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Can
Western Muslims Be De-radicalized?
by Uriya Shavit and Sören
Andresen
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2016 (view PDF)
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While
not sanctioning violence, some mosques and schools cultivate among
young devotees a triumphal, supremacist, Islamic mindset, which can
eventually lead to violent action. Former British prime minister David
Cameron (above) set off a firestorm of protest in October 2015 when he
spoke about the existence of radical "breeding grounds" for
terror and vowed there would be "no more passive tolerance [to
radicalism] in Britain."
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Stopping the radicalization of young Muslims has become a focal point
of political and academic discussion in the West as thousands of Western
Muslims have traveled to jihadist training camps in Syria and Iraq. The
attacks in Paris in 2015 and in Brussels and Nice in 2016 have also
heightened fears of terrorism in the West perpetrated by returning
jihadists. Along with an intensification of intelligence and surveillance
operations, three main courses of action have been deliberated and
partially implemented by Western governments: banning or limiting the
freedom of preachers who, while not endorsing violence, openly oppose
liberal values and envision an Islamic future for the West; setting up
domestic programs to prevent or reverse radicalization by enhancing
integration of Muslim communities and persuading citizens who have joined
jihadist groups to return home; and fighting the Islamic State (or ISIS)
on its home turf with the aim of destroying it.
There are positive aspects to each of these courses of action, but do
they significantly decrease the current threat of Islamic terror in
Western countries? Is it possible that they may even contribute to
increasing the very threat they aim to counter? An examination of current
programs can reveal which components are useful and which are not. Such
an assessment along with other ideas based, in part, on interviews with
European security officials and leading radical imams in Europe offer
useful policy recommendations.
1. Closing
Down "Grey Zones"
A primary thesis in political and academic counterterrorism discourse
is that in some, though not all, cases, gradual, nonviolent
radicalization precedes and anticipates violent actions. To combat this,
some in the West have concluded that "grey zones," places where
Islamist, Salafi, and other radical ideologies are endorsed and promoted,
must be closed down. While not sanctioning violence, some mosques and
schools cultivate among young devotees a triumphal, supremacist, Islamic
mindset, which can eventually lead to violent action. Then British prime
minister David Cameron articulated this view in October 2015 when he
spoke about the existence of radical breeding grounds for terror and
vowed there would be "no more passive tolerance [to radicalism] in
Britain."[1]
Banning the proliferation of hateful and supremacist rhetoric limits
freedom of speech, but, as implied by Cameron and others, can be
justified with caution. Liberal democracies have an obligation to protect
their citizens and defend their very existence against those who openly
use the freedoms of those democracies to extinguish those freedoms for
others. However, a closer look at some of the assumptions underlying this
argument should give pause.
Much attention, for example, has been devoted by authorities to the
dangers of Salafi proselytizing. An influential study published in 2007
by the New York police department analyzed the backgrounds of terrorists
involved in ten terror attacks in North America, Europe, and Australia, and
demonstrated that individuals attending Salafi mosques (i.e., mosques
that are radical yet preach against violence) are considerably more
likely to become jihadist-Salafi and active in terrorism than individuals
attending other mosques.[2]
According to another study, out of some 2,600 mosques in Germany, almost
37 percent of the 110 German Muslim jihadists whose biographies were
studied and whose attendance at a specific mosque could be verified, had
been attendees of just six specific Salafi mosques in the country.[3]
Their hostility to liberal values and intolerance of other religions
notwithstanding, there are reasons to think that closing down Salafi
mosques may also negativaly impact the fight against terror, especially
in the short term. To begin with, some Salafi mosque leaders are adamant
and passionate propagators of an anti-jihadist agenda, in line with the
anti-jihadist campaigns of the Saudi religious establishment.[4] These imams argue that by
residing in the West and being given citizenship or a visa, Muslims are
party to a contract, and true Muslims never breach a contract,[5] or that attacking civilians and
committing atrocities breach Islamic norms.[6] Salafi imams in England[7] and in Germany[8] have stated in interviews with
the authors that their preaching is a great asset to prevention efforts
because of their ability to ground opposition to jihad in persuasive
religious terms. And while these claims may well be self-serving, Salafi
mosques do contain more anti-ISIS and anti al-Qaeda litrature than other
places of worship due to the burning hatred between Wahhabis and
jihadist-Salafis.
