,
encouraged private enterprise in order to hasten economic development, and
implemented social welfare programs. After winning a huge majority in the
May 1954 elections, Menderes introduced more authoritarian legislation,
restricting freedom of the press and limiting freedom of assembly.[20] By 1959, disgruntled opposition
members boycotted the Grand National Assembly and threatened to take their
protests to the streets. The Turkish political scene had grown volatile.[21]
1960, 1971, 1980: Military Coups and Intervention
In April 1960, amidst student protests and unrest between
the government and the opposition parties, the military launched a coup to
restore political and social order, installing a Committee on National
Unity led by General Cemal Gürsel. On May 27, they arrested Bayar,
Menderes, other members of the Democratic Party cabinet, deputies, and
officials. Prime Minister Menderes and two members of his cabinet were
executed after the coup. The following year, the Committee of National
Unity created a larger constituent assembly, rewrote the constitution, and
submitted it to popular referendum. After sponsoring elections, the
military returned power to civilian control in November 1961. The Grand
National Assembly appointed Gürsel president, but he first resigned from
the military. While historians and diplomats may condemn the coup, the
Turkish experience stands in sharp juxtaposition to that in Egypt, Iraq,
and Syria where the military seized control and refused to relinquish
power. Even neighboring Greece had to wait seven years to restore civilian
control.
Turkish society, however, remained unstable through much of
the 1960s as the debate about Turkey's place in the Cold War and the
spread of socialism grew more polarized. While the socialists could not
consolidate control, they were still able to undermine the ability of
coalition governments to operate.[22]
Between 1965 and 1969, the reactionary leftist groups grew strong
alongside the nationalist right. This led to an increasingly virulent
left-right struggle, which often manifested itself in violent clashes.
Trade Unions, which ironically gained the right to strike only in the 1961
constitution, increasingly took to the streets. The balance-of-payments
deficit worsened, inflation increased, and in 1970, the government
devalued the currency. In early 1971, civil violence rose sharply. There
were student clashes with the police, kidnappings, murders, and bombings
of government buildings. In the military's opinion, the situation had
become untenable. The deteriorating situation and Prime Minister Süleyman
Demirel's inability to maintain order convinced the military to intervene
again in order to recalibrate and stabilize political life.[23]
On March 12, 1971, the Turkish military sent a memorandum to
President Cevdet Sunay and Prime Minister Demirel insisting on the need to
appoint a new government to calm society and to resolve continued economic
problems. In the two years that followed, debate over the future of the
republic raged among the political parties and between civil and military
institutions. The successor government to Demirel's collapsed after Prime
Minister Nihat Erim was unable to bridge the differences between his
government, the Justice Party (Adalet Partisi), and the Republican Peoples
Party.[24] After the March 1973
parliamentary elections, the political parties elected retired Admiral
Fahri Korutürk as president on April 6. After the precedents of Gürsel and
Sunay, the rise of a retired military official to the presidency seemed
natural; after all, the military was seen as above politics and, in the
Turkish system, the president is traditionally a consensus figure who can
rise above political party antics. Nevertheless, the legacy of the 1971
intervention is mixed. While the military did force the government to
reshuffle, its goal of establishing a "powerful and credible government"
did not succeed, given that four weak coalition governments rose and fell
in the thirty-one months following the memorandum.[25]
Turkey remained unstable. High inflation, cuts in public
expenditures, and labor disputes led to protests and strikes. Meanwhile,
there were general malaise and rising political turmoil between Bülent
Ecevit's ruling CHP and its Islamist rival, Necmettin Erbakan's National
Salvation Party (Milli Selamet Partisi).[26] Between 1971 and 1980, there were eleven
successive governments. Most were too greatly sidetracked by their efforts
to contain rivalry within their coalition to tackle social unrest,
extremism, and an economic crisis exacerbated by the 1973 oil embargo.
With this increase in unrest and the political situation untenable, the
military again decided to "invoke the power granted to them by the
Internal Service Code to protect and look after the Turkish Republic."[27] On September 12, 1980, the military
carried out a nonviolent coup, arresting 138,000 people, of whom 42,000
received judicial sentences. Restrictive laws clamped down on political
demonstrations and strikes. Unlike the 1971 coup, in which the military
only took a guiding role in reestablishing the political system, in 1980,
it used a heavy hand to restore order.[28]
Up to the 1983 elections, primary power rested in the
military leadership and was channeled through the National Security
Council under General Kenan Evren. The military dominated most aspects of
society, taking strict control of universities, dismissing or transferring
academics, depoliticizing the public service system, and dissolving
existing political parties. In essence, the military enforced martial law
to ensure public safety. [29] The
military, once again, issued a new constitution. In 1983, Turgut Özal and
the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) assumed power with Evren
serving as president.
