Boston, London, Paris jihad attacks: all the jihad murderers had been flagged to law enforcement but deemed not to be a priority

from JihadWatch

Boston, London, Paris jihad attacks: all the jihad murderers had been flagged to law enforcement but deemed not to be a priority

http://www.jihadwatch.org/2013/06/boston-london-paris-jihad-attacks-all-the-jihad-murderers-had-been-flagged-to-law-enforcement-but-de.html

This is the price of the Obama Administration's willful ignorance about the jihad threat -- and that of the Cameron and Hollande governments. They lie to themselves and to the public about the beliefs and goals of the jihadists. They apparently believe their own lies as well, and those lies hamstring their ability to resist the jihad.
"Intel dilemma in Boston, London, Paris attacks," by Lori Hinnant for the Associated Press, May 31:

PARIS (AP) - Intelligence agencies that have succeeded in thwarting many of al-Qaida's plans for spectacular attacks are struggling to combat the terror network's strategy of encouraging followers to keep to themselves, use off-the-shelf weapons and strike when they see an opportunity. In recent weeks - at the Boston Marathon, in the streets of London and in the shadow of one of Paris' most recognizable monuments - young men allegedly carried out attacks with little help, using inexpensive, widely available knives and explosives from everyday ingredients. In each of the attacks, suspects had previously been flagged to law enforcement and deemed not to be a priority.

A tough debate is raging within the intelligence community - previously focused on searching for al-Qaida cells - on how to assess red flags without violating basic liberties.
Confronting an overwhelming sea of mostly harmless individuals who act suspiciously, authorities are still struggling with questions about how and how much to keep tabs on people who spout jihadist rhetoric online or buy material that could be used to make explosives - or something innocuous.
A French government report last week recommended a radical new approach in light of the 2012 terror in which a French-born radical Muslim attacked French paratroopers and a Jewish school in Toulouse, killing seven people. It called for an overhaul of the country's intelligence networks to combat the rising threat of militants working alone outside established terror networks.
One of the report's advisers, academic Mathieu Guidere, said last week's attack showed that intelligence services haven't learned their lesson.
"They're not originally made for fighting against this kind of threat. They're intended to fight against cells, against groups, against organizations, but not against individuals," he said. "It's a question of adapting. That's why there are the same errors in Boston, London and France. There was identification - but not detention - before the suspects passed into the realm of action."
Easier said than done, counters David Omand, who served as Britain's first security and intelligence coordinator.
"No reliable psychological test or checklist has been devised that can predict when such an individual may tip over into actually taking violent action," Omand said in an emailed response to questions from The Associated Press. "Short of a police state on East German lines the number of such individuals who can be subject to very intensive surveillance sufficient to detect preparations for violent action is but a small proportion of the total - and of course individuals can flip quickly even where they have been checked out previously."
Still, British, French and American officials are re-examining whether opportunities might have been lost in the run-up to the recent attacks....

Of course opportunities were lost. These politically correct Keystone Kops are forbidden to understand the motives and goals of the enemy. How can they possibly devise realistic ways to counter that enemy?

For its part, the U.S. government has emphasized that local communities are most likely to spot unusual or suspicious behavior, and has encouraged more outreach to communities that might be vulnerable to radicalization. The federal government has led a nationwide suspicious activity reporting campaign and trained local police to identify potential terror-related activities. "The best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community - which has consistently rejected terrorism - to identify signs of radicalization and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting toward violence," President Barack Obama said in a recent speech.

Call on the foxes to guard the henhouse. Good strategy.

Clearly, al-Qaida has placed a big bet on the lone wolf model as its own best hope of success. The first issue of al-Qaida's in-house magazine, Inspire, in 2010 called on recruits to avoid plotting with others, to strike near home and to use whatever weapons were at hand. In all three recent attacks - allegedly by young radical Muslims in the U.S., Britain and France - that advice seemed to be followed nearly to the letter.
Outside Paris, a young Frenchman who converted to Islam in his late teens was arrested Wednesday on suspicion of stabbing a soldier with a locally purchased pocketknife in the La Defense business area, near a modernized version of the Arc de Triomphe. Intelligence officials had been tracking the suspect, 22-year-old Alexandre Dhaussy, for several years. But the intelligence - including his refusal in 2011 to take a job that would place him in contact with women and preaching on the street in 2009 - never got bumped up to a national level, according to a statement by the French National Police headquarters late Wednesday.
He simply didn't "fit the profile of a jihadist," said France's highest security official, Manuel Valls....

How would he possibly know that? His government, like that of the U.S. and Britain and all governments in the West, is committed to unreality, fantasy and wishful thinking about the nature and magnitude of the jihad threat. U.S. intelligence officials are forbidden to study Islam and jihad in any connection with terrorism. So how would Valls, or any of them, possibly know what the profile of a jihadist really is?