The revised British "Prevent Strategy," the country's main
anti-radicalization program, stated unequivocally that cooperation with
radical preachers is out of the question,[9] and German security officials
take a similar stand.[10]
But some challenge the wisdom of this view, noting that police
cooperation with radical communities has proven effective.[11]
When radical individuals center in
one location, intelligence is more effective and easier to gather.
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The complicated reality is that neither side of the debate is wrong as
exposure to radical ideas has varying effects on different individuals.
On the one hand, there is evidence that some of those who attend radical
mosques turn to jihadism. On the other, it is safe to conclude that the
vast majority of Western Muslims who embrace and even articulate radical
rhetoric have not turned to actual, violent jihadism. For them,
provocative rhetoric appears to satisfy a need to profess anger or
disrespect toward their host for whatever reason. This form of passive
radicalism is still problematic, but, in terms of terror prevention
efforts, it is fanciful to think that adherents of radical ideologies
will choose mainstream ideologies if their radical bases are closed down;
they may become angrier and go underground.
Finally, the needs of the intelligence community should be considered.
As long as the "breeding grounds" of which Cameron spoke exist,
security agencies have, at the very least, settings upon which to focus
some of their work. When radical individuals center in one location,
intelligence is more effective and easier to gather than when they
disperse.
2.
Radicalization Prevention Programs
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Silvio
K (above), a convert to Islam, is a German jihadist who has threatened
to bomb a U.S. nuclear weapons storage facility located in Germany. By
all estimates, thousands of European Muslims have been trained in
Islamic State camps and are part of its fighting forces. According to
the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization at Kings
College London, these include some 1,200 French fighters and some 600
German and 600 English fighters.
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Over the past decade, Western governments have established
multi-layered prevention programs to de-radicalize jihadists as well as
those Muslims who may be on the verge of becoming violent. Stopping young
Muslims from turning to terror or encouraging them to leave terror
organizations has become a huge, publicly-funded industry, parallel in
scope to other prevention campaigns such as the war on drugs, smoking,
alcohol abuse, etc. One example is the Berlin-based, federally-sponsored
Hayat (Turkish and Arabic for "life"), established in 2011 by
Exit-Germany, an organization that originally specialized in encouraging
individuals to leave neo-Nazi groups. Hayat's guiding principal is that
family members are the most effective influence on radicalized
individuals. It counsels families on appropriate, non-confrontational
approaches to de-radicalize potential jihadists or, in extreme cases,
bring loved ones home who have gone off to wage jihad.[12]
The federal program Demokratie leben (Live Democracy) supports dozens
of anti-radicalization initiatives, including seminars held at youth
centers in which radicalized young Germans learn to embrace a pluralistic
view of Islam taught by state-hired educators, including Muslims.[13] One criticism against the
program is that, by using the term Islamism, it risks contributing to the
confusion of Islamist ideology as representing Islam.[14] The Wegweiser program, developed
by the Interior Ministry and the Verfassungsschutz in the German state of
Nord Rhine-Westphalia, approaches young, at-risk people based on
information provided by concerned parents, friends, and teachers. Its
premise is that improving the social situation of young people who are
being radicalized is crucial to the prevention of radicalization. Thus,
it seeks to help at-risk youths find jobs and to educate them about the
dangers of Salafi teachings and the manipulative techniques Salafi
preachers employ.[15]
Since 2007, the British government's efforts to prevent people from
becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism have centered on the Prevent
program, part of the broader, national anti-terrorism program CONTEST,
reformed by the Conservative government in 2011.[16] Among its activities is the
funding of local theater productions that raise the issue of extremism.[17]
The Channel program encourages
parents, friends, community leaders, public servants, and teachers to
report possible terrorists.