While many academics and Western diplomats view military
interventions in black and white terms as always antithetical to
democracy, throughout these formative years of Turkish democracy, this was
not the case. Nilüfer Göle, director of studies at the école des Hautes
études in the Centre d'Analyse et d'Intervention Sociologiques in Paris,
writes, "the military interventions of 1960-1961, 1970-1973, and 1980-1983
can be perceived as state reactions against the 'unhealthy' autonomization
and differentiation of economic, political and cultural groups."[30] The military simply sought the
continuance of the Kemalist ideology, which had broad popular support and
was the template upon which the constitution allowed various political
parties to act.[31]
Erbakan and His Legacy
Following the coup of 1980, the military stayed out of
politics and, indeed, under Özal, who served as prime minister from
1983-89 and president from 1989-93, lost some of its political autonomy,
even as it remained free from civilian control. Only when Prime Minister
Tansu Çiller began to lose control during an economic and social crisis in
1994 (during which inflation reached 100 percent) did the military again
begin to involve itself actively in politics.[32]
In 1996, after winning just 21 percent of the vote the
previous year, Erbakan became prime minister as the leader of a coalition
between Çiller's True Path Party (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) and his own
newly-formed Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP). He was an ardent Islamist,
but while he was disliked by the military, the Turkish General Staff did
not seek to prevent his accession, both because the Turkish military does
not intervene as lightly as some of its detractors suggest and because,
holding 158 of 550 seats in parliament, his party could not rule without
its Kemalist coalition partners.[33]
Almost immediately, however, the Erbakan government began to
support a strong pro-religious platform and a reorientation of foreign
policy as Erbakan visited Iran and Libya. In February 1997, the National
Security Council reported that the foundations of Turkey's political
structure were being undermined by the government's pro-Islamist policies.
Amidst growing disaffection among the populace due to the government's
religious policies, the military forced Erbakan's resignation and, within
months, the Constitutional Court banned the Refah,[34] but not before Refah officials had formed new
parties to which they transferred most of their party's assets. Recai
Kutan assumed command of the spin-off Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) and
mollified Refah's hard-line position. It was nevertheless banned in 1998
after the Constitutional Court found that the party's Islamist platform
breached the 1982 constitution.[35]
Supporters of the Virtue Party led by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in turn formed
the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) in
July 2001.
Erdoğan, a former mayor of Istanbul, was a controversial
figure in Turkey. In 1998, a Diyarbakir court convicted him of inciting
religious hatred after he read an Islamist poem at a political rally,[36] and even after the party swept to
victory in the November 2002 elections, he remained prohibited from
holding office, a ban overturned the following February.
The AKP's rise had less to do with its Islamist agenda than
with public disgust over corruption scandals among the more traditional
parties amidst the November 2000 banking and February 2001 currency
crises.[37] On a single day on
February 22, 2001, the Turkish lira lost one-third of its value.[38] Erdoğan is a skilled politician. He
moderated both his and his party's image to ensure that the AKP would not
meet the fate of Refah or Fazilet. As public confidence in Ecevit and his
coalition partners waned, Erdoğan sought to appeal to a constituency
beyond the AKP's Islamist base. A July 2000 poll conducted by the Ankara
Social Research Center found that 30.8 percent of those surveyed would
vote for Erdoğan's party.[39]
The Rise of Erdoğan
And so it came to be. In 2002, the AKP gained power with 34
percent of the vote. Because five other parties fell just short of the ten
percent threshold necessary to enter parliament, this propelled the AKP's
grip on parliament to a clear majority with 363 seats in the Grand
National Assembly, the largest majority in Turkey's multiparty era. The
CHP, Turkey's oldest political party but one which had not been
represented in the 1999 parliament, won 19 percent. A clear reflection of
the popular dismay with the previous government, the Motherland Party
received just over five percent of the vote.