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A flagship program of Prevent is the Channel de-radicalization
project, an initiative that identifies at-risk individuals, assesses the
threat they pose, and offers them support. Since 2007, Channel has
intervened in the lives of hundreds of such Muslim youths, including
those who planned to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State.[18] Channel encourages parents,
friends, community leaders, public servants, and teachers to report
possible terrorists (for the latter two groups, reporting is mandatory).
Between June and August 2015, 798 individuals were reported to the
program, 312 of whom were under eighteen years of age. The number of
referrals found to have been justified has not been made public.[19] Similar programs have been
employed in other Western countries, including the United States,[20] Denmark,[21] and Australia.[22] These pro-grams aim at
redirecting youths from the path of radicalization through educational
initiatives and the interventions of trusted facilitators.
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British
men appear in a jihadist recruitment video. Many programs in the West
consider radicalization to be the result of personal failures and
assume that these issues can be addressed by family or community.
Instead, Western governments should focus not on consumers of radical
ideologies but on the financiers and propagators of Islamist dogma.
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Several positive aspects of Western prevention programs are beyond
dispute. Cases of de-radicalized individuals suggest that there are
programs that have had an impact on some Muslims.[23] These programs have also
informed parents, educators, and local religious leaders that fighting
radicalization is a responsibility they share. These initiatives have
also facilitated the funding of cultural and social programs for Western
Muslim populations at large that may have otherwise not been funded,
including Internet forums, theater productions, "safe spaces"
for discussions of grievances, and matching youth at risk with role
models.
There are, however, limits to the ability of prevention programs to
significantly contain the threat of terrorism. To begin with, the idea
that a sense of disaffection and marginalization is the key factor
underlying violent radicalization, which guides most prevention programs,
is hardly borne out by reality. Many, if not most, young people lose
their jobs or face the agonies of unrequited love at one point or
another, but only a small percentage become terrorists. In fact,
quantitative studies suggest that poor prospects for employment or
economic marginalization are not predictive of potential or active jihadist
affiliations. For example, the above noted biographical survey of 110
Germans involved in jihadist activities since 2001 identified a wide
range of economic, educational, ethnic, religious, and migratory
backgrounds.[24]
Likewise, a study of English Muslims aged 18-45 of Pakistani and
Bangladeshi descent in East London and Bradford found that university
students who were U.K.-born, were in good health, and whose prospects in
life were relatively promising were more likely to sympathize with
terrorist causes than poor, unhealthy individuals who were not enrolled
at a university.[25]
Other than being young and male, there is evidently no standard type of
Western Muslim who acts on the belief that the West should be violently
attacked from within.
It is unlikely that any of the prevention programs currently
implemented in the West can affect the majority of those already
dedicated to jihad. As interventions rely on cooperation from family,
friends, or relatives (who serve as informants as well as contact-persons
to the suspects) and also from the actual suspected individuals, those
strongly committed to jihad are less likely to be affected by any form of
intercession. Hundreds of Western recruits who have joined ISIS have
remained loyal to its cause and have lost touch with their families, and
are, therefore, beyond the reach of such prevention programs.
Broadly speaking, state-funded initiatives that educate young people
to distinguish between "true" Islam and "misguided"
Islam have two significant pitfalls. First, massive campaigns against
radical Islamic ideologies elevate the status of these ideologies, in
essence putting them on an equal footing with more moderate beliefs and
practices. In Germany, for example, Salafis constitute less than 1
percent of the total Muslim population,[26] but the volume of
public-funded literature against their ideology creates, ironically, the
impression that Salafiya is a dominant affiliation.
Government-associated imams or
teachers who preach against radicalization may make such affiliations
more attractive.
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The association of anti-jihadist preaching with the state or with more
moderate Islamic organizations supported by the state presents another
dilemma. Just as a school nurse, who represents the establishment while
speaking out against smoking risks, may actually tempt rebellious
teenagers to experiment with cigarettes, so government-associated imams
or teachers who preach against radicalization may make such affiliations
more attractive.
Finally, the continuum between becoming a more devout Muslim and radicalization
is neither clearly defined nor understood by Western authorities. Given
the high level of anxiety in Western societies at the moment and the
general ignorance about Islam, mistaken accusations of radicalization are
almost inevitable. Such accusations, in turn, can push some Muslims
toward violence.
3. Defeating
the Islamic State
In his October 2015 speech, Cameron also stated that Britain would not
be safe until the Islamic State is defeated.[27] There are, indeed, good
arguments why ISIS's destruction would significantly decrease the threat
of Islamic terrorism in Europe over the long term. The Islamic State's
strongholds in the Middle East provide radical Muslims with training,
funding, and, most importantly, inspiration. Its major recruiting appeal
has been its overwhelming success—unmatched in the annals of modern Arab
jihadist groups—in establishing Muslim rule over a vast territory. While
other radical groups have had similar visions of grandeur, ISIS
actualized them through its conquests. Tarnishing its triumphal image
could lessen its appeal for some.
In the short term, however, the complete destruction of the Islamic
State may actually exacerbate the threat. By all estimates, thousands of
European Muslims have been trained in ISIS camps and are part of its
fighting forces. In 2015, the International Centre for the Study of
Radicalization at King's College London estimated that 4,000 Western
Europeans have joined either the Islamic State or Jabhat al-Nusra in Iraq
and Syria. One third have either died or left the conflict zone. These
include some 1,200 fighters from France and some 1,200 from Germany and
England.[28] If
the Islamic State is destroyed, at least some of its fighters will find
their way back to their homelands, armed with field experience, motivated
by the same convictions that sent them to ISIS, and out for revenge. It
is also possible that Libya and other countries where ISIS has
established strongholds will transform into new grounds for massive
recruitment of Europeans.
Even if the last European recruits to the Islamic State were somehow
to be eradicated or contained, the threat of terror in the West is
unlikely to disappear altogether. In ideological and operational terms,
the attacks on Western soil by affiliates of the Islamic State do not
constitute a novelty. They did not start with ISIS and are unlikely to
die with it. For almost two decades now, well before ISIS came into
existence, hundreds of young Western Muslims have considered it their
duty as Muslims to violently attack the West from within. The cornerstone
of this concept was encapsulated in Osama bin Laden's declaration on the
establishment of The World Islamic Front for the Jihad against the Jews
and the Crusaders back in February 1998, which ended with a religious
edict calling upon all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies,
serviceman and civilians alike, wherever and whenever possible.[29]
It is clear that this religious edict has been largely rejected.
Nevertheless, it has appealed to those who, since 2001, have conspired to
attack Western targets. To plan religiously-motivated terror attacks,
they did not need to meet with bin Laden personally nor be financed or
trained by his henchmen. It sufficed that they were impressed with the
premise that the West was at war with Islam, and the only way to
effectively defend Muslims was to transfer that battle to Western soil.
Policy
Recommendations
A troubling reality emerges from this analysis. None of the projects
discussed have the potential to reduce significantly the threat of
terror, and some aspects of these policies may prove counterproductive.
More efforts should be exerted in learning why thousands of young Western
Muslims are violently radicalized and in evaluating the efficacy of
existing programs. But it is unlikely that additional studies will
provide any single instantaneous remedy. And as seen in Paris, San
Bernardino, and most recently Brussels, Orlando, Nice, and Berlin, the
West cannot afford to wait.
In the short term, Western governments must slash opportunities by
focusing on intelligence and security measures. Security operations in
Western Europe have tended to oscillate between extreme reactions such as
closing down entire cities in the aftermath of attacks to periods of
complacent negligence. Instead, the middle-ground of a steady and calm
state of alert and action should be established. This middle-ground
should include, most importantly, tightening controls in public areas.
The death toll and emotional effects caused by the takeover of a train, a
subway, a ferry, a museum, or a theater by an ISIS cell are no different
from those caused by the commandeering of a commercial airplane, but all
these venues are extremely vulnerable and penetrable as are other forms
of mass transportation.