The AKP hewed a moderate foreign policy line when it assumed
office. Unlike Erbakan, Erdoğan embraced the European Union accession
process. For the AKP, this was a brilliant tactical move. By
blurring—rather than sharply defining—the line between pro-Western
orientation and Islamism, Erdoğan provided his party with plausible
deniability about its goals; it could be all things to all people. In
Central Anatolia, its deputies could preach Islamism while party officials
convinced Turkish businessmen in Western-oriented cities such as Istanbul,
Ankara, and Izmir that it was committed to orienting Turkey closer toward
Europe. Simultaneously, the 1999 Copenhagen Criteria, which outlined the
reforms necessary to join the European Union, would weaken military
influence within the Turkish state. Not only would a civilian lead the
National Security Council, but the body would meet only six times a year,
cutting by half the opportunities it had to micromanage policy. As
important, European Union reforms placed military expenditures under the
scrutiny of the Court of Accounts, a body similar to the U.S. General
Accounting Office.[40]
Turkey's military is divided about whether European Union
accession is a reflection of traditionalist Kemalist views. Perhaps
two-thirds of the Turkish public supported Ankara's bid to join the
European Union upon announcement of the Copenhagen Criteria. General
Hüseyin Kivrikoğlu, chief of the Turkish General Staff at the time, said
that "joining the EU was a geopolitical necessity," whereas a retired
general commented that "EU membership was against Turkey's history and
contradicted the Kemalist revolution."[41]
As Copenhagen Criteria reforms weakened the power of the
military in internal Turkish affairs, Erdoğan has advanced an Islamist
agenda which has altered Turkish society. The most prominent example of
the AKP's Islamism has been its argument that Turkish women should have a
legal right to wear veils in schools and public institutions, a policy
traditional Kemalists and the military consider a symbolic affront to the
Turkish government's secularism. Here, ironically, Erdoğan has clashed
with European officials. After the European Court of Human Rights backed
the ban on head scarves in public schools, the prime minister complained,
"It is wrong that those who have no connection to this field [of religion]
make such a decision … without consulting Islamic scholars."[42]
However, the AKP's attempts to roll back the separation
between mosque and state involve more than the head scarf. In May 2006,
the Erdoğan-appointed chief negotiator for European Union accession talks
ordered state officials to cease defining Turkey's educational system as
secular.[43] Indeed, Erdoğan moved to
equate Imam Hatip religious school degrees with those of public high
schools, thereby enabling Islamist students to enter the university and
qualify for government jobs without serious study of basic Western
principles.[44] When university
presidents complained about growing AKP political interference and
Islamist influence in their institutions, Erdoğan ordered the police to
detain the most outspoken university rector on corruption charges that
later proved baseless.[45]
Distrust of the AKP and its agenda solidified after a
gunman, reportedly upset with a ruling against the veil law, stormed the
Council of State, equivalent to the Supreme Court, and opened fire
shouting, "I am a soldier of God," killing one justice.[46] Erdoğan declined to attend the dead man's funeral.
Both the President and Yaşar Büyükanıt, chief of the Turkish General
Staff, have warned publicly of growing threats to secularism. On April 12,
2006, Sezer said, "Religious fundamentalism has reached alarming
proportions. Turkey's only guarantee against this threat is its secular
order."[47] The following day,
Büyükanıt warned military cadets of growing Islamic fundamentalism and
said that "every measure will be taken against it."[48]
The military was, however, powerless to intervene, at least
compared to 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997. On April 27, 2007, Büyükanıt held
a press conference to stress that the military wanted the next president
of Turkey to uphold the original principles of the republic.
Traditionally, the Grand National Assembly and major political parties
agreed on a nominee for president, as the position, unlike in the United
States, was meant to be above politics and held by a consensus figure.
Erdoğan, however, had a majority in parliament to choose the president
without consulting political rivals and simply announced that his
candidate would be Abdullah Gül, the foreign minister in the AKP
government.
Hours later, the Turkish General Staff posted a statement on
its website declaring, "Some circles who have been carrying out endless
efforts to disturb fundamental values of the republic of Turkey,
especially secularism, have escalated their efforts recently," warning
that the "fundamentalist understanding [of the government] was eroding the
very foundation of the Turkish Republic and the ideas that it was founded
upon."[49] Rather than step aside
with relative grace as had Erbakan, the AKP issued a rebuttal, reminding
the military that in "democracies," the military does not intervene in the
political process.
Islamists and many diplomats branded the military's
statement as an "Internet coup," casting the military as aggressors,
rather than defenders of a constitutional order violated by Erdoğan. After
a constitutional battle over procedures, the AKP-dominated Grand National
Assembly selected Gül as president, further consolidating the party's
power and effectively eliminating any future presidential vetoes over
concerns about the constitutionalism of AKP legislation.