Soft targets must be secured by
well-trained, armed guards, equipped with metal detectors and
authorized to inspect personal belongings.
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Soft targets of this kind must be secured by well-trained, armed
guards, equipped with metal detectors and authorized to inspect personal
belongings. Landmarks of great symbolic importance that attract mass
crowds—for example, the Eiffel Tower, or the Chiesa di Santa Maria delle
Grazie in Milan—must be protected by two tiers of security to minimize
the risk of an effective attack (the latter, appallingly, is currently
not secured at all). The Israeli experience since the 1990s has
demonstrated that, while costly, such measures are economically feasible,
meagerly injure privacy, and have a positive psychological effect on the
public's sense of security. Besides, the cost of a crisis involving
hundreds of victims will be far higher.
Over the long term, more consideration and focus should be dedicated to
the deep-rooted origins of the jihadist phenomenon in the West, and new,
more audacious approaches to countering it should be formulated and
applied. On the political and diplomatic fronts, Western governments
should turn their attention from the consumers of radical ideologies to
the providers.
The Saudi religious and political establishment plays an ambivalent
role vis-à-vis violent radicalization. On the one hand, it leads and
inspires theologically-grounded campaigns against al-Qaeda, the Islamic
State, and other jihadist groups. On the other, it has served as the main
financier and propagator of the notions that non-Muslims are inferior to
Muslims; that Muslims are bound to segregate culturally from non-Muslims
and Islamize the West; and that the liberal West is a corrupt, helpless
civilization on the verge of collapse.
In strategic terms, it is astonishing that a militarily weak kingdom,
whose existence hinges in substantial ways on the continued support of
the United States, should serve as the main sponsor of radicalization
that destabilizes Western societies. U.S. and European Union policies
should, therefore, be confidently informed by a simple truth: The West
can survive without a Saudi alliance, but the kingdom will not last a
year without U.S. military support. The kingdom's responsibility for
breeding radicalism in the West should be underscored publicly and
regularly, and the House of Saud should be pressured to reform its ways
by all means possible. It must substitute its ambivalent policies for
either unequivocal support for integration-minded agendas, or better
still, a complete retreat from its campaign to influence the minds of
Muslims in the West.
Other allies of the United States that directly and indirectly support
radical affiliations in the West, including Qatar, should be treated
similarly. Countries that serve as transits for terrorists must be warned
that their negligence could bear harsh diplomatic consequences.
There is an equal need for clearer guidelines and for actions to match
rhetoric in the West. Western governments without exception have never
fully clarified what specific radical notions they deem beyond the pale
of legitimacy. Authorities need to be provided with the flexibility to
address nuanced situations, but once limits on inflammatory rhetoric and
teaching are decided upon and made public, they should be strictly
observed and applied. David Cameron's strong rhetoric, for example, has
not been matched by action. British legislators have never explicitly
stipulated, for example, whether disavowing non-Muslims or teaching that
they should be hated based exclusively on their religious beliefs is
acceptable in the eyes of the law.
Lastly, in the ongoing battle for hearts and minds, some thought needs
to be given to the implication of home-grown Islamic terrorists becoming
the focus of the public discourse on Islam in the West. Islam is most
often discussed in the media in the context of terror. So much is said
about ISIS, and rightly so; yet so little is said about Indonesia's
democratic transformation, for example, which is as important. Young
people search for role models to look up to and imitate. Heroes help
build their characters and motivate them for a life of positive
contributions. But other than professional athletes, notably soccer
players, few Western Muslims have been portrayed in the Western media as
heroes and not all young people are attracted to sporting culture.
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One
tool to combat radicalization of Muslim youth is to present alternative
role models to those contemplating jihad. Aziz Sancar (front center), a
Muslim, Turkish-American professor at the University of North Carolina,
won the Nobel Prize in chemistry, presented by Swedish King Carl Gustaf
(right) in 2015. Stories like Sancar's can serve as inspiration for
young Western Muslims for what they can achieve in liberal, pluralistic
societies while maintaining their faith.