Since winning a second term and consolidating control with
46.7 percent of the vote, Erdoğan has gone on the offensive. After
surviving a judicial challenge which could have resulted in the
disbandment of the AKP on questionable constitutional grounds, the AKP
pushed forward with prosecutions on an alleged nationalist and Kemalist
plot to cause chaos in order to provide an excuse for military
intervention. AKP-led prosecutors and security forces have detained
hundreds of journalists, retired military officers, political rivals, and
academics. While, at its root, physical evidence exists to suggest some
malfeasance on the part of radical Kemalists, there is little evidence to
suggest a widespread plot.
The AKP, therefore, faces growing criticism that it is using
the case as an excuse to intimidate or silence anyone who opposes its
agenda.[50] The importance of the
so-called Ergenekon prosecutions, though, is to show just how little
influence and control the military has over Turkish society.
Simultaneously, should the Ergenekon prosecutions represent an internal
putsch by Erdoğan against his and the AKP's opponents, the episode shows
how unbalanced Turkish democracy can become when the military can no
longer effectively act as a force for constitutionalism and reform.
The Military Exits?
Turkey remains a strategic asset to the West. Its military
is the second largest in NATO, and it is the preeminent Western security
force in what is considered by many Westerners to be the most volatile
region in the world. With Turkey at the doorstep of the European Union, it
is ever closer to realizing its movement to the West. Ironically, it may
not be able to take this final step without recognition of the domestic
role of its military.
Since the days of the Ottoman Empire and throughout the
history of the Turkish Republic, the military has been the one institution
that has repeatedly checked civilian autocratic tendencies, maintained
moderation, and ensured the preservation of the state. While Western
officials may view repeated coups as antithetical to democracy, the
military has always returned power to the civilian sector. Indeed, the
elements that complain loudest about military involvement tend to be those
least committed to constitutionalism and least tolerant toward political
opponents.
Moreover, the military has, since the late nineteenth
century, maintained the push towards modernization while continuing the
tradition of the Ottoman and republican Turkish societies. Though the
external environment has changed dramatically, the military has remained
an anchor for society.
The EU accession process has driven reforms that have
weakened the military's internal role. While many democracy experts and
leaders of EU member states argue that the military should not have a role
in internal politics,[51] Turkey is
different. The Turkish political system is dynamic and permits a wider
range of political views and philosophies to compete on the political
stage than many other European states. The system has not always worked
well, however; on several occasions, such as that leading to the 1960
coup, politicians consolidating disproportionate control have appeared
ready to cast aside the foundational principles of Turkish democracy. In
other instances, such as 1971 and 1980, parliamentary fractiousness has
impeded coalition formation or effective government. Ordinary democratic
processes were unable to resolve the political stalemate. When the Turkish
military intervened, it did so to restore democratic stability, not
supplant it. From 1923 to the present day, the military has proven its
commitment to democracy and constitutionalism and, indeed, only invokes
its role as a constitutional check and balance as a last resort.
In essence, the military has acted as a guide to usher
Kemalist principles into full realization. This is not to say that the
military should continue to have a dominant role in perpetuity. However,
failure to recognize the military's unique and traditional role as the
protector of the public from any political party's undemocratic
consolidation of power and as the defender of the constitution is
dangerous because it creates the possibility that the checks and balances
of Turkish society might collapse without creation of a new system of
supervision. As Turkey and its people move into the future, the military
should move as well. Just as Atatürk modernized Turkey and initiated its
drive toward the West, European officials should consider the military a
reformist force without which Ankara's movement further to the West might
not occur.
David Capezza is a consultant for the Center for
New American Security in Washington, DC.
[1] Freedom in the World, 2007 (New York: Freedom
House, 2007), pp. 986-7.
[2] Tim
Jacoby, Social Power and the Turkish State (New York: Frank Cass,
2004), p. 133.
[3] Levent Gönenc,
"The
2001 Amendments to the 1982 Constitution of Turkey," Ankara Law
Review, Summer 2004, p. 93.
[4]
Serap Yazici, "A Guide to Turkish
Public Law and Legal Research: 10.2, The Constitutional Amendments of
2001 and 2004," GlobaLex, Hauser Global Law School Program, Jan.
2009.
[5] Serap Yazici, "A
Guide to the Turkish Public Law Order and Legal Research: The
Constitutional Amendments of 2001 and 2004," GlobaLex, Hauser Global Law
School Program, Sept. 2006.
[6]
Sabah (Istanbul), Aug. 18,
2004.
[7] Bernard Lewis, The
Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002),
p. 78.
[8] Ibid.,
125-8.
[9] Ibid., p. 171.
[10] William Hale, Turkish Politics
and the Role of the Military (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 16.
[11] Quoted in Lewis, The Emergence
of Modern Turkey, p. 202.
[12]
Alexander L. Macfie, The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923 (New
York: Longman's, 1998), pp. 41-56.
[13] Metin Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats: Guardians of
the National Security and Modernization of Turkey (Salt Lake City:
University of Utah Press, 1976), pp. 10-9.
[14] Roderic H. Davidson, Turkey: A Short History
(Huntingdon, U.K.: Eothen Press, 1998), pp. 121-7.
[15] Tamkoc, The Warrior Diplomats, p. 28.
[16] Donald Everett Webster, The
Turkey of Ataturk: Social Process in the Turkish Reformation
(Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science,
1939), pp. 162-72.
[17] Ibid., pp.
163-71.
[18] Hale, Turkish
Politics and the Role of the Military, pp. 72, 80.
[19] Ibid., p. 83.
[20] Walter Weiker, The Turkish
Revolution, 1960-1961 (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution,
1963), pp. 6-11.
[21] Davidson,
Turkey: A Short History, pp. 148-54.
[22] David Shankland, The Turkish Republic at
Seventy-Five Years (Huntingdon, U.K.: Eothen Press, 1999), p.
94.
[23] Hale, Turkish Politics
and the Role of the Military, pp. 175-9.
[24] Ibid., pp. 194-200.
[25] Ibid., pp. 207-8.
[26] Ibid., pp. 216-7; Davidson, Turkey: A Short
History, p. 171.
[27] General
Kenan Evren, quoted in Hale, Turkish Politics and the Role of the
Military, p. 246.
[28] Erik
Cornell, Turkey in the 21st Century (Richmond, U.K.:
Curzon Press, 2001), pp. 36-7.
[29] Davidson, Turkey: A Short History, p.
172.
[30] Nilüfer Göle, "Toward an
Autonomization of Politics and Civil Society in Turkey," in Metin Heper
and Ahmet Evin, eds, Politics in the Third Turkish Republic
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 213-22, quoted in Sylvia Kedourie,
Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic (London: Frank Cass
Publishers, 2000), p. 141.
[31]
Kedourie, Seventy-Five Years of the Turkish Republic, p. 139.
[32] Ibid., pp. 136-9.
[33] Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest
for Identity (Oxford: One World Publishers, 2003), pp. 168-70.
[34] Cornell, Turkey in the
21st Century, pp. 45-9.
[35] Thomas Carroll, "Turkey Shuts down the
Islamists … Again," Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, July
2001.
[36] Turkish Daily
News (Ankara), Sept. 28, 1998.
[37] Soner Cagaptay, "Turkey
Goes to the Polls: A Post-Mortem," Policywatch, no. 675,
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Nov. 7,
2002.
[38] "Economic Survey of
Turkey, 2002," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Paris, Oct. 2002.
[39] Umit Cizre,
Secular and Islamist Politics in Turkey (New York: Routledge Press,
2007), pp. 201-3.
[40] Soner
Cagaptay, "European
Union Reforms Diminish the Role of the Turkish Military: Ankara Knocking
at Brussels Door," The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,
Washington, D.C., Aug. 12, 2003, p. 214.
[41] Ahmad, Turkey: The Quest for Identity, pp.
175-6.
[42] Turkish Daily
News, Nov. 15, 2005.
[43]
Turkish Daily News, June 1, 2006.
[44] Turkish Daily News, Oct. 24, 2005.
[45] Sabah, Oct. 23, 2005.
[46] Turkish Daily News, July 14,
2006.
[47] Turkish Daily
News, Apr. 14, 2006.
[48]
Turkish Daily News, Oct. 3, 2006.
[49] BBC News, Apr. 27,
2007.
[50] Michael Rubin, "Erdogan,
Ergenekon, and the Struggle for Turkey," Mideast Monitor, Aug.
8, 2008.
[51] "Foreign
Affairs, Sixth Report: The Military," the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, British House of Commons, Apr. 23, 2002.
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