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This in turn means that the violent heroes' culture cultivated by
ISIS, with its promise of meaning and glory in this life and eternal
paradise in the afterlife, has faced meager competition in the West. In
December 2015, a Muslim, American-Turkish scientist, Aziz Sancar, won the
Nobel Prize in chemistry. Sancar's story could serve as an inspiration
for millions of young Muslims across Europe and the United States for
what they can achieve in liberal, pluralistic societies while maintaining
their faith. Sadly, he has not gained a fraction of the attention that
British-born Jihadi John (Muhammad Emwazi) received before being killed
in a drone attack.
To explore and trumpet the success stories of Muslim minorities in the
West is not an act of political correctness. It is a reflection of a
diverse reality that deserves more attention from Western politicians,
journalists, and academics. In the on-going fight against
jihadi-Salafi terrorism, the worst may yet be to come. It is clear that
some of the main policies of Western governments are not only of limited
efficacy but also, possibly, counter-productive. New long- and short-term
policies should be introduced to avert catastrophe.
Uriya Shavit is associate
professor in Islamic studies at Tel Aviv University and author of Shari'a and Muslim Minorities (Oxford
University Press, 2015). Sören Andresen is a law graduate from the
University of Münster and holds an M.A. in security and diplomacy studies
from Tel Aviv University. He works as a legal trainee for the Higher
Court of Berlin and specializes in radicalization in Europe.
[1]
"Tory Party Conference 2015: David Cameron's
Speech in Full," The Independent (London), Oct. 7, 2015.
[2]
Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The
Homegrown Threat (New York: New York Police Department, Intelligence
Unit, 2007), pp. 16-85.
[3]
Alexander Heerlein, "'Salafistische' Moscheen—Ort des Gebets oder
eine Brutstätte für Dschihadistische Muslime?," in Gefährliche
Nähe: Salafismus und Dschihadismus in Deutschland, Michail Loginov
and Klaus Hummel, eds. (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014) p. 169. The term
Salafi implies in this context adherence to the teachings of the Saudi
Wahhabi religious establishment. In a descriptive-empirical sense, Salafi
is understood today in the European-Muslim context as Wahhabi-oriented;
not all Salafi mosques are supported financially by Riyadh, but all
preach the Wahhabi version and adhere to the jurisprudence and theology
promoted by the Wahhabi religious establishment.
[4]
See, for example, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Ibn Baaz, "al-Wala wa-l-Bara
wa-Ahkam al-Kuffar," in Fatawa al-Balad al-Ḥaram (Cairo:
Matktabat at-Tawfiqiya, n.d), pp. 174-5; Sheikh Uthaymin, Muslim
Minorities (Hounslow, U.K.: Message of Islam, 1998), p. 20; Saalih
bin Fouzan al-Fouzan, Al-Wala wa-l-bara: Allegiance and Association
with the People of Islam and Eeman and Disassociation and Enmity with the
People of Falsehood and Disbelief in Islam (Ipswich: Jam'iyyat Ihya
Minhaj as-Sunna, 1997), pp. 13, 24; Ahkam at-Ta'amul ma'a Ghayr
al-Muslimin (Riyad: Dar Kunuz Ishbilya li-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzi, 2009),
p. 20.
[5]
See, for example, Abdur Rahman Mahdi, Martyrdom in Jihad versus
Suicide Bombing (London: Islamic Knowledge, 2010), pp. 48-9.
[6]
See, for example, "Combating 21st Century Violent
Extremist Terrorism: ISIS, al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syria—A Must Read: The
Islamic Salafi Position towards Extremist Insurgencies in Light of
Quranic and Prophetic Teachings," Salafi Publications (Birmingham,
Eng.: The Salafi Bookstore, n.d.); Abdul Adhim Kamouss, "Wer sind die ISIS?"
Sept. 28, 2014, accessed Sept. 15, 2015.
[7]
Authors' interview, Imam Nur ad-Din Abu Abdullah, Masjid Daar us Sunnah
Islamic Centre, London, Oct. 7, 2015.
[8]
Author interview, Imam Nasir Isa at an-Nur Mosque, Berlin, Aug. 1, 2013.
[9]
"Prevent Strategy," Home Department, presentation, U.K.
Parliament, June 2011, pp. 34-5.
[10] Authors'
interview with Katrin Strunk and Gordon Jensen, Interior Ministry of Nord
Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf, Oct. 13, 2015.
[11]
Robert Lambert, "Empowering Salafis and Islamists against al-Qaeda:
A London Counterterrorism Case-study," Political Science and
Politics, Jan. 2008, pp. 31-5.
[12]
"Counseling | De-radicalization | Network," Hayat
Deutschland, Berlin, accessed
May 26, 2016; "German program triggers international
de-radicalization network,"
Deutsche Welle (Bonn), Sept. 3, 2014; The National Post
(Toronto), Apr. 4, 2014.
[13]
"Demokratie leben!"
Berlin, Apr. 2015.
[14]
For criticism, see, Akif Sahin, "Kampf gegen "Islamisten":
Bundesregierung setzt auf mehr Prävention," Jan. 10, 2015.
[15]
Authors' interview, Katrin Strunk and Gordon Jensen, Interior Ministry of
Nord Rhine-Westphalia, Düsseldorf, Oct. 13, 2015; authors interview, Dirk
Sauerborn, Intercultural Affairs, Nord Rhine-Westphalia police,
Düsseldorf, Oct. 13, 2015.
[16]
"Prevent Strategy," Home Department, presentation, U.K.
Parliament, June 2011, p. 7; Paul Thomas, Responding to the Threat of
Violent Extremism: Failing to Prevent (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), pp.
3-6, 96-117; Floris Vermeulen, "Suspect Communities—Targeting
Violent Extremism at the Local Level: Policies of Engagement in
Amsterdam, Berlin and London," Terrorism and Political Violence,
Nov. 2013, pp. 294-5.
[17]
"Prevent Strategy," p. 26.
[18] International
Business Times (New York), Nov. 15, 2014.
[19] International
Business Times, Oct. 8, 2015; The Sun (London), Oct. 9, 2015.
[20]
"Countering
Violent Extremism," U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, D.C., May 24, 2016; "Safe
Spaces: An Updated Toolkit for Empowering Communities and Addressing
Ideological Violence," The Muslim Public Affairs Council,
Washington, D.C., accessed May 26, 2016, pp. 8, 16-9.
[21] Lasse
Lindekilde and Mark Sedgwick, Impact of Counter-Terrorism on
Communities: Denmark Background Report (London: Institute for
Strategic Dialogue, 2012), pp. 28-9.
[22]
Shahram Akbarzadeh, "Investing in Mentoring and Educational
Initiatives: The Limits of De-Radicalization Initiatives in
Australia," Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, Jan. 2014,
pp. 455-8; "Countering
Violent Extremism," Australian Attorney-General's Department,
Barton, accessed May 25, 2016.
[23]
Authors' interview, Dirk Sauerborn, intercultural affairs officer with
the Nord Rhine-Westphalia State Police, Düsseldorf, Oct. 13, 2015.
[24]
Heerlein, "'Salafistische' Moscheen," pp. 155-82.
[25]
Kamaldeep Bhui, Nasir Warfa, and Edgar Jones, "Is Violent
Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, Migration, Poor Self-Reported
Health and Common Mental Disorders?" PLOS One (San
Francisco), Mar. 5, 2014.
[26]
"Salafistische
Bestrebungen," Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution), accessed Feb. 5, 2016.
[27]
"Tory Party Conference 2015: David Cameron's
Speech in Full."
[28]
Peter R. Neumann, "Foreign
Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan
Conflict in the 1980s," International Center for the Study of
Radicalization, Kings College London, Jan. 26, 2015.
[29] Al-Quds
al-Arabi (London), Feb. 23, 1998.
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